Ariadne’s Thread: Addressing the Challenges and Critical Reforms for the “Jeddah Platform” to Bring an End to the War in Sudan
Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
On May 29, 2024, the United Nations envoy for Sudan, Ramtane Lamamra, launched his second visit to Sudan.
Ramtane Lamamra, a 71-year-old Algerian diplomat, was Algeria’s foreign minister twice before: from 2013 to 2017 and again from 2021 to 2023. He also held a long-standing position within the African Union and chaired the “African Union Peace and Security Council” from 2008 to 2013. Lamamra also served as the African Union’s High Representative for Silencing Guns in Africa and served on the High-Level African Mechanism for Sudan and South Sudan from 2018 to 2021, under the chairmanship of former South African President Thabo Mbeki.
Given this extensive diplomatic background and experience, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed Lamamra as his personal envoy to Sudan on November 21, 2023, to lead UN efforts to ending the war there. This appointment followed the termination of the UN’s special political mission in Sudan, “UNITAMS,” after pressure from the Sudanese government.
Lamamra’s visit coincided with an announcement by U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller of a phone call between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Sudanese Army Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan on May 28. The statement indicated that al-Burhan and Blinken discussed the urgent need to end the conflict in Sudan, facilitate unimpeded humanitarian access, including cross-border and crossline aid delivery, protection of civilians, and de-escalation of hostilities in El Fasher, North Darfur.
Remarkably, during this phone call, the resumption of negotiations on the Jeddah Platform was a key topic. Since the outbreak of the conflict on April 15, 2023, the Jeddah Platform has been the sole officially declared negotiation forum bringing together the warring parties: the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The first round of the Jeddah Platform was launched on May 6, 2023, under joint Saudi and U.S. sponsorship. Prior to its suspension in November 2023, the platform saw eleven ceasefire agreements between the combatant parties. Nevertheless, these truces were consistently overlooked, and violations and heightened assaults became the norm immediately following each signing.
On May 11, 2023, the Jeddah Platform witnessed the signing of the “Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan.” The declaration underscores the commitment of the signatories to protect civilians, address humanitarian needs, and reaffirm adherence to international humanitarian law. The declaration includes stringent commitments, encompassing the following:
1. Continuous Protection of Civilians: Ensuring the safety and well-being of civilians at all times, including allowing safe passage for civilians to leave areas of active hostilities on a voluntary basis, in the direction they choose.
2. Refraining of Disproportionate Attacks: Committing to refrain from any attack that may be expected to cause incidental civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated and taking all feasible precautions to avoid and minimize civilian harm.
3. Evacuation of Civilian premises: aiming to vacate urban centers, including civilian houses, and prohibiting the use of civilians as human shields.
4. Respect for Critical Infrastructure: Commit to vacate and refrain from occupying, as well as to respect and protect all public and private facilities, such as hospitals and water and electricity installations, and refrain from using them for military purposes.
5. Prohibition of Child Recruitment and Arbitrary Detention: Refrain from the recruitment of children and the use of children in hostilities and preventing any engagement in forced disappearances or arbitrary detention of civilians and refrain from any form of torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, including sexual violence of all kinds.
To the end of a comprehensive list of humanitarian obligations that are not different from the provisions of International Humanitarian Law and the four Geneva Conventions, which establish the norms of the law of war and regulate the behavior of combatants during armed conflicts.
These principles should have been fundamental and pre-existing obligations, not necessitating reaffirmation through a new declaration. However, events over the past year demonstrate that these commitments have not been consistently honored. Violations persist, including the continued occupation of civilian properties by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Recordings of militia soldiers threatening original homeowners of never attempting to come back and claiming ownership of these houses in the context of their war to end the state of 1956 stand witness to that. Furthermore, throughout the past year, the militia has persistently imposed sieges and starvation blockades on vast residential areas. Notably, Tuti Island has been under siege since June of last year, with militia elements preventing its inhabitants from leaving. Other affected areas include Elfitihab, Bant, and neighborhoods in Wad Madani city among many other areas. The violations escalated to deliberate deprivation of water and living necessities, as witnessed recently when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) seized the “Golo” reservoir—the sole water supply for the besieged city of El Fasher. RSF militiamen closed the water supply pipelines before joint forces managed to regain control of the reservoir. A similar scenario unfolded in large parts of Bahri city, one of the three cities comprising the capital, Khartoum. Since the conflict erupted, the RSF’s occupation of the main water purification plant in Bahri has led to severe water shortages.
The attacks on residential areas extended to villages in the Gezira state, where a campaign of terror, killings, and systematic displacement continues unabated. Even internally displaced persons (IDP) camps were not spared from militia assaults. For instance, the camps of Kalma and Abu Shouk, located in North Darfur state, faced attacks and destruction by the RSF, repeating the tragedy of forced displacement experienced by their inhabitants. Meanwhile, the RSF continued to use residential areas and civilian facilities as shields, while the army persisted in aerial bombardments of militia positions, often disregarding the human cost and destruction incurred.
