The American Plan B in Sudan (2 – 2)

The Americans aim to achieve their goals by opposing any form of victory, specifically by disrupting Sudan’s growing relationships with Eastern international allies. This suggests the possibility that a deceptive and imposed offer was presented to the Chairman of the Sovereign Council and Commander-in-Chief during his time in New York. The offer was likely based on acknowledging the Sudanese army’s victory over the rebel militias, aiding in their defeat both in the field and through external condemnation. However, the offer would likely hinder and delay strategic Russian deals and expanded cooperation with Iran and China. The key question that arises is: Does this American offer include the complete eradication of the militias or merely ensuring victory over them to enter new negotiations with improved terms for the army? This highlights the danger of falling into the trap of American offers, which have historically achieved the same goals through different means.

The United States has realized the difficulty of reaching a settlement between the army and the rebel militias unless it is based on the army’s victory. Therefore, they have shifted their focus to framing this victory in a way that prevents the total destruction of the militias, which remain one of their primary tools in shaping Sudan’s future.

So, what are America’s options in this complex Sudanese situation?

The answer is undoubtedly to turn the Jeddah Agreement on humanitarian issues into a new Trojan horse.

With the army’s position improving on the battlefield, the Sudanese leadership has made it clear that they are moving towards a military solution. The success of operations targeting key leaders of the rebellion and the continued flow of supplies to the army makes the end of the rebellion a matter of time. Should this be achieved in the Khartoum state alone, it would mark a significant conclusion. The U.S. is preparing to obstruct this by pressuring the Human Rights Council’s fact-finding committee to recommend deploying forces to protect civilians and impose an arms embargo across all of Sudan, not just Darfur. Additionally, they aim to extend the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor to cover the war that began on April 15. All of this would serve as leverage for the U.S. to reinitiate negotiations in Jeddah.

As the Sudanese army continues its large-scale offensive and succeeds in undermining the rebel militias’ belief in achieving any victory, the U.S. will return to the Jeddah platform. The Sudanese government had previously conditioned its return to negotiations on the implementation of the humanitarian issues agreement, which was drafted less than a month into the fighting. At that time, the militias were in a stronger position than the army, occupying all state institutions in the capital, Khartoum. The condition of the agreement was for the militias to vacate civilian homes and all state facilities, which naturally meant they would regroup in camps within Khartoum and other cities, awaiting the second phase of peace negotiations on power-sharing and political programs. It is well known that in such cases, international monitoring forces are usually responsible for overseeing this process, providing guarantees and protection to the rebel forces from army attacks. But is it acceptable for the militias to enjoy such protection under a ceasefire now? And is it reasonable or acceptable, after their involvement in atrocities against Sudanese citizens and their documented war crimes, for them to be eligible to sit in negotiations over power-sharing and the political trajectory of the transition?

It is important to note that the Jeddah Agreement on humanitarian issues was a necessary measure to protect the Sudanese people and institutions from destruction and to avoid the long-term consequences of the war. The militias and their foreign backers have crossed all bounds by killing tens of thousands of people, starting in Geneina and continuing across all of Sudan, forcing millions into displacement and humiliating the people with crimes of rape, enslavement, and abduction. The militias have also completely destroyed and looted the state’s economic infrastructure. As a result, all the reasons for the Jeddah Agreement have collapsed, and new imperatives have emerged: firstly, the need to completely dissolve the militias in line with the army’s commander’s decision, without any form of compromising settlement. Secondly, the pursuit of militia leaders and the countries that fueled the war, demanding reparations for Sudan and its people, and compelling them to rebuild what the war destroyed. Thirdly, the liberation of national decision-making to shape Sudan’s future by those who were not involved in the plot to dismantle the state by any means.

The detailed explanation of this situation illustrates how the implementation of the Jeddah Agreement could be the American Trojan horse to preserve the militias, which would otherwise be eliminated by the army’s victory and its restoration of control over Khartoum. The remaining operations would be to continue purging Sudan from the cancer that has ravaged the land. The warnings against returning to Jeddah now are more crucial than the previous warnings against bypassing the agreement when pressure was mounting on the army leadership.

Maintaining and sustaining military success requires an urgent articulation of the state’s vision for the next phase of the war, based on the following negotiation principles:

1.Any negotiation platform must be centered on the complete and final disbandment of the militias without any political compensation.

2.The future of Sudan and the arrangements for the transitional period are the sole prerogative of the Sudanese people, who will decide on this in a comprehensive national forum within Sudan, not outside it.

3.The state must present its security and military arrangements for the next phase, including the integration of armed groups that fought alongside the army into state institutions within a specified timeframe, in line with the security arrangements of the Juba Peace Agreement, with modifications to reflect the realities of the April 15, 2023, war. This should be accompanied by measures to protect social peace across Sudan, particularly in Darfur, to prevent negative consequences stemming from the rebellion and the actions of some tribal leaders. Efforts should be made to invest in the positive social movements emerging from tribal coordination groups, which have begun to form in Port Sudan, the temporary capital.

4.The military leadership must oversee the transitional period by forming an independent, non-ideological technocratic government with full authority to manage executive functions, free from military intervention, until a comprehensive national forum is held to decide the country’s future, including how power will be transferred and how state institutions will be reformed without external interference.

In conclusion, this writing aims to warn against the American and regional traps that seem to be taking shape in the dark rooms of New York. These traps are becoming apparent through enticements such as facilitating Egypt’s political alignment to reintegrate Sudan into the African Union, the organized bribes from IGAD urging Sudan’s return, and the sanctions on Kony Hamdan, which may escalate to the classification of the militias as a terrorist organization if necessary. Even the false media narrative claiming that the Sudanese army’s victory was due to the Egyptian army serves this purpose.

William Burns’ hypothetical offer, presented by the CIA director and his intelligence team, will likely be limited to confirming Sudan’s retreat from recent Russian agreements and its hesitance to move towards China and Iran. Once this is confirmed, Sudan will be left to drown in the short-sighted tactics of American maneuvering.

Awareness is our real battle. Breaking away from reliance on American promises is essential to victory and avoiding Sudan’s execution on the guillotine of deceit.

May God protect Sudan, its people, its army, and its institutions, and may He humiliate all those who oppose it.