The Ceasefire Dilemma

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1
Regional and international governments and organizations continue to flood the public sphere with statements calling for an immediate ceasefire in Sudan. Yet, these calls remain hollow, part of the usual flood of bland declarations, offering neither a framework on which such a ceasefire could be built nor clarity on its consequences. This renders them incapable of addressing the heart of the crisis. To illustrate the dilemma, let us consider the possible scenarios if the government were to heed these calls.

2
The first possibility is that militias would remain in control of all Darfur cities, except El-Fasher, and parts of Kordofan, while negotiations drag on for months or even years — with no guarantees of reaching an agreement. At its core, this scenario amounts to an implicit recognition of Sudan’s partition between the government and the militia.

3
The second scenario assumes that militias would agree to withdraw from the cities, allowing government and army forces to regain control, while the militias regroup in camps pending integration into the military. This, however, would effectively mean their acknowledgment of defeat — something neither the militias nor their foreign backers are willing to accept. Moreover, the government has already declared its outright rejection of any negotiations with the militia or granting it a political future.

4
Should the government agree to a ceasefire, the militias would exploit it to rearm and recruit more mercenaries from camps in Libya and elsewhere, especially since the borders remain open and arms continue to flow in with the support of their external sponsors. Even if the government, under pressure, were to comply, could the international community or the UN Security Council actually stop these arms flows? Reality suggests otherwise.
The Jeddah Agreement stipulated that militias withdraw from civilians’ homes — yet the Security Council and the international community failed to enforce it. They also failed to lift the siege on El-Fasher or to prevent civilians from being starved, let alone halting the flow of weapons into Darfur. The experience of the UNAMID mission speaks volumes: over $22 billion spent, more than twenty thousand troops deployed — yet no peace was achieved, nor was the arming of militias halted.
Any ceasefire, under these circumstances, would in practice mean the partition of Sudan. Government acceptance would amount to handing over Darfur to a militia that has committed crimes of genocide against civilians.

5
The collapse of ceasefires and the resumption of wars after peace agreements prompted a group of war-and-peace scholars to convene in Chicago in 2024, at what became known as the Pearson Global Forum.
Their extensive studies, covering Africa and Asia, revealed that 40% of peace agreements signed since 1975 collapsed within just five years — with conflicts returning even more violently. This led some participants to argue that it might be better to let wars run their course until a decisive outcome is reached, thereby ensuring what they called lasting peace, rather than allowing warring factions to rearm and fight with greater ferocity.

6
The forum identified several reasons for the failure of peace agreements: weak trust among signatories; the presence of internal or external actors who see peace as a threat to their interests and thus sabotage it; the lack of clear and enforceable mechanisms; and the absence of a neutral body capable of imposing sanctions. Moreover, the exclusion of key groups — such as local communities and women — further undermined agreements. The report also stressed that ignoring the root causes of conflict — political marginalization, economic injustice, ethnic exclusion, and institutional weakness — makes any agreement fragile and short-lived.

7
The forum concluded that peace is not achieved by signing an agreement but by sustaining it. What is needed is not just a superficial ceasefire, but durable mechanisms to uphold it. Success stories, such as Colombia and Northern Ireland, demonstrated that inclusivity in negotiations and the participation of all stakeholders, alongside respect for local context, are critical to securing lasting peace. Externally imposed initiatives, by contrast, often fail because they clash with societal realities and cultures. True peace, the forum emphasized, must be built from within communities.

8
In addition, the forum noted that weak state institutions undermine peace and leave countries vulnerable to renewed violence, underscoring the need to pair any agreement with the construction of strong state structures. It also stressed that there can be no genuine peace without controlling arms imports and cutting off funding for armed groups. As Michèle Pierre-Louis put it: “There can be no peace without curbing the sources of violence.” Many agreements failed precisely because actors who viewed peace as a threat deliberately sabotaged it, highlighting the need for strategies that either deter or politically integrate such actors.

9
Thus, both reality and historical experience show that the oft-repeated calls for a ceasefire are not a solution in themselves — and may even become a trap if not built on solid foundations that dry up the sources of weaponry, dismantle criminal militias, and deliver justice to victims. Otherwise, any externally imposed ceasefire lacking substance will serve only as a prelude to rearmament — setting the stage for an even bloodier round of conflict.