The Quartet Is Now a Thing of the Past… But Why?

As I See

Adil El-Baz

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Yesterday, as we chased any scrap of information about the convening of the Quartet meetings in Washington—following media hype and political speculation—and while the opposition rushed to raise expectations about what these meetings could achieve, Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper (note: Asharq Al-Awsat, and not any other outlet) published a breaking news update last night, stating: “Reliable sources at the U.S. State Department confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that the Quartet meeting on Sudan—scheduled to be hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates tomorrow, Wednesday—has been canceled, without specifying the reasons or setting a new date for the meeting.”

It is no coincidence that Asharq Al-Awsat—and not another publication—was chosen to publish this news. It is a message from Riyadh itself: the Quartet cannot be driven by unilateral decisions.

Meanwhile, Egypt’s Ambassador to Washington, Moataz Zahran, hinted that the meeting may be postponed to next September, affirming to Asharq Al-Awsat the Quartet’s commitment to maintaining international pressure in pursuit of a settlement to Sudan’s crisis.

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So the Quartet was abruptly derailed. But why?

Certainly, the reasons are not due to the absence of the warring parties, nor the lack of civilian representation, nor even due to failure or disagreements about expanding the Quartet—something that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio proposed. Nor is it because America suddenly realized the risks of imposing a settlement on the Sudanese people—it has no real interests or major stakes in Sudan to protect.

So why the postponement—according to the Egyptian minister—or outright cancellation, as per the U.S. State Department source quoted by Asharq Al-Awsat (read: Saudi Arabia)?

Several reasons lie behind the delay/cancellation. Chief among them: the Emirati position.

Although the UAE was invited under Saudi pressure, in an attempt to bind it to the meeting’s outcomes, it adopted two baffling positions that diverged completely from the stances of the other three parties (the U.S., Egypt, and Saudi Arabia).

The UAE insisted that the final communiqué must include language about excluding both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Army from the transitional period, and that Sudan should be led by civilians—without specifying who these civilians are. This is exactly the stance expressed by Anwar Gargash in a tweet yesterday.

This position, which aims to sideline both military factions, stems from the UAE’s desire to oust Hemedti and replace him with Abdul Rahim. It also clearly seeks to reposition its proxies—Sommoud and Ta’sees—in Sudan’s political scene. In short, Abu Dhabi is trying to kill four birds with one stone: eliminate Hemedti, exclude the army, empower its clients Abdul Rahim, Sommoud, and Ta’sees, and secure influence in Sudan’s future governance.

The second strange position was the UAE’s attempt to insert references to the so-called Ta’sees coalition in the final statement, presenting the (Nyala-based) government as a parallel authority to the one in Port Sudan—even if it only exists online. (Now do you understand why the Ta’sees “government” was declared just 72 hours before the now-canceled Quartet meeting?)

What’s astonishing is that Abu Dhabi knows full well the other three countries’ positions on any parallel government. Just a day earlier, Al-Watan newspaper ran a prominent column by Suleiman Al-Aqili titled: “A Parallel Government… A Pathetic Partition Plan!”

In it, he wrote: “The Ta’sees coalition is merely a theatrical move—more of a political gamble destined to fail at the first real test on the ground, because Sudan’s unity is far greater than the ambitions of militias and the delusions of swift power.”

Moreover, on Tuesday, July 29—the very day the Quartet was supposed to convene—Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement categorically rejecting any recognition of the so-called Ta’sees government declared by the RSF. The statement described it as a direct threat to Sudan’s legitimacy and unity amidst a war that has raged for over a year. It added that establishing a parallel government outside internationally recognized legitimacy would only further complicate the crisis and undermine regional and international efforts toward a comprehensive political solution.

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Egypt took a similar stance. In a statement issued on March 2, 2025, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry said that Egypt rejects any attempts to form a parallel government that would threaten Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The statement warned that such actions would “complicate the scene,” “hinder efforts to unify Sudanese political forces,” and “worsen the humanitarian situation” in the country.

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As for the U.S. position on the UAE’s attempts to create a parallel government in Sudan, it had already been made clear back during the Nairobi declaration. On March 5, 2024, the U.S. Department of State—via the Bureau of African Affairs and the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum—issued a statement saying: “The United States is deeply concerned by reports that the RSF and its allied groups have signed a so-called ‘Transitional Constitution’ for Sudan. Efforts to create a parallel government do not contribute to peace and security in the country, expose Sudan to further instability, and risk an effective partition of the nation.”

Despite these clear positions from three out of four Quartet members, the UAE remained insistent that the statement include a reference to the illegitimate Ta’sees “government”—barely three days old.

What’s even more baffling is that Abu Dhabi continues to cling to this illegitimate entity, which has been rejected by the entire international community. Just yesterday, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council strongly condemned the July 26, 2025 declaration by the so-called Ta’sees coalition led by the RSF, rejecting its establishment of a parallel government in Sudan.

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Now, the U.S. has failed to unify even its own allies. The Quartet collapsed in Washington just as the Jeddah, Addis, London, and Geneva tracks did. The illusions of Ta’sees crumbled. The dreams of Sommoud did not last. The bitter truth came quickly.

The mantra “the solution is in the field” still dominates the scene.

And as I finish writing this article, one question keeps lingering in my mind:
Why is Abu Dhabi doing this? What’s in it for them?

To be continued…