Addis Declaration: And the Mediators Laugh nonchalantly (2-2)

Abdullah Ali Ibrahim

The Rapid Support Forces scored two unmatched gains upon signing the Addis Ababa Declaration. The first is that Taqaddum has concurred with it in blaming the Islamists of the Ingaz regime and the remnants, for starting the war. Secondly, the Declaration removed the embarrassment of being “integrated” into the Armed Forces in the expected military reform. The preamble of the declaration stipulated that the war broke out to block the path to the December 2019 revolution. One does not need much intelligence to recognize these who blocked the path before the march of the revolution. The statements of Rapid Support Forces “RSF” and “Taqaddum” together agree that the remnants are the culprits in igniting the war through cunning to eliminate the revolution and restore their defunct regime. “Taqaddum” statement on December 29, 2023 attributed to the Armed Forces the failure to respond to IGAD’s call for a meeting to negotiate to end the war initiated by the remnants. They are the ones who ignited this war in the first place, and are calling for its continuation out of fear that a peaceful negotiated solution will result in resuming the democratic path, achieving the goals of the glorious December Revolution, and eliminating their agenda: the return of the tyranny and corruption regime led by the National Congress Party.
One wonders why the declaration included a paragraph stipulating the formation of a credible committee to uncover the facts about who started the war. In its preamble, the declaration failed to be patient enough to see the outcome of its committee which it recommended forming to investigate the facts about the outbreak of war. This is what we call “palpation after slaughter.” I do not know, with the situation as it is, what will tempt the Armed Forces to accept the Declaration of Taqaddum, which not only burdened them with the responsibility of igniting the war, but also accused them of waging a war of proxy, not for its own sake, but on behalf of the remnants.
The second exceptional gain of the “RSF” is that its Declaration has eclipsed the specter of “integration”, that is, RSF integration, into the Armed Forces. This is a position that Hemedti was not late in denouncing, even during the period of rule of Ingaz State. He said frankly that day that RSF is not an armed movement that will be integrated into the army when its powers expire. On the contrary, it is another army whose composition, tasks, and organization were issued by law from the People’s Assembly in 2017. You will find that the clause of Taqaddum and “RSF” Declaration is strangely devoid of the term integration, while it was the original in the framework agreement that the army and “RSF” signed in December 5, 2022. The ongoing war even erupted as conflict between the Armed Forces and the “RSF”, upon the discussion of the military reform, over the terms of integrating the RSF into the Army.
You will find that the principle of integration has totally evaporated in the drafting of the Addis Ababa Declaration on Military Reform, but also that the People’s Armed Forces have become a term about the multiplicity of armies that will find their dissolution in the establishment of a national professional army. The Declaration stated that the upcoming military and security reform processes after the war will deal positively “with the currently existing establishments, provided that these processes lead to reaching a single professional and national army that represents all Sudanese according to the criterion of the population census and the army shall be brought under the civil authority.” Thus, as the declaration says, we put an end to “the phenomenon of multiplicities of armies (the Armed Forces, the RSF, the police, and the intelligence services) outside the single national professional army.”
Look at how the Armed Forces, which were supposed to open their doors to integrate “RSF” into them, became an army in the ranks of “RSF.” Thus, “Taqaddum” accepted “RSF” an eligible army on an equal footing with the Armed Forces. It saw in their presence together a multiplicity of armies that was inconsistent with the establishment of a professional national army. The wording of the recent Addis Ababa declaration echoes Hemedti’s consistent position, which he expressed, and did not deviate from. What is required for him is the establishment of a new army, not the existing Armed Forces integrated into the “RSF” and armed movements. He said in a statement on August 23, 2023, that the necessity of establishing and building a new Sudanese army that “reflects the diversity of Sudan” must be recognized. He previously said on July 25, 2022 that a single professional army should be formed to “reflect Sudan’s diversity.” In the phrase of “Taqaddum” Declaration which states “according to the criterion of the population census,” there is an echo of what Hemedti used to say about an army that reflects “Sudan’s pluralism,” or its diversity.
The last article by Dr. Abdul-Rahman Al-Ghali has dwelt on an absolutely forbidden matter in the “Taqaddum” speech, which is that it must deal with the National Congress and the Islamists (the remnants) in its mediation efforts to end the war. At present they don’t even exchange greeting, and contrary to this situation, Al-Ghali, who is believed to be keen Taqaddum’s supporter, called for amending the Declaration by involving the National Congress and the Islamic Movement, i.e. the remnants, in efforts to stop the war. He said that when Taqaddum accuses them of igniting war, the war will not stop without them being accompanied in negotiations for the purpose. Al-Ghali did not accept Taqaddum negotiations with the “RSF” while the remnants excluded. “RSF,” in his statement, was flooded with remnants, many of whom were in RSF military and political leadership. If Taqaddum excluded the remnants, aware of their crimes and violations during the era of their state, then why would it turn a blind eye to the crimes and violations of the “RSF” during the Ingaz and afterward, and sit with it to negotiate peace while refusing accord the same treatment for the remnants?
Ms. Rasha Awad, a leader in Taqaddum, strongly denounced this call. She said that it is absurd for the forces in “Taqaddum” to disagree about sitting with the remnants or exclude them. The remnants, in her belief, understand only two languages: weapons and the to be subjected to isolation forcing them to be modest and consider themselves partners in this homeland, not its masters, or its custodians. It seemed that she agreed with Al-Ghali in an unexpected way. She said “like Al-Ghali, those calling for sitting with the remnants “do not make any effort to persuade (Kizan) (the remnants) to lower the flag of war and the eradication speech, and to deposit any down payment that makes the call to sit with them, not infringing with the minimum limits of self-respect.”
It would, of course, be impossible that the remnants respond to what Rasha asked, without sitting with them just in the way Ghali has said. In fact, Rasha herself may have presented the strongest arguments at all for sitting with the remnants to end the war. She described their mastery in the political and military fields as such that there is no way for peace to pass through their gates. She said that they control “the army, infiltrated the Rapid Support, and infiltrated the political parties.” If the remnants enjoy such power, according to Rasha’s accounts, then their exclusion by the advocates of stopping the war, is rather a call for the continuation of the war until the last remnants are eliminated.
The press conference held at the end of the meeting between “Taqaddum” and “RSF” in Addis Ababa made the Declaration worse. The presser attended by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of the RSf, was not a press conference, but rather a political night in which he not only broadcast his political line against the Armed Forces, but also unfoundedly challenged the military strength of General Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan. It was met with clapping and upon progressing laughter from the audience, who came forward after paragraphs of Hemedti’s sermon, when he criticized Al-Burhan making him lose his temper in comments, after the conclusion of that gathering. Al-Ghali said that “for the first time he has seen a mediator applaud the speech of one of the parties to the conflict that it wants to resolve.” Accordingly, in his understanding, Taqaddum, with such a press conference, left the Armed Forces no choice but to refuse to meet with them. The mediation became “useless”, or as the Sudanese say in their proverb, “a vine in broth”.