The Final Gamble in Sudan’s War

Othman Mirghani

Three major developments this week have cast a spotlight on the predicament facing Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF):

The first concerns Colombian mercenaries brought in to fight alongside the RSF in Darfur. Some of these mercenaries were seen in video clips found on the phone of one who was killed during a failed attack on the city of El Fasher. Their involvement, along with others from neighboring countries, sparked widespread controversy. Colombian media outlets reported on the issue, citing the testimony of a returned mercenary who detailed the recruitment process, their missions, and how they were transported to western Sudan.

The second development emerged in the U.S. Congress, led by Senator Jim Risch, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is spearheading a bill to classify the RSF as a terrorist organization and treat it accordingly.

The third issue relates to the growing internal fractures within the RSF. Tensions have escalated to the point of armed clashes, with some tribal factions and recruits complaining of neglect and discrimination. Many feel marginalized in the so-called “parallel government” announced by the RSF last month—a government that was immediately rejected regionally and internationally, with calls to avoid any recognition or engagement.

All of these are signs that the RSF is in serious trouble on multiple fronts—militarily, socially, internally, and internationally. This is despite its attempts to expand operations in parts of Kordofan to block the army and its allies from advancing toward Darfur, and despite efforts by its media apparatus to amplify propaganda, mask the dire reality, and boost the morale of its fighters and supporters.

The truth is that the RSF has lost a significant portion of its forces and equipment, suffering major defeats that have forced it to retreat, becoming largely confined to Darfur and parts of Kordofan. After nearly 28 months of war, it has become clear that its core strength—its professional, trained fighters—has been broken. The tribal mobilization efforts, both internally and from across the borders, have waned significantly due to continued defeats, reports of unpaid wages, and the dwindling opportunities for looting that were once rampant in Khartoum, Gezira, and other central states during RSF occupation.

To compensate for its losses, and with encouragement and funding from its backers, the RSF has increasingly turned to hiring mercenaries from neighboring countries and even distant places like Colombia. It has also resorted to forcibly recruiting children and youth, sending them into battle after minimal weapons training.

Despite injecting money into tribal leaders to secure loyalty and encourage recruitment of their youth, RSF leadership appears unable to overcome its deepening crises. There have been reports of desertions and rebellions on various fronts in Darfur and Kordofan. Grievances among fighters have grown louder, with many appearing in recent video clips criticizing their leadership over the lack of medical care for the wounded, unpaid salaries, and what they described as discriminatory treatment among tribal components within the RSF.

The crisis has worsened with public defections of several RSF advisers, reports of assassinations of field commanders, and infighting among RSF recruits—even in Nyala, the city declared by RSF as the seat of its so-called “peace government.” Of particular note is the emergence of influential tribal leaders from RSF strongholds who have voiced their opposition to the group and rejected its parallel government. This opposition is growing, especially from major components like the Fur, Zaghawa, Meidob, and certain Rizeigat factions, who have been increasingly critical of the widespread violations and crimes committed and still ongoing.

Where do things go from here?

The RSF leadership and its backers understand that without a major military breakthrough, the internal fractures will widen and could lead to further open defections. That’s why they’ve placed all their hopes and efforts on two main fronts: first, trying to storm the besieged city of El Fasher; second, escalating attacks in Kordofan to disrupt the army’s plans and prevent its advance toward Darfur. However, both fronts pose immense challenges. El Fasher has held out, repelling 226 attempted incursions. The army is expected to intensify its efforts to reach and lift the siege on the city, making the battles in Kordofan potentially decisive with far-reaching consequences for the war’s trajectory.

A significant development in Kordofan is the announcement by a group of local tribes of a charter to defend their territories and align with the army. They have formed a military force called the “Alliance of Dignity – Kordofan Shield” to participate in the battles against the RSF and confront the extensive violations the group has inflicted on civilians in the region.

All of this suggests that the RSF is not just in a deep crisis—it may have entered its final gamble. If its offensives in Kordofan collapse, internal fractures will intensify, and the path will be cleared for the army to execute what could be the war’s concluding chapter—a finale that, as the title suggests, is already taking shape.