In summary, the Jeddah Declaration, signed between the army and the RSF, has not translated into tangible improvements for civilians. The humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan continues to worsen, making it the most pressing contemporary humanitarian crises. The latest round of the Jeddah negotiations, held at the end of last year, saw the inclusion of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) alongside Saudi and U.S. mediation efforts, expanding the forum’s scope beyond previous boundaries.
Despite the negotiating platform’s suspension since December 4, 2023, discussions about its resumption continued, with proposals to include and involve additional sponsors, particularly Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, to maximize inclusivity and influence over the warring parties. However, since then, there have been numerous changes and significant developments in the Sudanese war, which could potentially impact the ongoing efforts to resume the Jeddah negotiating platform to end the conflict.
In addition to Lamamra’s appointment as UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to Sudan, which came close to the last round of negotiations, the United States appointed Tom Perriello as Special Envoy to Sudan on February 3, 2024. This appointment coincided with the resignation (or perhaps dismissal) of the US ambassador to Khartoum, John Godfrey, from his position (or from the US State Department altogether, as some circles are repeating). Ambassador Godfrey’s diplomatic and political moves within Sudan in the period leading up to the outbreak of the war had contributed significantly to the increase in polarization that led to the ignition of its fuse, according to many observers of Sudanese affairs. Godfrey, supported by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, continued the same approach and policies of polarization after the outbreak of the war, which contributed to a great extent to its further escalation, as well as providing institutional political impunity to the “Rapid Support Forces” militia for the violations committed by its members.
The appointment of Perriello and the removal of Godfrey signaled Washington’s recognition of the failure of its previous policies in Sudan and their negative role in exacerbating the situation there since the October 25, 2021, coup. However, despite his efforts to distance himself from the legacy of Godfrey’s previous policies, the new envoy, Perriello, has not yet presented any new directions, policies, or proposals regarding the solution in Sudan, at least not in a public manner. Instead, he seems engrossed in conducting extensive consultative meetings with diverse Sudanese sectors, departing from the political patronage, client-making, and political directives that typified previous policies.
Perriello’s delay in presenting new directions or policies is not only attributed to his immersion in these consultations, but also to the hidden conflict within the corridors of the US State Department, between the old guards led by Molly Phee, who insists that the envoy work under her supervision, report to her, and receive his work instructions from her, and wants him to continue the same old policies with minor modifications, and a large group of Sudan experts in Washington who are supported by a large and influential coalition in the US capital that includes members of both major parties in the US Congress who support Perriello’s independence from Phee and demand that he be given the resources he needs for his work and that he be supervised directly by Secretary of State Blinken.
While this may seem like a mere administrative or procedural difference, it reflects the nature of a deeper disagreement within the corridors of the US State Department between bureaucratic State Department officials and career diplomats like Phee and Godfrey on the one hand, and those who hold political appointments like Perriello, who is appointed from the corridors of the ruling “Democratic Party” and who have held similar diplomatic positions by political appointment in the past, such as Personal Representative of President Obama to the Diplomacy and Development Review Committee from 2014 to 2015, and Special Envoy of the United States to the Great Lakes Region from 2015 to 2016, and was also an elected member of the US House of Representatives for Virginia’s 5th District from 2009 to 2011. It is enough to understand the extent of the impact of this disagreement that Perriello, despite four months since his appointment, has not yet been able to complete the appointment of his office staff or assistants due to Molly Phee’s control over the resources and powers needed to do so!
On the other hand, among the changes that have taken place since the suspension of the Jeddah negotiating platform are:
The Sudanese government’s announcement on January 20, 2024, that it would freeze its membership in IGAD. This came after the participation of Hemedti, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, and a delegation from the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FFC-CC) coalition, headed by former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, in the IGAD summit held in January. IGAD had prepared and announced at the end of December that both Burhan and Hemedti had agreed to hold a direct meeting under its auspices to negotiate a ceasefire in Sudan in early January. However, IGAD later apologized for holding the meeting, citing technical reasons that prevented Hemedti from reaching Djibouti, the planned venue for the meeting. However, it emerged that Hemedti and the FFC-CC coalition had preferred to hold their joint meeting in Addis Ababa on January 1 and 2, 2024, and to sign the Hamdok-Hemedti political agreement on January 2 in Addis Ababa, cutting off the way for a direct meeting between Burhan and Hemedti. This will add a new complication to the presence of IGAD as a mediator in the platform, in addition to other objections to its expansion and the addition of other parties in the first place.
The holding of a secret meeting between delegations from the army and the Rapid Support Forces in Manama during the period of the suspension of the Jeddah platform. This meeting, which was shrouded in secrecy, was arranged under the auspices of Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United States, as well as the participation of the African Union. However, the Manama negotiations were not a success, and upon closer examination, their outcomes were nothing more than an attempt to return to the power-sharing equations that prevailed in the period before the outbreak of the war.
