The Dilemma of Militarized Politics: Sudan’s War and Security Sector Reform

Since the outbreak of Sudan’s war in April 2023, the issue of restructuring and reforming the Sudanese military and security apparatus has become the most critical topic in the Sudanese political landscape. The raging war today is a direct consequence of the crisis of multiple official and semi-official military forces in the country, their political entanglements, and their pervasive influence on the state apparatus. The central issue that ignited this conflict was the integration of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

The Sudanese Armed Forces, with their long and storied history, have never been closer to the collective sentiment, emotional resonance, and widespread support of the Sudanese people than it is today. This unprecedented affinity and predilection stemmed largely from the ongoing confrontation with the RSF—an entity universally condemned as the more destructive and brutal actor in the current war. A litany of heinous abuses, including mass killings, sexual violence, displacement, and atrocities against civilians who, for the most part, had remained detached from the upper echelons of political strife, have implicated the RSF. These atrocities have transformed public perception, with many Sudanese now viewing the military as a guardian of their fundamental rights and a defender of their aspiration for a peaceful, secure, and stable existence. Alternative narratives and political disinformation employed to obscure this reality have largely failed, despite the political and media promotion it received from some civil political forces and some external parties—whether the United Arab Emirates or some Western diplomatic centers.

Nevertheless, this moment of public favor does not diminish the imperative to critically address the need for comprehensive reform and professional restructuring of the national armed forces. On the contrary, this alignment presents a unique and timely opportunity for a serious, objective, and results-oriented national conversation about military reform. Such a dialogue, at this time, possesses the opportunity to rise above the pitfalls of political opportunism, factional grievances, political score-settling, and personal or partisan ambitions. Rather, it can maintain the focus on prioritizing Sudan’s fundamental interests in order to cultivate a military institution that is both professional and apolitical while also serving as a foundational element for Sudan’s stability and democratic transformation.

Although security sector reform was one of the fundamental and essential goals of the December 2018 revolution that ousted the Islamic regime of President Omar al-Bashir, the lack of serious efforts to realize this goal—along with the deliberate obstruction of practical steps to implement it—has exacerbated the crisis. Furthermore, the ambitions of certain political forces and figures to exploit alliances with armed groups for their own gain have added fuel to the fire. Nevertheless, restructuring and reforming Sudan’s military institution remain on the forefront priorities toward achieving stability and lasting peace in Sudan.

The history of Sudan’s aborted popular revolutions and repeated military coups makes one thing clear: the survival of any democratic system in Sudan hinges on a thorough and fundamental reform of the military institution. This reform must include its complete restructuring and professional requalification, enabling it to perform its national duties free from political interference and economic utilization. The continued postponement and reluctance to commence this process have led to the tragic bloodshed the country witnesses today—a tragedy that not only threatens Sudan’s territorial integrity and displaces its people but will also erode the foundations of political practice in Sudan for very long time. The extreme polarization and opportunistic configurations, driven by the desire to seize power through armed influence, have sacrificed national stability at the altar of personal and factional interests.

The Chimera of Ideology and Military Power: A Corruptive Nexus

As in many countries, the roots of malaise in Sudan’s security and military apparatus are not sudden or coincidental but rather the cumulative outcome of decades of flawed intersections between ideology and the military institution. These flaws deepened and exacerbated under the reign of Omar al-Bashir.

Since the Islamist coup of June 1989, Sudan was ruled by an alliance between the National Islamic Front (in its various iterations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Charter Front, and later the National Congress Party) and the Sudanese military. This military institution, like many in post-colonial states, was shaped by a belief in its supremacy over civilians, asserting itself as a power above and beyond the state apparatus.

Over time, Bashir’s growing distrust of both components of this alliance led him to create private militias under his direct command to secure his throne of power. This gave rise to the Rapid Support Forces, which quickly evolved into a parallel army, overshadowing and rivaling the SAF.

The coalition between Islamists and the military was more than a mere political collaboration; it was an integrated system that embedded the military into an ideological project designed to dominate the state and reshape the Sudanese society along despotic lines. This partnership fostered a governance model rooted in exclusion and violence, simultaneously weakening state institutions and corrupting the military itself.

This precipitated a two-pronged corruption:

  Corruption of Ideology: Islamist ideology lost its intellectual foundation, shifting from engagement through reason and persuasion to coercion and violence as its primary tools. Detached from intellectual rigor, it became hollow and superficial, relying on grand, self-referential narratives devoid of real substance. This ideological vacuum manifested as a dogmatic obsession with imposing its preordained vision on reality, often through brute force, rather than engaging with the complexities of a changing world, analyzing and reacting to them. This was particularly evident in the waning influence of Islamic intellectuals and scholars, who were eclipsed by dogmatic and radical voices in Sudan.

