‏The Big Losing Deal (7-7) ‏Conclusion: Disengagement from the RSF

‏Al-Tijani Abdel Qader Hamid
‏July 30, 2024

‏Just as there is sometimes in fiction a “story within a story”, so too in politics there may be a story within a story, and a war within a war. Perhaps it has become clear from previous articles that there is a major regional-international war taking place in Sudan, and within this war other wars are taking place. In terms of the major war, it is clear that Sudan has become one of the arenas of the Cold War between Russia and the United States, a war that has shifted in the view of some observers from the field of ideology and political geography (the geo-politics) to the field of economic geography (the geo-economics).
That is, Russian penetration into Africa (in search of gold and minerals in exchange for wheat, fuel and weapons), and positioning on the Red Sea coast in the east and the Libyan desert in the west, will be met with a counter-trend by the United States and its allies in the region and some European countries (particularly Britain and France). The bet on Lt.Gen. Hemeti and the insistence on transforming the Rapid Support Forces RSF into a ruling military force in Sudan is only part of the counterattack plan, and it is undoubtedly a war within that greater war.
‏But the previous narration of events also made it clear that the Group of Four’s bet on Lt.Gen. Hemeti and the Rapid Support Forces RSF did not achieve its goals. Although Lt. Gen.Hemeti was able to play the role of an effective “circumstantial” figure in moving events according to the plan drawn up for him, and despite the military power and regional and international cover he had, his attempts failed for four unexpected reasons.
The first of these reasons is Lt. Gen. Hemeti’s early exit from the battlefield and from the command cabin (even the representatives of the major supporting countries were unable to communicate with him); the second reason is the effective presence of Lt. Gen.Burhan in the position of military and political leadership; the third reason is the cohesion of the Sudanese Armed Forces SAF and the absence of defections in them (as was expected); and the last reason is the armed forces’ recapture of Marawi Airport, thus cutting off the opportunity for the Rapid Support Forces RSF to receive urgent military supplies by air from the sponsoring countries – as they expected.
‏This early military failure of the rapid coup plan led to a greater failure when the Rapid Support Forces RSF sought to transform the issue from a limited coup against the leadership of the armed forces SAF and elements of the former regime into a comprehensive war against the Sudanese people – occupying their homes, looting their property, and forcibly displacing them.
In light of this situation, some elements of the Group of Four began to modify their initial plan and their discourse, replacing it with what could be called a “gradual disengagement” strategy; that is, leaving a distance between themselves and the atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces RSF (without completely abandoning their goals), and raising the slogan of protecting civilians and delivering relief to refugees through dialogue between the two generals.
In this context, Jeddah Extraordinary Conference (May 3, 2023) emerged, under Saudi-American sponsorship (with the UAE and Britain in the background).
Although the conference did not want to condemn the atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces RSF in its final statement, it affirmed that the conflict in Sudan is an internal affair, warned against foreign interventions, stressed the need to preserve state institutions, and emphasized the inevitability of political dialogue. )1) It is noted that the commitments included in the declaration issued by the conference mostly focus on matters that fall on the shoulders of the Rapid Support Forces RSF such as the need to distinguish between civilians and combatants, allowing civilians to leave combat zones, refraining from seizing private and public facilities, and refraining from looting and plundering. (2) It is noteworthy that the conference did not establish practical mechanisms to force either party to implement what it committed to, while the UAE and Britain did not show interest in its outcomes or its implementation mechanisms, which indicates that some kind of disagreement may have begun to emerge within the Quartet.
‏Then the atrocities of the Rapid Support Forces RSF intensified, and the voices of protest rose, forcing the Quartet to speak again about the importance of dialogue. Since dialogue requires a second party opposite the armed forces SAF it is necessary to search for another more acceptable “circumstantial” figure to replace Lt. Gen. Hemeti, whose political and military value has been waning at an increasing rate.
In this context, the sudden appearance (on October 26, 2023) of the Coordination of Progressive Democratic Forces (Taqaddum) can be understood to replace the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which had also lost its political value. It was not surprising that the new “circumstantial” figure was Dr. Hamdok, and that Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper presented him as a savior leading a Sudanese civilian front to stop the war, after the military front led by Lt.Gen.Hemeti failed (3). However, the Group of Four did not resort to the strategy of “gradual disengagement” out of compassion for the Sudanese people, or a desire for democratic transformation, or to abandon its basic goals, but there are many other factors that forced it to do so. Among these factors: the rise of voices denouncing the horrific violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces RSF wherever they marched, and the damage they inflicted on civilians, as they displaced no less than six million of them, and killed no less than 15 thousand, in addition to the fact that the killing, looting and destruction they practiced reached a level that the media and international human rights organizations could not remain silent about.
The assassination of Governor Khamis Abdullah Abkar, the governor of West Darfur, on June 14, 2023, and the mutilation of his body in front of the world was the beginning of a wave of global discontent.