The most significant and dangerous development since the suspension of the Jeddah platform has been the expansion of the war zone, the increase in violations and crimes committed, and their devastating humanitarian consequences. In recent days, coinciding with calls to revive the Jeddah negotiating platform, there has been an intensification of the RSF militia attacks on the city of Al Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, in an attempt to seize the last remaining state outside its control in the Darfur region. The scale of the violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces against civilians has doubled, and even displaced persons’ camps and the burning of villages in the areas surrounding the city have not been spared. Observers on the ground report that there is widespread and valiant popular resistance in conjunction with Sudanese army forces and the joint forces of the Darfur movements to defend the city from falling into the hands of the Rapid Support Forces. This resistance is fueled by widespread popular fear of the fascist practices that characterize the behavior of the Rapid Support Forces and the fate of the Masalit community in the city of El Geneina and its surroundings when the state of West Darfur fell into the hands of the militia in June 2023. A report by the UN Darfur Panel of Expert stated that the number of Masalit victims killed by the Rapid Support Forces militia on an ethnic basis ranged from 10,000 to 15,000 in a few days, while hundreds of thousands of citizens were displaced to refugee camps in neighboring Chad.
The Rapid Support Forces militia is seeking to control Darfur in order to declare an independent government similar to Haftar’s government in the Libyan scenario. As the villages and countryside of Al Gezira State, which fell into the hands of the militia at the end of last year, continue to witness a steady increase in the attacks of repression, killing, displacement, and looting carried out by the Rapid Support Forces on them, in addition to the deliberate destruction of agricultural land and the destruction of infrastructure in the state in a way that aims to displace and disperse its people, which in turn increases social polarization and reduces popular support for efforts to stop the war.
The recent developments in Sudan have cast a shadow over the prospects of reviving and reactivating the Jeddah platform, but they have also heightened its importance. Nothing has hindered and complicated the efforts to stop the war in Sudan more than the multiplicity of platforms and international initiatives, which need to be unified and coordinated. However, the Jeddah platform also needs more than that, mainly a restructuring of its structure and objectives within a logical framework that prioritizes urgent priorities and gradually moves beyond them. It also requires a clear and binding enforcement mechanism for previous agreements, especially regarding citizens’ personal and private property, their homes, and the like. This includes a gradual approach from:
Guaranteeing the protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance as obligations that are not subject to political calculations or negotiation. And by enforcing these obligations through international law, particularly the principle of the responsibility to protect, the lives, safety, and livelihood of Sudanese civilians cannot be compromised by the approach of appeasing both parties to the conflict and those carrying arms.
Establishing a technical ceasefire, which is not associated with any further political agreements, and reaching an agreement on it, which includes the identification of enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. The East African Standby Forces, an African Union mechanism with the requisite authority to supervise and enforce a ceasefire on a long-term basis, can play a significant role in this context.
Subsequently, the preparation for a comprehensive political process that establishes the groundwork for the end of the Sudanese war would start. This preparation entails the endeavor to mending the social fabric and mitigate the intensity of political polarization that is exacerbated by efforts to monopolize civil discourse and civilian representation. This political process should be civil and foundational, addressing Sudan’s crises without the involvement of armed forces. The political process is a purely civilian process, and the parties to the armed war should not participate in it. As the negotiation of a ceasefire and the separation of forces are purely military affairs, with civilians having no involvement in them except in terms of humanitarian arrangements, the political process is a purely civilian matter that should not include the participation of the warring parties.
However, the Jeddah Platform’s trajectory was also adversely affected by the eagerness of civilian politicians to engage in it and prioritize their political agendas and ambitions for power over the objectives of ending the war. This was the case in Manama, which resulted in its complete breakdown.
This process, which could find success through the Jeddah Platform, requires complete transparency, close popular monitoring, and mechanisms for justice and accountability. These mechanisms should be endorsed and supported by the victims themselves, rather than intermediaries who claim illusive representation. It should not replicate closed-door scenarios of previous political deals such as the Framework Agreement that preceded the war. Furthermore, the goals of the entire process must be clearly defined in advance and aligned with the slogan raised by the Sudanese revolution “The military to the barracks, and the Janjaweed to disband”. This slogan is implementable and achievable in the context of a comprehensive and structural reform process for Sudan’s security and military sector. It transcends mere integration and demobilization programs, as often oversimplified by mediocre political actors. Instead, it constitutes a fundamental and essential part of the broader reform effort aimed at modernizing and revitalizing Sudan’s state apparatus to align with contemporary realities.
Clarity and transparency within the Jeddah Platform will ensure that the call to “Stop the War” in Sudan becomes a rallying cry for all Sudanese, rather than a mere political banner that fails to halt the ongoing conflict since April 2023.
