Will the Zurich Meeting Stir Winds of Settlement in Sudan?
By: Al-Muslami Al-Kabbashi
A wave of relief swept through Sudan’s temporary capital, Port Sudan, on July 29, when news broke that the United States had canceled the “Quartet” meeting on the Sudanese crisis, which was scheduled to be hosted in Washington by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The U.S. State Department did not disclose the reason for the cancellation, even though preparations had reached the stage of drafting a joint communiqué.
That decision was welcomed with quiet optimism in Port Sudan. Within Sudan’s political and media circles, particularly among the ruling camp, the Quartet has long been viewed as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It was the Western-backed Quartet that had engineered the Framework Agreement, which poisoned Sudan’s political climate and set the stage for war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023.
The cancellation of the Quartet meeting—comprising the U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—brought a measure of relief toward Washington’s stance. Few expected it would soon lead to a direct encounter between Sudan’s Sovereignty Council chairman, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and U.S. Special Envoy for Africa and the Middle East, Masad Boulos. That meeting took place in Zurich, Switzerland, on August 11.
Although the Sudanese government did not issue an official statement, leaks two days before the meeting suggested cautious satisfaction with its outcome. Many Sudan watchers considered the Zurich encounter a breakthrough—cracking open a long-sealed window in U.S.-Sudanese relations, and perhaps signaling the start of a new opening in the deadlocked peace process.
Key Dimensions
Breaking the Quartet Barrier:
For the first time, Sudan was able to bypass the Quartet, which had long obstructed direct communication with Washington. Zurich established the possibility of face-to-face dialogue between the two governments, without intermediaries exploiting Sudan’s post-Bashir vulnerability.
Sudanese Narrative Unfiltered:
General Burhan used the meeting to present Sudan’s version of the war directly to Washington. According to leaks reported by Al-Sudani newspaper, Burhan submitted a comprehensive security dossier documenting regional and extra-regional states’ involvement in arming, financing, and training the RSF. The file allegedly included evidence of tens of thousands of mercenaries recruited from across Africa, war crimes committed against civilians, and flight logs detailing hundreds of arms shipments—from modern combat vehicles and artillery to air-defense systems and supplies—facilitated through eight foreign capitals.
A Sudanese Roadmap for Ending the War:
Burhan reportedly reiterated that the RSF has no future in Sudan, politically or militarily. He called for dismantling the militia, prosecuting its leaders, and pressuring foreign backers to cease fueling the conflict. This vision echoes a roadmap Sudan had earlier submitted to the UN Security Council.
Shifts in Washington’s Tone:
For its part, the U.S. envoy praised Sudan’s past cooperation with Washington on counterterrorism, human trafficking, irregular migration, drug smuggling, and extremism. Observers saw this as a notable departure from the usual language of threats, hinting at a recalibration of U.S. discourse.
In his own remarks posted on X, Boulos condemned alleged RSF atrocities at Abu Shouk displacement camp in El-Fasher, voiced concern over violence against civilians, and demanded unrestricted humanitarian access. The wording, however, included the qualifier “alleged,” which diluted the force of the condemnation.
Soon after, the UN Security Council issued a statement rejecting the RSF’s formation of a parallel government, warning it would fragment the country, and reiterating Resolution 2736 on lifting the siege of El-Fasher and enabling humanitarian access.
Winds of Change?
Why the sudden momentum? Analysts suggest several factors:
Military Realities on the Ground: The Sudanese army has regained strategic regions—Khartoum, Gezira, White Nile, and Sennar—that had been under RSF control for nearly two years. These areas are not only economic heartlands but also vital geographical connectors between east and west. The army’s improved performance, in manpower and equipment, suggests that nationwide control may only be a matter of time.
Washington’s Calculus: Is the U.S. now convinced the war must end? Or does it seek merely to prevent a decisive army victory by shoring up the RSF, aiming instead for a “balance of weakness” that forces a negotiated settlement?
Strategic and Geopolitical Stakes: Sudan’s central location—straddling the Red Sea, North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa—alongside its agricultural potential, water resources, and mineral wealth, makes it a prize in global competition. Washington’s Sudan policy is shaped as much by these geostrategic considerations as by humanitarian concerns.
Ideological Dimensions: Another layer is Sudan’s Islamist current, deeply rooted in society and strongly aligned with the army in the war effort. This reality complicates Western calculations and may drive U.S. attempts to influence the conflict’s trajectory.
Qatar’s Role: Leaks suggest that Qatar facilitated the Zurich meeting, even providing the plane that flew Burhan there. Doha has a track record in Sudan, having brokered the Darfur peace accords a decade ago. Washington itself acknowledged coordination with Qatar in July, citing its mediation roles in Sudan, Libya, and the Sahel.
A First Step?
The Zurich encounter, despite its ambiguity, may represent the first tentative step toward addressing Sudan’s intractable crisis. Whether it leads to genuine settlement or simply recalibrates the balance of war remains to be seen.