The High Commissioner for Human Rights began to condemn the crime, and the United Nations began to call for an investigation, which forced the US Secretary of State to announce that – based on a careful review of the facts and a legal analysis – he had concluded that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces SAF and the Rapid Support Forces RSF had committed war crimes. (4) Among these factors: the military advance of the Rapid Support Forces RSF and their seizure of a number of states, along with the relative weakness of the armed forces, led to the crystallization of a popular current that rejects the brutality of the Rapid Support Forces RSF and is ready to mobilize and fight alongside the armed forces SAF .
The strength of this current has increased with the response of elements of the youth (Islamists and others) and of sectors of the angry public who were expelled from their homes, stripped of their property, and forced to migrate and flee. This current may form a civil-military front that makes it difficult to establish an alternative regime led by Lt. Gen. Hemeti – as the Quartet had hoped. .
‏Among these factors: the military support received by the Rapid Support Forces RSF which enabled them to seize a number of Sudanese states, in addition to the political and legal cover provided by the Group of Four, may make the Sudanese Armed Forces SAF seek in turn to get closer to the Russian-Iranian-Turkish axis, a rapprochement that Lt. Gen. Hemeti had previously sought and the Group of Four had spent a great deal of money to thwart.
Events later proved that this fear was completely justified; despite all that the Group of Four had done to deepen the gap between Sudan and Russia, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Russian Presidential Envoy to the Middle East (Mikhail Bogdanov) arrived in Port Sudan (April 29, 2024) at the head of a delegation from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense that lasted for two days, and at the end of his visit he affirmed that the Sudanese Sovereignty Council TSC is the authority that represents the Sudanese people and their republic.
And Malik Agar, Vice President of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council TSC visited Russia (June 3, 2023) at the head of a delegation from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Minerals.
Among these factors is that the disagreement between the Group of Four has widened regarding the overall situation in Sudan, as the United States and Britain have begun to differ with the Emirates regarding the course of the war in Sudan, and are urging it to contribute to ending the war by stopping the supply of weapons to the Rapid Support Forces RSF . Some members of the US Congress have begun to pressure the Biden administration to take strict measures against the Rapid Support Forces RSF .
The Conservative government in Britain fell and was replaced by a Labor government that was not part of the deal concluded with Lt. Gen. Hemeti, and it is not known whether it will abide by it or not. As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it has become closer to the Russian-Iranian-Chinese side, and is no longer as enthusiastic and driven towards the Rapid Support Forces RSF
as the Emirates. If the military position of the Rapid Support Forces RSF diminishes (with the absence of its commander and the killing of many of its field commanders), and the visions and positions differ among the group of four, voices may rise demanding the opening of the file of crimes committed by the Rapid Support ForcesRSF during the recent war (especially the massacres committed in Geneina and Gezira ), and the military support provided by the UAE to the Rapid Support Forces RSF in clear violation of the previous Security Council resolution may be added to that.
The UAE may find itself alone in the position of accusation, which in this case will force it to one of two options: the option of retreat, so it agrees to gradually withdraw from the “big losing deal” as others have withdrawn, and the other option is to harden its positions – relying on its abundant financial resources, so it brings in mercenaries from neighboring African countries, and pumps blood into the veins of the Rapid Support Forces RSF that have been afflicted with drought. If it goes in this direction, and some of its international allies go with it, it is expected that we will witness the emergence of a “new modified deal” – a deal in which Lt. Gen. Hemeti disappears and is replaced by one of his brothers from the Rapid Support Forces RSF and the Lt. Gen. Al-Burhan (or one of his deputies) on behalf of the armed forces. In this case, Lt.Gen. Al-Burhan will find himself in the same “closed room” in which Lt. Gen.Hemeti was previously placed, and files will be brought out to him, and the carrots and sticks that were previously offered to Hemeti will be presented to him, with the addition of some spices that will make it easier to swallow the new modified deal.
In such a situation, the difference between the real leader and the circumstantial leader will become clear.
Features of the solution
Some readers ask me: Do you have – after this long round of searching – a solution or features of a solution to get out of this crisis?
The answer is that I am not close – as is known – to any direct executive position – political or military – so the secrets are revealed to me and the scene becomes clear to me.
All I have is information that is published and available to everyone, and all I intended to do was to provide an explanation for this information that may help others – as it helped me – in a deeper understanding of the events.
However, if it is necessary to risk proposing a solution, I thought it might be appropriate to first look at the solutions that ordinary Sudanese people resorted to in the face of the attack launched against them by the Rapid Support Forces RSF (April 2023-) and then conduct a dialogue with them about them in order to address the mistakes in them, and whether there are better solutions than them.
The first thing to note in this regard is that the solutions that the general public resorted to are not much different from the way they previously faced the “Corona pandemic” – that is, trying to coexist/then escape/then persevere and resist. It is noted that in all these stages they resorted to the option of “individual salvation” – whether they chose to coexist, escape or resist.
Let us then look at these options.
The option of coexistence:
When the incident occurred on April 15, the general public viewed it as a kind of internal military conflict between the Rapid Support Forces RSFand the Armed Forces SAF , or as if it were an internal conflict between two foolish generals, and it did not concern the general public except as the general national losses that result from military coups – both failed and successful – concern them.
