What Has Israel Done in Sudan?

By Dr. Yasser Youssef Ibrahim

(In Kampala, the Israeli embassy handed a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, congratulating him, his government, the chosen people of God, and the children of Israel on the victory over the Arabs in the 1967 war.)
— From the memoirs of General Joseph Lagu, one of the founders of the rebellion movement in South Sudan.

In politics, national leaders need strategic thinking that encompasses the nature of the challenges they face and the knowledge of both domestic and international environments upon which plans are built.

In this sense, it echoes the definition by German philosopher Ernst Haeckel, who described politics as “applied biology.” Just as biology helps understand environments and their roles in the growth of living organisms, understanding political environments realistically enables leaders to develop ideas that allow them to address political phenomena with realism and rationality.

One such phenomenon that has clouded and dominated the Arab mind for decades is the conspiracy theory, which assumes that some external actor is constantly plotting against Arab countries. The danger of this way of thinking lies in that it relieves the self of responsibility for shortcomings and failures, and deprives the Arab mind of the objectivity needed to address political phenomena without exaggeration or understatement, as Dr. Mohamed Al-Mukhtar Al-Shanqeeti states.

In this article, where we address the causes behind the persistent wars in Sudan—wars that have baffled observers—we will attempt to examine the fundamental causes of this phenomenon, focusing on the hidden hands that have consistently played a significant role in shaping events. In doing so, we will avoid overly conspiratorial explanations that magnify the role of conspiracy and oversimplify complex outcomes.

By “hidden hands” in Sudan’s wars—ongoing since 1955, a year before Sudan’s independence—we refer to foreign interventions, with the Israeli entity acting as the spearhead and the machinery driving events from behind the scenes. This is not to ignore the grave mistakes committed by the Sudanese elite across ideological and political spectrums.

One such mistake was the failure to properly understand Israel’s role in Sudan’s wars or to develop effective approaches to counter it. Israel made an early effort to study Sudan and its complexities and formulated a strategy driven by security fears and ancient mythological interpretations. These include beliefs that the Ark of the Covenant of Prophet Moses (peace be upon him) is buried in an Ethiopian church in Axum; that Ethiopian kings who once ruled Sudan are of Jewish descent from Prophet Solomon (peace be upon him); and that one of the Lost Tribes of Israel resides in the Great Lakes region and southern Sudan and must be found.

The guiding principle behind Israel’s policy toward Sudan can be summed up in a famous statement by David Ben-Gurion: “We are a small people with limited resources. We must focus our efforts in dealing with our Arab enemies by identifying and amplifying their weaknesses, particularly the relationships between different ethnic and sectarian groups, until those weaknesses become unsolvable dilemmas.”

This “governing text” laid the foundation for Israel’s approach to Arab countries, which evolved into what became known as the “periphery strategy”—fragmenting or amputating the peripheral regions of Arab states when needed, as was done in South Sudan.

The strategy aimed to destabilize the edges of Arab countries—by exploiting ethnic disputes or stirring up border conflicts—to keep those nations preoccupied with internal problems so their militaries wouldn’t support resistance movements against Israel.

To emphasize how long this Israeli plan has been in place, consider a 1959 lecture by Mossad chief Meir Amit during a graduation ceremony: “To contain the threat posed by the rise of Arab nationalism, we had to succeed in provoking psychological impulses within non-Arab groups inside Arab states, particularly in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Sudan.”

To trace the extent of damage caused by these “hidden hands” in Sudan, we must study several key documents:

The “Kivunim” document, presented by Ariel Sharon in 1983 at a NATO meeting, outlines Israeli strategies toward the Arab and Islamic world.
Regarding Sudan, it states: “Sudan is the most fragmented of all Arab and Islamic countries. It comprises four population groups, each alien to the others—from a Sunni Arab Muslim minority ruling over a non-Arab majority, to pagans and Christians.”
It concludes:
“Countries like Libya and Sudan will not survive in their current form.”

In 2008, Israeli Interior Security Minister Avi Dichter gave a lecture to top security officials, stating: “Sudan served as a strategic depth for Egypt during wartime, offering bases for Egypt’s air force and ground troops. It even sent forces to the Suez region during the War of Attrition. Therefore, we had to work to weaken it, strip it of initiative, and prevent it from becoming a strong, unified state. This was essential for strengthening Israeli national security.”

