The Third Anniversary of October 25: Legitimacy of Actions and the Government

Today marks the third anniversary of the October 25, 2021 measures in Sudan, during which the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, ousted Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdok and the Central Council of the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition, following intense conflicts between the military components at the time (the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces) and Hamdok’s government along with the Central Council faction. This was a pivotal turning point among the partners of the Constitutional Document, parts of which Burhan later annulled after the ouster.

The Sudanese public was divided over this step; some saw it as a clear coup, while others viewed it as corrective actions. The first group naturally called it a military coup, as it removed them from power. The second group argued that the military was a primary component of the transitional government, making it improbable for them to stage a coup against themselves.

The African Union deemed the move a coup and suspended Sudan’s membership, which remains frozen to date. However, current dialogues hint at the possibility of lifting the suspension, especially after the AU requested to establish an office in Port Sudan, headquarters of the current government, and the African Peace and Security Council recommended the suspension. An important delegation visit to Port Sudan earlier this month introduced unprecedented dialogue, which many see as a prelude to reinstatement.

Although some view the October 25 measures as directly tied to Sudan’s ongoing conflicts, it is essential to note that the Rapid Support Forces were a major partner in these actions. This report examines whether the events were the cause of Sudan’s current situation or if they marked a corrective start to save Sudan from dominance scenarios. Furthermore, we consider whether Hamdok’s allies, by challenging their removal, caused divisions within the military component, leading to dangerous polarization between the Rapid Support Forces and ousted officials on one side, and the army, civilians, and armed movements on the other. How constitutional were the October 25 actions, and what did they result in? What is their relationship to the legitimacy of the current government in power?

According to Dr. Nabil Adib, a leader in the Democratic Bloc and chair of the Sit-in Dispersal Committee, the October 25 actions resulted from sharp frictions between civilian and military components, fueled by economic turmoil at the time. Adib described the October 25 actions as a “coup” and undemocratic but believed that the Burhan-Hamdok agreement on November 21 could have stabilized the situation. However, the Forces of Freedom and Change rejected this agreement, demanding adherence to the Constitutional Document, which they claimed should not grant power to any specific civilian bloc. He argued that the lack of oversight bodies, primarily a legislative council, led to unchecked authority and that certain amendments to the document were needed.

Adib further clarified that the October 25 actions were not intended to abolish or bypass the constitution. Although the measures were flawed, reinstating Hamdok after them restored some governmental structure, though political disputes led to his resignation. He praised the military authorities for upholding the Constitutional Document for the transitional phase and emphasized the need for Sudanese civilians to reach an agreement on necessary amendments through Sudanese dialogue, reaffirming the current government’s legitimacy.

Political analyst Maki Al-Maghrabi described the October 25 measures as necessary, even if not corrective. He believed that appointing a prime minister after Hamdok’s resignation would have allowed for corrective decisions, an opportunity missed at that time but still available now. Al-Maghrabi argued that the real description of October 25, 2021, was a collapse of partnership rather than a coup, as the transitional period was initially based on an agreement between a military component and political factions, joined by armed (civilian-labeled) movements. He asserted that the October 25 events did not constitute a coup but were instead a response to internal collapses in partnership dynamics.