How does the militia smuggle gold abroad?

A dangerous report published by the American newspaper The New York Times, prepared by Declan Walsh, revealed the involvement of countries and regional officials in smuggling gold belonging to the militia, which they extract from the Songu mines in the Raddom Reserve in South Darfur. The report, titled “The Gold Rush in the Heart of the Sudanese War”, traced the smuggling routes, the perpetrators, and the way the militia and its leader, the rebel Hamidti, entered the gold trade and how he transformed from a camel trader to a warlord in Sudan.

The war has shattered Sudan’s economy and turned much of the capital, once a source of pride, into piles of rubble. However, the gold trade is thriving. Gold production and trade have exceeded pre-war levels, according to official figures in a country rife with smuggling. In fact, billions of dollars worth of gold are flowing out of Sudan in nearly every direction.

Instead of using the unexpected profits to help the starving and displaced masses, the militia uses the gold to fund their fighting. It helps pay for drones, weapons, and missiles that have killed tens of thousands of civilians and forced over 11 million people to flee their homes. It is the prize that mercenaries, who have looted many banks and homes, have earned, making the capital now resemble a giant crime scene. Militia followers proudly boast about piles of stolen jewelry and gold bars on social media.

The New York Times describes the militia leader as a camel trader turned warlord. His forces grew powerful after seizing one of Sudan’s most profitable gold mines in 2017 (Jebel Amer). The mine became the cornerstone of a multi-billion-dollar empire that turned his armed group into a formidable force. Hamidti later sold the mine to the government for $200 million, helping him buy more weapons and political influence. However, this was not enough for the camel trader, and his ambition led him to war with the Sudanese army.

Hamidti’s pursuit of gold intensified after the war he planned broke out. In one of his attacks, he seized the mine he had sold to the government. Weeks later, his militia descended on the National Gold Refinery in the capital, stealing gold bars worth $150 million, according to the government.

The UAE and Gold

The UAE is stoking the fire of war. On the battlefield, it supports the militia, sending drones and powerful missiles in a covert operation under the guise of a humanitarian mission. But when it comes to gold, the Emiratis also help fund the opposing side. A UAE company, linked to officials from the royal family, owns Sudan’s largest mine, and delivers a large portion of the money to the war machine.

Motorcycles, trucks, and planes transport gold out of the country at every turn, crossing the porous borders with neighboring countries. Ultimately, most of it ends up in the UAE, the main destination for smuggled gold from Sudan, according to Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Along the way, the beneficiaries of the smuggling (criminals, warlords, intelligence chiefs, generals, and corrupt officials from various countries) take their share. Some now liken Sudanese gold to “blood diamonds” and other conflict minerals.

In a corner of Darfur largely untouched by the war, the militia has quietly built a vast and secretive gold mining operation, expanding into a project worth hundreds of millions of dollars annually, with the help of Wagner mercenaries. In the forests surrounding the Songu area, in the Raddom Reserve, tens of thousands of miners work in sandy pits in an area rich with gold, uranium, and diamonds. The mines provide rare jobs. The Songu mines are the latest branch of a massive family business run by the Al-Dagalo family, which began before the war.

When Hamidti seized the Jebel Amer mine, he became Sudan’s biggest gold trader overnight, channeling profits into a network of up to 50 companies that paid for weapons and mercenaries, according to the UN. Hamidti became so wealthy from gold that in 2019, he publicly offered $1 billion to stabilize Sudan’s faltering economy.

His company, Al-Junaid, later cemented his empire through gold and weapons, focusing on hundreds of square miles around Songu, with production across the region, according to eyewitnesses, satellite images, and documents obtained by the newspaper.

A secret report to the UN Security Council in November revealed that $860 million worth of gold was extracted from militia-controlled mines in Songu this year alone. The area has more than 13 active mining sites.

Journalists who visited the region this year reported that the militia was patrolling the Al-Junaid gold factory, with Russian employees behind high walls.

Sudan’s mines were a huge temptation for Wagner two years ago. Since then, new documents obtained by The New York Times have provided more details about Wagner’s partnership with the militia in diamond mining near Songu. The militia has a ready market for its gold in the UAE, where 2,500 tons of undeclared gold, worth an astounding $115 billion, were smuggled out of Africa between 2012 and 2022, according to a recent study by Swiss Aid for development.

Before the war, Hamidti used to fly his gold directly to the UAE, but after the war, he had to find new routes through neighboring countries.

On March 5th, a luxury plane landed in Juba on a mission to collect hundreds of boxes filled with illegal gold. Three people involved in the deal or familiar with it said the porters grumbled as they carried boxes of gold worth about $25 million onto the plane. Airport officials secretly kept a perimeter around the plane, which was prominent at the main airport. The plane that landed in Juba to collect the militia’s gold was not the typical plane used by many African smugglers.

It was a Bombardier Global Express, a long-range business jet registered in the U.S., with a long and suspicious history of smuggling. Seven months earlier, the plane’s pilot and flight attendant were arrested in Zambia shortly after landing another private plane. Zambian investigators who raided that plane said they seized five rifles, $5.7 million in cash, and 602 gold bars.

In contrast to that flight, this one went smoothly, perhaps because the deal involved a network of powerful officials from multiple countries who helped facilitate the route. The plane came from Abu Dhabi, with a brief stop in Uganda before landing in Juba. Though the plane could carry up to 15 passengers, only two were listed on the manifest, one being a relative of Hamidti and the other a senior Ugandan intelligence officer. The Ugandan official denied being on the plane to The New York Times. However, the three people involved in the deal or familiar with it said he was seen standing outside the plane while porters loaded the gold boxes.

Other regional officials seem to have also been involved in the deal. Two people familiar with the transfer said the gold came from Darfur via Wau City. It was flown to Juba on a passenger plane operated by South Sudanese intelligence. On March 6th, the plane landed in Abu Dhabi, just before 3 a.m., at the Al Bateen Executive Airport.

Fly Alliance, a Florida-based airline operating the plane, declined to answer questions about the flight, including who rented it.

The New York Times confirmed that the UAE is a major hub for the militia, using front companies controlled by Hamidti and his relatives to sell gold and buy weapons. The U.S. has imposed sanctions on 11 militia-affiliated companies, most of them in the UAE, often due to their connection to the gold trade.

The New York Times claimed that Emirati investors own a gold mine in Sudan called Kush, located 222 kilometers from Khartoum. The mine is ostensibly managed by a Russian executive, Boris Ivanov. In 2021, mysterious Emirati investors acquired the mine under the name Emerald Resources, a new company founded by Ivanov, and backed by a bigger player: Emirati National Security Advisor Tahnoun bin Zayed (brother of Mohamed bin Zayed). Emerald responded to the newspaper’s questions by stating that the company is owned by an investment group in Abu Dhabi, but they refused to name them.

A senior Sudanese official told The New York Times that Ivanov is listed in the Ministry of Minerals’ records as the owner of the Kush mine. However, Emerald denied this, asserting that Ivanov left the company last year and that the company is Emirati.

Many questions remain unanswered, and perhaps The New York Times report opens the door for these lingering questions.