In the book “Mossad’s Mission in South Sudan” by Mossad agent David Ben Uziel (alias “General John”) and “Israel and the South Sudan Liberation Movement” by Mossad brigadier Moshe Farji, chilling details are shared about the level of military, political, and economic support provided by Israel to the southern Sudanese rebellion. This included:

Arms shipments

Deployment of experts

Training of tens of thousands of soldiers

Sabotaging infrastructure

Occupying towns

Disrupting development projects

Farji notes that Israel succeeded in the South due to several factors, most notably:

Thwarting Arab support to Sudan’s government

Halting the Jonglei Canal Project, which was expected to provide 5 billion cubic meters of water shared by Egypt and Sudan. Israel warned southern leaders that the project would be disastrous for them.

Encouraging Southern nationalism, paving the way for secession from the North.

These documents make it clear that Israel has always classified Sudan as a strategic enemy, and thus acted accordingly—keeping it constantly embroiled in internal conflict.

Dichter again confirmed: “We initiated and escalated the Darfur conflict to prevent Sudan from focusing on building its capacities. Our strategy, which was implemented first in the South and now in the West, has succeeded in steering Sudan toward crisis and division. These ongoing conflicts will eventually end in Sudan’s fragmentation into several states or entities.”

Israel’s vision for Sudan can be summarized in the following points:

1. Targeting Egypt through its southern neighbor by disrupting Sudan’s development.

2. Fueling internal conflicts to preoccupy Sudan with itself.

3. Preventing Sudan from utilizing its vast resources to become a centralized power.

4. Weakening Sudan via fragmentation, as Dichter puts it: “A fragile, fragmented Sudan is better than a strong, effective one.”

Israel’s targeting of Sudan extended beyond military conflicts. Its efforts included diplomatic campaigns and influence in international organizations to isolate and pressure Sudan.

At the height of the Darfur crisis, Jewish organizations formed a coalition of over 180 groups worldwide promoting the narrative of “genocide in Darfur.” Their campaign was launched from the Holocaust Museum in Washington, under the sponsorship of “Save Darfur” and the Jewish Agency for International Development, culminating in referring Sudan to the International Criminal Court.

In the current war—sparked by a surprise attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against the Sudanese Armed Forces, and followed by targeted destruction of infrastructure—Israel has played a prominent, though hidden, role.

The war followed a period of intense Israeli activity in Sudan after the normalization of ties and the signing of the Abraham Accords by Prime Minister Hamdok’s transitional government. Israel launched a diplomatic campaign in Khartoum, focusing on:

Gathering intelligence on Sudan’s defense industry

“Protecting Sudan from Iranian cells,” according to an Israeli official after a 2020 visit

Under the guise of peacemaking, Israel offered to mediate between the army and RSF. According to then-Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, Israel was working through several channels to negotiate a ceasefire. But this mediation was never mentioned again, suggesting that Israel may be prolonging the war to weaken both sides—applying the doctrine of Zionist strategist Edward Luttwak: “Give war a chance.”

Moreover, emerging information reveals deep ties between Israel and RSF leader Hemeti, who independently established contact with Tel Aviv. According to a report by Israeli site Walla, the Mossad chief’s plane landed in Khartoum in June 2021, carrying Mossad officials who met with Hemeti and RSF commanders.

After the war broke out, Middle East Eye published an article titled “How Israel Will Win the War in Sudan”, asserting that Israel favors the RSF due to Hemeti’s services in Libya and his pledge to “dismantle Islamists within the Sudanese army.”

Recently, as the Sudanese army gains the upper hand, Israeli voices began accusing Sudan of collaborating with Iran, calling for direct Israeli intervention on the grounds that Sudan’s army has become the “Hamas of Africa.”

The Sudanese leadership must now recalibrate its foreign relations to contain and eliminate these malicious plots before they continue to destroy Sudan’s potential.

In this regard, Sudan needs the support of its allies to uphold the legitimacy of the Sudanese army and the civilian government led by Dr. Kamal Idris, while also working to strengthen internal unity and thwart the schemes of those lying in wait.