The New Imperialism and the “Weaponization” of Investment in Africa (1–3)

By: Al-Tijani Abdel Qadir Hamid
(1) Introduction:
The years that followed the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 witnessed what came to be known historically as the Scramble for Africa. The continent was carved into protectorates and colonies, each annexed to a major European power. Now, nearly two centuries after that great imperial rush—during which Africa endured calamities and wars—it may be appropriate to ask: how did it happen, and what can be done to prevent history from repeating itself?
(2) The First Imperial Rush into Africa:
We must remember that the early “scramblers” were chasing foreign investments. Their economic claim was that their vast domestic savings could not find adequate outlets at home, leaving them with no choice but to seek opportunities abroad. To justify this pursuit, they aligned their private interests with national interests, arguing that the nation stood to benefit from opening new markets and annexing vast territories. However costly or risky this “annexation” process might be, they deemed it essential for national survival and progress.
They further argued that any nation that hesitated would leave room for bolder rivals, who would seize ports and markets, restrict trade routes, and perhaps cut off access to vital foodstuffs and raw materials.
The scramblers, of course, had little concern if their actions were branded “imperialist.” To them, it was a necessary imperialism, requiring states to deploy diplomacy—and force of arms—to secure and expand those markets.
Experience soon showed that war was among the most effective means of securing such markets, even if that meant turning African lands into “protected territories” or outright colonies. Thus emerged classical imperialism, which soon hardened into full-scale colonialism.
(3) The New Scramblers:
If the how and why of Europe’s first rush into Africa are now clear, along with its grim consequences, the troubling questions today are: will the old scramblers return, or will “new scramblers” emerge on the African stage? And whether it is the former, the latter, or both together—will they return in the guise of military occupiers, or as capitalist investors? Will the continent witness an economic renaissance under their hands, or will its people sink deeper into poverty—bearing in mind that, according to World Bank reports, one-third of Africa’s population currently lives in extreme poverty?
This article does not seek—and indeed cannot hope—to fully encompass the modern capitalist rush toward Africa, nor the number and aims of the states and corporations chasing easy investments, precious minerals, and cheap labor. They are many, diverse in nationality, and varied in their goals and methods. Instead, we will focus on the United Arab Emirates as an illustrative case: a small, young state racing to stake its claim in Africa, and in the process securing a prominent position in the architecture of global trade balances.
In discussing the UAE’s turn toward Africa, the intention here is not to deny its right to plan and diligently pursue its economic interests—whether in Africa or elsewhere—but rather to understand the nature of this new role, the investment policies through which it is being enacted, and the extent of their impact on conditions across the continent.