  Corruption of the Military: The military, stripped of its professional integrity and neutrality, was transformed into an instrument of political power. Instead of serving its rightful role as the impartial defender of national security, it became a politicized actor, competing with civilian forces for control over political, economic, and social arenas. More gravely, the military’s involvement in lucrative economic activities related to Sudan’s natural resources, such as large-scale agricultural projects and gold mining, has resulted in systemic corruption of the military, further distancing it from its norms as an official duty and a governmental service. Moreover, the ideologization of the long-standing civil war in South Sudan as a religious “Jihad,” which ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, also contributed to the spread of the ruling Islamic ideology within the ranks of the army, further undermining its professionalism and political neutrality.

This phenomenon, which stems from the destructive combination of ideology and military power, is not exclusive to Sudan. The repercussions of this poisonous combination are exemplified in the rise and fall of communism and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the instability and failures of the post-colonial African socialism and Pan-Africanism, the catastrophic collapse of the Ba’ath models in Iraq and Syria, the anti-communism and nationalism military junta in Argentina (1976–1983), and the Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, among others: the hollowing out of ideology and degrading the military.

In Sudan, this dynamic had further dire consequences. As evidenced by Sudan’s history of civil wars, particularly during Bashir’s reign, this dynamic led to the normalization of armed expression of political demands, undermining the state’s authority and peaceful, civilian political practices, and creating an environment where violence became the default language of politics. The spread of the civil war in South Sudan and the outbreak of the war in Darfur, coupled with the proliferation and multiplication of armed demand movements, led to the state’s recognition of weapons as the primary tool of political practice. This was expressed through statements by its governmental and Islamist officials on more than one occasion. Then, it was no longer possible for the state and the rest of the political practitioners to deny that the regional political struggle movements use this tool to advance their political theses. In the absence of a rule that binds everyone, especially those in positions of power, imitation and borrowing of the opponent’s methods, regardless of their validity, becomes the norm. In the context of legitimate management, the state bears a greater obligation due to its sovereignty over society to strictly adhere to and enforce the rules and laws. When the deposed president Al-Bashir resorted to forming parallel militias, the disease spread more widely. The Rapid Support Forces militia was not the first, even in its initial Janjaweed manifestations, as Al-Bashir had previously used friendly forces (Paulino Matip’s South Sudan Defense Forces) during the civil war in South Sudan against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Carrying weapons and becoming a mercenary has become a means of earning a living by gaining political influence and harnessing it to reap economic gains. This escalated until the Rapid Support Forces militia, which Al-Bashir formed as a tool of violence and tyranny that aims only to protect his rule and lacks a political or social basis that justifies its existence, has become a major player in the field of politics and economy in Sudan.

The Post-Colonial Legacy: Illusions of Military Entitlement

In many Global South countries, militaries developed a misplaced sense of entitlement to govern, arising from their roles in anti-colonial struggles. These liberation movements, dominated by militaristic command structures, often carried over their authoritarian ethos into post-independence governance. One of the most perilous legacies of this military heritage is the widespread culture of unquestioning compliance and the demise of analytical mentality. This phenomenon permeates not only military institutions but extends throughout post-colonial societies, affecting political parties and civil society. There exists a tendency to place unwavering faith in the judgment of leaders, coupled with a reluctance to embrace change and engage in theoretical debate.

Sudan’s case was somewhat different. Independence was achieved not through armed struggle but through political negotiation led by civilian institutions like the Graduates’ Congress and national parties. However, the political elite’s inexperience, lack of a unified national developmental project and their divisive struggles for power created a vacuum that allowed the military to assert itself as a dominant political player through the means of political coups. Principles of civilian oversight of the military were disregarded, and the military emerged as the focal point that civil forces endeavored to ally with and sought to exploit in their pursuit of power. The military establishment was transformed and then normalized as a political stakeholder competing with political forces for power and management of the state apparatus, instead of its original nature as part of the structure of this apparatus.

The Toll of Military Coups

From General Ibrahim Abboud’s coup in 1958 to the Islamist coup of 1989 and beyond, Sudan has endured a series of military takeovers, each exacerbating the country’s political and economic instability. These coups established a pattern where the military became a tool for political factions to resolve disputes, often at the expense of national unity and democratic progress.

Since the first military coup led by General Ibrahim Abboud in 1958, Sudan has entered a spiral of military coups, where the military institution became a means to seize power. Abboud’s coup came as a result of a political struggle in which the parties involved resorted to the army to end the conflict. Despite Abboud’s attempts to distance his regime from political ideologies, he established the dominance of the military institution over the state apparatus, imposing central visions that originated from a narrow circle, far from popular participation. This effectively established the conceptual ideology of the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Abboud’s coup was just the beginning. Other military coups with ideological characteristics took place in Sudan, including Jaafar Nimeiri’s 1969 coup and its shifts from the left to the right, al-Bashir’s 1989 National Islamic Front coup, and other power-oriented and ideologically neutral coups like the October 2021 coup. These coups did not only cause political and economic devastation but also left a painful legacy of armed conflicts, the worst of which is the current war with the Rapid Support Forces militia.

