Let’s assume the armed forces are remnants of a bygone era: Who authorized the Rapid Support Forces to rid us of them? What experience do they have in this regard?
Abdullah Ali Ibrahim
In a recorded speech, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, hinted that remnants of the previous regime (referred to as the “floul”) were behind the Sudanese Armed Forces’ abstention from attending the Geneva meetings. This accusation risks breeding mistrust in the army on one hand, and on the other hand, attributing too much power to the remnants, giving them more significance than they deserve.
We call this overestimation of the floul’s influence in our political discourse “the Kizan delusion.” This delusion strips every entity except them of any ideology, interest, or determination to achieve their goals. In his brief recorded speech last Wednesday, Perriello complained about those playing negative roles and rushing to impose political solutions even before the war stops. He claims they do this because they know they lack popular support among Sudanese people. This, according to him, is opportunism, as they seek personal gain while the Sudanese people suffer in their most weakened state.
It is said that you don’t need to teach an orphan how to cry, and similarly, you don’t need to teach Sudanese people how to fight against Islamists.
The Islamists, or the floul, regardless of what we say about them, have been part of the national project within the structure of politics and society since the 1940s. They are not a “cellular” group of Muslims from all corners, like what we see in Al-Qaeda or ISIS, waging war on society and the state.
They, with their pride in being a group with a national project aided by preaching and politics, did not embrace Sayyid Qutb’s ideas in the 1960s, which called for the Islamic group to withdraw from society, strengthen their beliefs through education, and wait for the day they return as conquerors. Instead, Sudanese Islamists refused to submit to the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood to avoid yielding to external influences. The international organization even declared Hassan Al-Turabi, the Secretary-General of Sudanese Islamists, an apostate as a result. Moreover, the Sudanese Islamists do not even agree with being called “Muslim Brotherhood.”
The Islamist project clashed with competing national projects, such as socialism and Arab nationalism, during democratic periods in arenas like trade unions, student associations, and unions of farmers and intellectuals. These forces also clashed with them during periods of autocracy and eventually overcame them. The Islamists did not last long when they supported President Jaafar Nimeiry in theocratic years of his rule. They fell before him, by his hand, and his regime itself ended with the 1985 revolution.
The Islamists did not respect the returning democracy, which made them the third-largest party in the country. They overthrew it in 1989 and ruled for 30 years, ending with their ousting in April 2019. They were removed by a peaceful popular revolution with determination. They had not only withstood America’s sanctions, which closed the world’s doors to them with sanction after sanction, but also the armed forces of the marginalized Sudanese regions, aiming at them in Darfur and beyond. They became remnants by Sudanese will.
Anyone familiar with the history of the Islamists and the Sudanese people would refrain from patronizing them by pointing out plots they might fall for. This situation is one where it is said, “Give the bread to the baker.”
Setting conditions before negotiations is not unprecedented. In the army’s conditions for sitting down to negotiate, as we have seen, there is much that deserves attention to ensure good negotiations before satisfying the army.
