The Crumbling Tribal Structure of the Rapid Support Forces: The Mahariya Tribe Opens the Door to Defection and Disrupts Western Supply Lines
Sudan Events – Agencies
Signs of a deep fracture have begun to surface within the tribal structure that has long formed the backbone of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia since its inception. Reports indicate the withdrawal of several influential tribes, both socially and militarily, most notably the Mahariya tribe (Awlad Mansour). This tribe is considered one of the most influential in supplying fighters to the militia due to its cross-border presence spanning western Sudan and into Chadian territory.
A War Without Prospect
This retreat, described by experts as a turning point in the conflict, reveals the exhaustion that has overwhelmed tribal communities involved in the war, nearly two years into a draining conflict with no strategic gains to justify the immense human sacrifices.
The Mahariya tribe alone has, according to unofficial estimates, lost thousands of young men—killed, wounded, or disabled. This has stirred widespread discontent and silent anger, prompting a reassessment of the value of continuing to engage in a war with no clear end.
The RSF’s strength was never solely derived from its weaponry or external support; a significant part of its resilience stemmed from a vast tribal recruitment network stretching westward. Chad has long served as a strategic depth and critical passageway for the movement of fighters and supplies. This network has often overlapped with routes used for smuggling weapons, fuel, and even mercenaries to and from Darfur, amid public accusations that the Chadian regime has facilitated the passage of supplies from various sources through the airports of Amjarass and N’Djamena before distributing them to battlefronts within Sudan.
The Chadian Regime’s Dilemma
This tribal defection places the Chadian regime itself in a difficult internal position. Its involvement in supporting the Sudanese rebellion is no longer without political and social cost, especially as tribal awareness grows about the bloodshed of their sons in return for benefits that largely serve a narrow circle of political and military elites.
Analysts suggest that tribal pressure may force N’Djamena to gradually reconsider its stance—or at least limit the flow of supplies that have long passed through porous borders and open deserts.
On another front, this development is expected to increase disarray within the RSF and restrict its ability to quickly replenish human resources—something that has historically been one of its advantages in countering strikes from the Sudanese army and its allied and mobilized forces. Any collapse of the main tribal support base would mean the loss of the “human reserve” that sustains frontlines and keeps the war going in towns and villages.
An Opportunity for the Sudanese Army
Some view this retreat as a golden opportunity for the Sudanese army and its supporting forces to capitalize on this moment of fracture by urging other tribes to withdraw their sons and cut off the flow of youth into battles that serve only a broader regional agenda—one managed by foreign actors and fed by mercenaries and multiple funding channels, while it is the tribes that pay the ultimate price.
Conversely, experts expect that the RSF may try to compensate for any potential loss of Chadian support by intensifying its operations through the Libyan corridor. This would build on previous alliances with influential parties in eastern Libya, particularly factions loyal to Khalifa Haftar, which have in the past provided a haven for mercenaries and facilitated the flow of supplies. However, this alternative, despite its appeal to the RSF leadership, remains fraught with challenges, including regional and international surveillance as well as the vulnerability of desert routes that can be targeted logistically and militarily at any time.
In this context, the crumbling of western supply lines may signal the beginning of broader defections if internal pressures continue within the tribes involved in the war on both sides of the Sudan-Chad border. This development could also open the door to new arrangements that may compel N’Djamena to take a step back for fear of social unrest in areas traditionally dominated by tribes like the Zaghawa, Mahariya, and others.
Growing Tribal Fractures
The strategic importance of these shifts is not confined to the battlefield alone but extends into political spheres, where the RSF’s backers now face both logistical and moral dilemmas. The collapse of tribal cover limits the effectiveness of external support, weakens the militia’s ability to regroup, and concurrently boosts the Sudanese army’s ability to neutralize supply lines and gain more popular momentum for the project of restoring state authority.
Ultimately, the coming stages appear likely to witness further fragmentation of the cross-border tribal alliances that were long driven by interests and transient incentives. Meanwhile, a new societal will is emerging—one that seeks to reclaim agency after realizing that the war projects leave nothing in their wake. The costs paid thus far pale in comparison to the illusion of influence and control that was built on shifting sands.
The key question remains: Can the Sudanese state capitalize on this rupture with political intelligence to accelerate the end of the rebellion and dry up its sources? Or will regional players find new ways to recycle the conflict and prolong the bleeding?
Source: Al-Muhaqiq News Website