The solution, in the view of these citizens, was summed up in the theory of “coexistence”; that is, we must watch and wait for whoever the consequences will be. When the Rapid Support Forces RSF began entering citizens’ homes in the first weeks of the war, and establishing “bases” in alleys and rooftops, the proponents of this theory thought that this was a kind of temporary preventive “tactic” that the Rapid Support Forces RSF resorted to for fear of air raids carried out by the armed forces. Some of them began sharing food and drink with them. When the Rapid Support Forces RSF began tracking down some citizens and detaining them in unknown locations, the proponents of this theory thought that the Rapid Support Forces RSF were only looking for elements of the former regime, or military and security elements.
However, this view quickly became clear when the Rapid Support Forces RSF began showing their fangs, forcing women to hand over gold (and other valuable things), and forcing men to hand over their car keys and leave their homes.
Those who refused to leave were brandished weapons, made to lie on the ground, whipped, slapped in the face, and cursed in front of their sons and daughters. It was then confirmed that the Rapid Support Forces RSF were not only waging a war against the armed forces SAF but also against the citizen, and that they were following a scorched earth policy, occupying homes, stealing property, raping, and killing, in a brutal and insane war that did not differentiate between a disabled woman or an elderly man, or between supporters of the old regime and its opponents. Then the option of “coexistence” completely fell, and ordinary citizens resorted to the option of escape and exit. Was that a useful option?
The option of escape:
When the war intensified, and state institutions began to collapse, unarmed civilian citizens realized that coexistence with the Rapid Support Forces RSF was not possible – as we mentioned.
Most of them resorted to the policy of “Saad escaped, Saeed perished”; that is, individual escape from the grip of the Rapid Support Forces RSF .
The Sudanese left in groups and alone on what resembled death trips. As a result of this policy, the total number of Sudanese fleeing the war reached about ten million (some in safe Sudanese states and some in neighboring countries). In this great wave of flight, the fortunes varied. Those who sought refuge in Egypt, for example – most of whom were from the middle classes – had financial savings or remittances from their expatriate children that enabled them to live a decent life. Those who sought refuge in Chad (about 900,000) were even more unfortunate because most of them were women and children.
They ended up in the camps of Adre and Erdimi and continued to suffer from a lack of water, food and medicine, and endured bitter humiliation and degradation.
As for those who sought refuge in Ethiopia, they were like those seeking refuge from the frying pan in the fire. They sought refuge in a UN camp seeking protection, only to be attacked by local armed Ethiopian militias, who looted, killed and expelled them into the forests and jungles. The gist of these bitter experiences is that the option of individual salvation by seeking refuge in camps in neighboring countries is an option of extreme necessity, and those who seek refuge in it may discover that returning to their Sudanese homeland and dying there with honor is better than dying a humiliating death in the Ethiopian and Chadian camps. If the option of coexistence is not possible, and the option of escape is useless, is it possible to find a better option? What about the option of legitimate community defense?
Community Defense-Project: The idea of ​​​​project civil defense is not a new invention, as much as it is an old idea that many societies that faced devastating, destructive wars of extermination resorted to. The idea basically requires (first) that the members of the targeted society be convinced that the war raging over their heads is not just a limited political-military conflict at the leadership level, but rather a comprehensive grassroots war targeting them all, regardless of their ethnic components and political currents; and it requires (second) that the members of the concerned society be certain that the path of “individual salvation” is not the path to survival, since no matter how strong and courageous an individual is, he cannot confront armed forces that do not hesitate to kill alone. And it requires (third) that everyone be certain that the war does not stop by surrendering to an aggressor who came displaying his spear, but it will stop if he knows that his cousins ​​”have spears,” as the poet of the Old Testament, Hajal bin Nadlah Al-Bahili, said. (Fourth) requires that everyone believe deep down that the war is their war, and that there is no military person to fight it on their behalf, or an international envoy to stop it out of pity for them. In such circumstances, the slogan “The share is the homeland” should be raised, so that the will of civilians and military, right-wingers and left-wingers unites, so that their war and peace are one, and there is nothing behind that but downfall. If these general principles are confirmed, and the majority of Sudanese see that they should move in this direction, then that means that they have begun to set foot on the path to a solution – despite the bitterness and hardship involved. This may be the first time that a Sudanese person finds himself facing a test not only in patriotism, but also in manhood.
As for the envoy of the major international powers, he can of course move the Quartet and the African Group, hold a conference after the conference, send or stop humanitarian aid, oppose any condemnation directed at the Rapid Support Forces, or any proposal to put them on the list of terrorist organizations, or to impose sanctions on the countries that supply them with weapons, but he will not be able – in the end – to break the will of the Sudanese people. There is no power except with God.
Footnotes:
(1) Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, May 3, 2023. www.aawsat.com/home/article/4309301
(2) (To learn about the main points of the Jeddah Declaration (May 11, 2023), see Al Jazeera Net). net/news/2023/5/12
(3) (Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, October 26, 2023. www.aawsat.com
(4) (See the press interview with Beth Van Schaak (US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice) www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-war-crimes.Dec 14