During Bashir’s rule, the military institution underwent a systematic indoctrination process that made loyalty to the regime a substitute for competence. The mission of the army became no longer to protect the country from external threats; instead, it shifted to protecting the ruling regime and its ideology by suppressing the opposition. Later, fearing for his seat of power, Bashir’s regime sought alternative ways to defend itself, employing the same harsh methods that led to the proliferation of militias. This policy undermined the army’s neutrality, weakened its strength and professionalism, and effectively ended its monopoly of the armed force.

The ongoing conflict with the RSF clearly demonstrates the ramifications of this legacy, underscoring the pressing necessity for reform to reinstate the military’s professional integrity. This begins by relocating it from its current counterfeit position, external and superior to the state apparatus, to its intrinsic role and position as a vital and integral component of its structure.

What Sudanese people see in the army’s current battle against the RSF militia—despite historical context and because of the grave crimes perpetrated by the RSF against the people—is a glimmer of hope for the military to reclaim its national role and original mission of protection rather than guardianship. The Sudanese Armed Forces have never enjoyed greater support from the Sudanese public than they do at present. This prevalent sentiment highlights the pressing necessity to initiate an impartial process of reform, development, and modernization of the Sudanese military.

The military reform is not a standalone or separate process but must be part of a broader political project aiming to address the structural flaws of the state and its political practices. This involves redefining and reforming the military, along with other state institutions, as law-abiding public agencies that serve all citizens impartially, without dominating them and remain neutral in political affairs. It also involves criminalizing and safeguarding against any attempts to use them in a partisan manner.

Reform: A Non-Negotiable Priority

Military reform must be an integral component of a comprehensive political project aimed at addressing the structural flaws within the Sudanese state. A modern state is founded on a social contract that ensures the neutrality and independence of its institutions, while affirming the state’s exclusive right to exercise legitimate violence to protect all citizens without favoritism or bias toward any specific group or faction. Any deviation from this principle undermines the state’s legitimacy and transforms its institutions into tools of repression and tyranny.

This situation in Sudan is far from unique. Across the world, particularly in democratic transitions from prolonged authoritarian rule, security and military reform has been a cornerstone of stability. For instance, in Spain, the military was a key pillar of General Francisco Franco’s regime (1939–1975), playing a dominant role in politics and society with unwavering loyalty to the dictatorship. When Franco’s era ended and power transitioned to King Juan Carlos I, ushering in the path toward democratic transformation, the military remained a potent threat to political reform due to its extensive influence. In 1981, Spain faced an attempted coup d’état led by Antonio Tejero (the “23-F Coup Attempt”), a critical test for its young democracy. King Juan Carlos stood resolutely against the coup, declaring his unwavering support for democracy. His decisive action bolstered his legitimacy as a symbol of democratic transition and paved the way for gradual military reforms, a stand that Hamdok lacked post the 2021 coup in Sudan. The security sector reform in Spain struck a delicate balance between preserving democratic progress and enacting legal changes to curtail the military’s role in politics, while maintaining its essential capacity and power to serve the state. The steadfast commitment of the political leadership, exemplified by King Juan Carlos, was instrumental in the success of this transformation.

Similarly, Rwanda, in the aftermath of the genocide, undertook a thorough process of military rebuilding with reconciliation as its primary goal, ensuring robust civilian oversight of the armed forces. Colombia made significant efforts in restructuring its military and disarming armed groups following the 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In Chile, the transition after Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship (1973–1990) focused on reestablishing civilian oversight over the military through democratically elected institutions. In Argentina, President Raúl Alfonsín spearheaded a gradual security and military reform process to curtail the military’s political influence through legal mechanisms, following the traumatic period of the Dirty War (1976–1983) that saw thousands of disappearances.

These examples, among many others, underscore a universal truth: military and security reform in nations emerging from authoritarian regimes is not optional but essential. While such reforms often require time, extensive effort, and a careful balance between maintaining stability and diminishing the military’s unchecked influence, they are vital. Aligning the military with the principles of democracy and human rights is indispensable for achieving lasting stability and ensuring the integrity of state institutions. This task, though challenging, cannot be ignored in the pursuit of national progress.

Starting the process of reforming the military institution during the ongoing war may not be feasible. However, there is an undeniable urgency to launch an in-depth national dialogue on this matter. This discussion should transcend superficial solutions and aim for an integrated vision to establish a professional and national army. It is essential to reinforce commitment to this vision and its objectives while exploring the necessary tools and methods for implementing it in post-war Sudan. The production of this vision should transcend mere political entitlement and the pursuit of partisan political gains that stained previous discussions of the matter, such as those of the Framework Agreement. This is a necessity for the survival and stability of the Sudanese state, as evidenced by its history. This necessity should not be exploited for political maneuvering, settling personal vendettas, or the pursuit of political advantages. Instead, it serves as a crucial foundation for establishing stability in Sudan, where governance prioritizes the needs of the people and society rather than the dominance of the most powerful rifle or the longest spear, which is the pattern that has characterized Sudan’s political history since the invasion of Muhammad Ali Pasha.