The Big Losing Deal (3-7) Hemedti-Burhan Coup, and the Russian Role

Al-Tijani Abdel Qader Hamid
July 23, 2024

Although Lt.Gen. Hemedti and the leaders of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) were partners in the coalition government headed by Hamdok, and although the FFC leaders were – outwardly – offering him their obedience and loyalty, Lt.Gen. Hemedti did not trust them or reciprocate their respect. Rather, he stated on more than one occasion that the leaders of the (Forces of Freedom and Change) do not have real popular support, and do not have experience in running the state.
He used to mock their management of the economy (particularly the Ministry of Trade), saying about them – sarcastically – “A man with gold goes begging”, then he threatened them and warned them, saying: “We don’t care, it’s none of our business, what do we have to do with them, and again, we tell the one-eyed man that he has one eye”, and sometimes he even went so far as to say that they receive their salaries from foreign embassies.
The differences between the two partners escalated, until the matter reached the point of rupture, so he (and Lt.Gen.Burhan) turned against them on October 25, 2021 – thus putting an end to the ruling coalition. It was not surprising that the first internal decision taken after the overthrow of Hamdok’s government was to freeze the file of the dispersal of the sit-in – the file that was keeping him awake at night. The other decision – which will have serious consequences and will turn Sudanese politics upside down – is to turn one’s back on the Quartet and head towards Russia. Did Russian intelligence know about the coup? Was Lt. Gen. Hemeti working in coordination with it – as some indicators indicate? The first indication of Russian involvement in the coup is the close cooperation previously between the Wagner Foundation and the Rapid Support Forces RSF in addition to the Russian leadership’s interest in Lt. Gen. Hemeti personally; President Putin invited him to visit Moscow.
On February 23, 2022 (just three months after the October 25, 2021 coup, and one day before the Ukrainian war), Lt. Gen. Hemeti made an announced visit to Russia accompanied by a large delegation that included the ministers of finance, agriculture and mining. At that time, President Putin was preparing for his war against Ukraine (February 24, 2022), and was looking for a foothold on the Red Sea, to facilitate communication with his points of support in the African interior, and to ensure the flow of gold and minerals to fill the shortage of foreign currencies due to the ban imposed on its exports.
It was not hidden from observers that Russia was – and still is – seeking by all means to enhance its influence in the entire African continent, as it has security, military and economic projects and agreements that were based on the “Wagner” Foundation, which has previous connections with the Rapid Support Forces RSF affiliated with Hemeti. Russia was – and still is – coveting investment in the mining sector in Sudan, a sector in which the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces RSF is expanding through the Al-Junaid Company and others.
Hemeti’s visit to Russia sparked a great deal of resentment in American and European circles. However, the Russian desire to establish a military base on the Red Sea was not new, but rather dates back to previous understandings and agreements.
The Sudanese governments have been hesitant about this matter, which prompted the Russian government to search for an adventurous leadership figure, and found its prey in Lt. Gen.Hemeti, and began to bet on him for reasons similar to those of the former Sudanese president, and similar to the reasons that made the Quartet interested in him. The Russian government – based on the experience of the Wagner Group in Sudan – saw Hemeti as a type of adventurous “circumstantial” figure who could go against the norm.
In the context of this geo-economic conflict between Russia and Western countries, arrangements were made for the October 25, 2021 coup, in which Western sources were quick to say that Russia had a role, although official reports denied this and indicated that the visit came within the framework of normal cooperation on regional and international issues.
Hemeti’s coup against Russia
But less than half a year had passed since the October 2021 coup, when Lt.Gen. Hemeti took a position that contradicted his first positions.
He began to apologize for orchestrating the coup and assumed the character of a democratic reformer.
The gap between him and Lt.Gen. Burhan began to widen, and between him and the leaders of the (Freedom Forces) who he had been insulting until recently became closer. Then he began to praise the youth of the revolution and talk about the democratic transition. Here we have the right to ask: What happened to Lt. Gen. Hemeti in those six months that followed the October 2021 coup?
How can this political coup be explained in relation to his first military coup? Did he suddenly become convinced of the democratic transition? Did he begin to feel that there were real security concerns surrounding him?
Were some pressures and threats exerted on him? Asking these questions – and trying to answer them – will help us understand the sudden shift that occurred in Lt. Gen. Hemeti’s path, and in the path of Sudanese politics after that.
Many observers have noticed this major shift in Hemeti’s positions after his visit to Moscow, and they have interpreted it in various ways.
Some hasty journalists rushed to say that Hemeti’s statements are worthless because some of them copy others. And that, like their predecessors, they reflect the state of confusion, chaos, confusion, psychological turmoil and internal conflict that he is experiencing, making him indecisive about his position, bias and correct reading of the current political scene and future directions.
Others assumed that perhaps Hemeti had been struck by a “conscious awakening”, so he began to review himself and reconsider his political positions, and he began to lean towards engaging in the path of the coup against the coup, and handing over power to civilian forces on a golden platter.
All of these are, in our estimation, dreamy assumptions, because repentance for coups and a shift towards the democratic path are psychological and intellectual processes that do not happen suddenly. However, assuming that they do happen, the person who repents for the coup will immediately submit his resignation and will not entrench himself in his “presidential” position from which he plotted the coup, nor will he move towards further militarization; such as increasing the number of recruits, and bringing in more tanks, rocket launchers, and anti-aircraft missiles – as Lt. Gen. Hemeti was doing at that time. Which makes us lean toward a third assumption – and we seek to prove it in this article. The assumption is that Lt. Gen. Hemeti was not subjected to a conscience awakening, but rather was subjected to a process of threats and blackmail from the major powers hostile to Russia.
In addition to the threat, he was offered a “big deal” that was consistent with his political ambitions (according to the carrot and stick policy).
He succumbed to the blackmail and accepted the deal. As a result, a major shift in his positions appeared, and was reflected in the studied statements issued about that strategic “deal” that those powers concluded with him.
Since he was unable to disclose this “deal” (except to the inner circle of Daglo family), his statements seemed to some journalists to be a “hit,” but the unfortunate truth is that it was the journalists who were “hitting.” So what was the deal? We continue.