Youssef Ezzat Mourns the Militia!

Dr. Muzammil Abu Al-Qasim

The analytical article written by Youssef Ezzat, the former political advisor to the militia leader, is one of the most significant and dangerous documents analyzing the current conflict in Sudan. Its importance stems from the fact that the author is highly knowledgeable about the inner workings and complexities of the militia, possessing a deep understanding of its political, social, and even military dimensions.

In his alarming article, Ezzat admitted that the militia is experiencing a dreadful state of chaos and security breakdown. He stated that the militia is suffering from a noticeable decline on all fronts, with its areas of influence showing severe security instability reflected in the spread of looting and violations of civilians’ rights. This breakdown can be analyzed through two main dimensions:

1. Loss of Popular Support – The field violations have undermined public confidence in the militia, especially in urban areas, which have suffered the most from looting and assaults. These violations have also tarnished the image of the leadership, portraying it as incapable of controlling its members, leading to increasing isolation from society.

2. Lack of Internal Accountability – Ezzat acknowledged that the absence of internal accountability has led to the rise of rogue groups operating beyond the direct control of the leadership, fostering a climate of chaos and making it difficult to restore order. He concluded that this security breakdown has weakened the militia’s ability to present itself as an organized and legitimate actor, generating negative polarization against it within local communities.

Ezzat also addressed the contradiction in the militia’s political rhetoric. The leadership has relied on a narrative focused on confronting the Islamists (“Kizan”), which initially gained temporary support from civil forces opposing the former regime. However, the presence of individuals affiliated with the Islamists within the militia’s ranks undermined the credibility of this narrative, exposing a fundamental contradiction between its slogans and actual practices.

Ezzat analyzed the impact of the war on the militia’s political priorities, noting that it has imposed new priorities on the leadership. Mobilizing tribal and social support has become more important than adhering to a civilian political project, reducing the political vision to a mere tactical tool.

He concluded that the absence of a coherent political narrative reflecting a clear future vision has led to a loss of popular support and exposed the militia internationally as an actor incapable of committing to principles of civilian transition.

Ezzat also tackled the problem of weak leadership and the multiplicity of decision-making centers within the militia. He noted that the militia suffers from a structural leadership crisis, manifested in the absence of a unified center for strategic decisions. This problem is evident in the overlap between the supreme leader (Hemetti) and his deputy (Abdul Rahim), which creates conflicting decisions and delays in responding to events.

He highlighted the negative influence of individuals surrounding the militia’s leadership, including family members and close associates, which has created complex dynamics that hinder decisive decision-making. Ezzat criticized the leadership for lacking long-term planning and strategic vision, relying instead on reactive decision-making without thoroughly analyzing future consequences.

Ezzat concluded that the absence of centralized leadership has negatively affected the militia’s ability to manage the war effectively, leading to conflicting decisions that weakened its political and military position.

In a particularly damning section, Ezzat criticized the militia leadership’s involvement in conflicting alliances with political and military forces. The most recent of these alliances involved adopting the “New Sudan” project. However, according to Ezzat, these alliances suffer from clear structural contradictions, conflicting with the militia’s familial and tribal makeup. The New Sudan project requires restructuring the militia into a national democratic institution, whereas its current structure is based on family leadership and tribal loyalties.

Ezzat criticized the militia’s leadership for treating alliances as temporary tools without genuine ideological or political commitment to the principles behind them. He concluded that the absence of a strategic vision for alliances and consistency in maintaining them has made the militia appear opportunistic, threatening the stability of these alliances and increasing political isolation.

Ezzat pointed out that the direct confrontation between the militia and the central state has reshaped tribal alignments in unprecedented ways. For the first time in modern Sudanese history, Arab communities have become divided between supporting the army and the militia.

Ezzat concluded that the conflict with the central state has contributed to the disintegration of traditional tribal alliances, deepening social divisions, and driving Arab communities in western Sudan back to their traditional environment and alliances with marginalized forces that were once used by the central authority to suppress them. He posed the critical question: Does the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have a clear strategy to protect the communities under its control and ensure their survival?

He answered that it does not, citing the following reasons:

1. Improvisation instead of strategic planning.

2. Contradictions between political rhetoric and actual practices.

3. Absence of unified leadership for decision-making.

4. Reliance on unsustainable temporary alliances.

5. Inability to overcome the legacy of the past.

In short, Youssef Ezzat, Hemetti’s former advisor, essentially declared the political and military project of the militia dead and buried. He condemned it as chaotic, undisciplined, lacking credibility, and devoid of political vision and cohesive leadership. He portrayed the militia’s social and structural composition as contradictory and opportunistic, relying on fragile alliances driven by local and racial considerations with no potential for growth or survival.

Ezzat effectively delivered the final blow to the Dagalo family’s state project, which attempted to adapt to different circumstances—sometimes posing as a champion of a fabricated cause, other times claiming to represent the marginalized, and at other times advocating for democracy and civilian rule. It even sought to appeal to anti-Islamist forces by waging a war against remnants of the old regime. The result, however, was a chaotic, fascist, and brutal project that inflicted unprecedented suffering on millions of Sudanese through one of the most brutal wars in modern history. The militia’s leaders have earned widespread hatred, and its rogue elements have faced mass rejection from most Sudanese people. Association with the militia or its leaders has become an unforgivable crime and a mark of betrayal that follows individuals wherever they go. Could there be a greater loss for the racist, fascist, and criminal Dagalo state project than this?