From Warlord to Statesman? How the RSF Is Using Diplomacy to Dismantle Sudan

By Dr. Abdelnasser Solum Hamed*

Sudan’s war has entered a new and dangerous phase. What began as a violent contest for territorial control between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has evolved into a struggle over international legitimacy. As the RSF constructs a parallel state through coercive governance and calculated diplomacy, it is rewriting the rules of recognition in Africa’s most fragile conflict zone.

This is no longer just a civil war—it is a test of whether the international system can resist being manipulated by militias who trade food for access and diplomacy for legitimacy.

Since April 2023, the RSF has entrenched itself across Darfur, Khartoum, and Kordofan. It now collects taxes, appoints administrators, manages trade, and issues decrees mimicking sovereign authority. But the group’s most strategic front is diplomatic. Through engagements with UN agencies, African Union envoys, and humanitarian actors, the RSF seeks to present itself not as a militia, but as a government-in-waiting.

In RSF-controlled zones, aid delivery is conditional. The group has built a quasi-bureaucracy—checkpoints, registration offices, liaison officers—to monitor, restrict, and redirect humanitarian access. Neutral relief has become a bargaining chip. In El Fasher and elsewhere, aid organizations are forced into negotiations just to reach starving civilians. Each UN-led meeting or aid negotiation, no matter how pragmatic, sends a dangerous signal: that control can substitute legitimacy.

What results is de facto recognition through operational necessity. Lacking a functioning central state, foreign actors are compelled to engage the RSF to maintain access and fulfill mandates. The RSF, by occupying this vacuum, gains the credibility it could never earn at the ballot box or through a peace agreement.

The RSF’s growing influence exposes a troubling legal vacuum. According to international law, recognition—whether de jure or de facto—should rest on effective control, respect for international obligations, and legitimacy derived from a political process. The RSF satisfies none of these. Yet through sustained engagement and control over humanitarian corridors, it is gaining what scholars call “tacit recognition,” a dangerous precedent that undermines the Vienna Convention’s principles on diplomatic relations and the Montevideo criteria for statehood.

Some regional powers have gone further. Khalifa Haftar’s forces in Libya offer logistical support. The UAE’s involvement, while officially denied, is increasingly scrutinized. Chad’s leadership opts for stability over confrontation. These ties offer the RSF not just supplies, but diplomatic validation. They embolden its leadership to act as equals on the regional stage.

This is not without historical precedent. In Afghanistan, the Taliban leveraged diplomatic isolation to portray themselves as the only viable authority. In Lebanon, Hezbollah built a parallel state within a state, using both violence and social services to gain legitimacy. The RSF’s strategy echoes both—militarized governance fused with pragmatic diplomacy to bypass traditional routes to recognition.

This sets a dangerous precedent. In eastern Libya, the Sahel, and South Sudan, other militias are watching. The RSF has become a model: seize territory, weaponize aid, engage diplomatically—and become a government by default. The collapse of sovereignty is no longer a cautionary tale, but a tactical blueprint.

The RSF’s governance is neither transitional nor accountable—it is authoritarian, extractive, and militarized. Aid is politicized. Taxes fuel recruitment. Administrative power serves war aims. There is no vision for peace—only for survival and expansion.

What is at stake is not just Sudan’s unity, but the norms of international diplomacy. The post-WWII architecture of state recognition is built on legality, legitimacy, and representation. If diplomacy becomes a tool for armed groups to entrench themselves, those foundations are at risk.

The international community must act with strategic clarity. Humanitarian engagement must not evolve into political normalization. Operational coordination must include legal caveats. Recognition must be earned—not seized through coercion.

If the RSF succeeds in transforming its battlefield conquests into political recognition, the consequences will reverberate far beyond Sudan. It will signal to armed groups everywhere that war crimes can be laundered into statecraft—and that the collapse of sovereignty is not a tragedy to be reversed, but an opportunity to be exploited.

The world must decide: Will diplomacy serve peace and justice, or will it become just another weapon of war?

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*Director, East Africa & Sudan Program, FOXS Research, Sweden