Will the Army’s Gains in the Capital End Sudan’s War?

Sudan Events – Agencies 

Before the battles in the Jebel Moya area of Sennar State, southeast of Sudan, in October 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had not suffered a major defeat since the war began in April of that year.

However, their losses began to mount after the army reclaimed this strategic region, gradually diminishing RSF-controlled areas in central and eastern Sudan. Their presence in the capital, Khartoum, has also become increasingly threatened. So, do the army’s victories, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the setbacks of the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), indicate that the war between the two generals is nearing its end?

The army asserts that it has achieved significant victories and inflicted heavy defeats on the RSF, vowing to continue fighting until it is completely eradicated. The RSF, on the other hand, denies suffering defeats, claiming that its withdrawals from certain areas were not due to battles but rather part of new tactical maneuvers. It also argues that the army has failed to provide concrete evidence of the heavy casualties and material losses it claims to have inflicted.

Notably, the withdrawing RSF forces have been retreating toward the Darfur and Kordofan regions, where they have strong social support. RSF spokespeople insist that “the areas we withdrew from were initially seized from the army during the early months of the war. We held them for more than a year and a half, then left by choice—and we can retake them whenever we decide.” However, army supporters believe the war is nearing its end, while independent analysts argue that “the end of the conflict is still far off.”

A New Strategy

Political analyst Al-Jameel Al-Fadil suggests that the army’s recent advances are merely “one phase in a war that does not appear to have a near end.” He explains that “the conflict is expected to become even more violent and bloody, not in the areas the army has reclaimed, but in more vulnerable regions within the army’s social stronghold.”

Al-Fadil also pointed to a recent statement by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, in which he urged his forces not to be discouraged by the loss of certain areas and instead focus on new targets. He added, “It appears that the RSF is adopting a new strategy, shifting away from widespread territorial control across the country. The increased use of drones in recent battles also suggests the locations of upcoming confrontations. While the RSF is retreating in Khartoum, it is advancing in western regions, in coordination with Abdulaziz al-Hilu’s forces.”

Several analysts predict that the war will shift from the capital to western Sudan, becoming even more intense if a parallel government is established in RSF-controlled areas, accompanied by the introduction of advanced weaponry and enhanced military capabilities—potentially altering the balance of power on the ground.

Battles in the Capital

On the battlefield, fierce clashes are ongoing in the three cities that make up the greater Khartoum area—Khartoum, Omdurman, and Bahri—where the army has made notable progress. In the East Nile area of Bahri, army forces and their allies are closing in on the Al-Manshiyya Bridge, which connects East Nile to central Khartoum, after recapturing most of the Haj Yousif district—one of the RSF’s key strongholds since the war began.

However, the intensity of fighting in Khartoum and Omdurman has decreased since the start of Ramadan, with military operations slowing along most frontlines. Territorial control has remained largely unchanged. Witnesses report that the army continues to hold several neighborhoods in southwestern Khartoum, extending to the Al-Hurriya Bridge and the industrial zone. Meanwhile, the RSF still controls areas in southern Khartoum, including the Presidential Palace, the South Belt district, parts of the army’s strategic headquarters, Khartoum International Airport, and the eastern section of the army’s general command.

In Omdurman, the army has expanded its control over parts of the city’s southern and western neighborhoods, particularly in Umbada and Al-Fatihab. However, battles on the outskirts of these areas have turned into a back-and-forth struggle, with no definitive gains for either side.

Battles in the West

In North Kordofan, in central-western Sudan, the army has achieved victories by reclaiming the cities of Umm Rawaba and Al-Rahad, advancing to the outskirts of Al-Obeid, the region’s largest city, and reopening the main road linking it to central Sudan. However, the army suffered a major defeat when it attempted to advance eastward toward the city of Bara. The RSF claimed that it “routed the attacking forces, inflicting heavy losses in personnel and equipment,” while the army has not commented on the incident.

Military operations in the Blue Nile State have been influenced by the alliance between the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu. This alliance has allowed the two forces to jointly seize several areas in the state near the South Sudanese border, posing a direct threat to the state’s capital, Damazin.

On February 22, political and armed factions—including Abdulaziz al-Hilu’s movement—signed a political agreement in Nairobi, Kenya, with the RSF. This pact aims to unify their political and military efforts against the army and its allies, whom they accuse of being remnants of Sudan’s former regime. Additionally, the agreement outlines plans to establish a rival government in RSF-controlled areas, countering the army-led government based in Port Sudan.