Abu Dhabi: From Weaponizing Investment to Politicizing Trade
As I See
Adel El-Baz
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In the latest issue of Africa Focus, intellectual and scholar Dr. Al-Tijani Abdel Qader published a profound and far-reaching article, as is his hallmark. He posed a pressing question: Why is the UAE resorting to weaponizing investment in Africa? His essay navigated vast streams of information and deep analysis to unpack the UAE’s imperial project on the continent, its entanglements with global powers, and how Abu Dhabi leveraged its investments to exert influence over them. He also examined the UAE’s arms industry, its heavy investments in artificial intelligence technologies, and the integration of these tools into weapons manufacturing to serve the broader strategy of weaponizing investment. It is an article well worth reading; I provide its link below this commentary.
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What prompted me to highlight Dr. Abdel Qader’s article are the UAE’s actions over the past two days—moves that many observers interpret as politicizing trade and investment. For a country that built its entire reputation as a global hub of free and secure commerce, this step is nothing short of a self-inflicted wound. Much like the policy of weaponizing investment in Africa, it is disastrous—not just for the continent, but for the wider world.
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So, what were these steps that turned trade into a political tool?
On August 7, 2025, the UAE Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure issued a directive banning sailing permits to Port Sudan and prohibiting the handling of cargo linked to it across all Emirati ports.
On August 11, 2025, global shipping giants CMA and CGM released advisories confirming the suspension of UAE sailing permits and halting the handling of any shipments bound for Port Sudan via Emirati ports.
By late August, reports from the shipping and energy sectors indicated disruptions in oil cargoes and rerouted shipments as a result of the UAE’s ban.
On September 3, 2025, the same companies announced a reversal: cargo to and from Port Sudan could once again transit via Jebel Ali port in Dubai, despite weeks of restrictions.
Yet within 48 hours, both companies retracted that decision, citing an immediate and strict ban on all shipments tied to Port Sudan through the UAE’s ports and terminals. They apologized for the confusion and thanked clients for their “understanding.”
What exactly happened during those 48 hours remains unclear. But the whiplash of decisions revealed an internal tug-of-war within the UAE itself—between Abu Dhabi’s political calculations and Dubai’s economic imperatives through its ports.
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From its inception, the UAE built its economic project on turning ports into tools of soft power. Dubai’s Jebel Ali port was never just a commercial facility; it was a symbol of the Emirates’ role as a “neutral transit hub” amid regional conflicts. That neutrality allowed Dubai to eclipse historic competitors such as Aden and Port Said. Yet recent measures—blocking Sudanese airlines, banning vessels bound for Sudan, and prohibiting companies from exporting directly to the country—have laid bare Abu Dhabi’s drive to politicize trade, investment, and maritime routes. By banning Sudan-linked shipments for political reasons tied to siding with one faction in a civil war, the UAE undermines the very foundation of its reputation: neutrality and openness to all.
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DP World, which operates or holds stakes in more than 70 ports worldwide—from Latin America to East Africa—built its success on the image of being a stable, apolitical partner. When forced into government-driven political decisions, as with Sudan, it finds itself in a bind: obliged to comply with state directives while risking its reputation with international clients.
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History offers lessons. In 2006, when DP World attempted to acquire six U.S. ports, it faced a political backlash in Congress that torpedoed the deal. The objections were not economic but security-based: fears of foreign control over strategic gateways. Today, the irony is reversed. A political decision from Abu Dhabi is what undermines DP World’s capacity to expand—or even maintain—its foothold in East Africa.
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The rapid reversal of decisions within just two days highlights a deeper rift in the UAE: Dubai, through its ports, prioritizes economic neutrality, while Abu Dhabi views ports as geopolitical tools of leverage in conflicts like Sudan and Libya. The commercial wing of the federation understands that the ports’ neutral reputation is the Emirates’ true capital. This tension is longstanding: Abu Dhabi’s security-driven worldview often collides with Dubai’s trade-first outlook. But since 2011, as the UAE deepened its regional military footprint, politics increasingly outweighed economics. The disputes in Djibouti and criticism over Yemen—where the UAE was accused of using ports as political weapons—illustrate how politicized port strategies invite legal disputes and reputational losses.
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The recent bans on flights and goods flows don’t just harm Sudan; they destabilize the UAE’s global image. How can a country branding itself as the “world’s open trade hub” simultaneously block goods in transit? And how can it demand the trust of international partners while signaling that political disputes could override commercial neutrality at any moment? For investors and traders, the risk premium rises sharply. In such a volatile world, why would they bet their capital on a hub where contracts can be overturned overnight by political fiat? The UAE now faces a double dilemma: politicize ports and lose its neutral standing, or roll back decisions and appear erratic, as happened with the contradictory orders of early September.
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Global experience shows that politicizing ports brings only losses. What unfolded in Aden and Djibouti—and now in Port Sudan—serves as a clear warning to the UAE: without commercial neutrality, investment crumbles. Abu Dhabi stands at a crossroads: either ports remain economic powerhouses, or they become short-term political levers that alienate partners and invite competitors to fill the vacuum. The latest shipping diversions and oil disruptions near Fujairah are early signs of this erosion.
Blending free trade with politicized trade is as untenable as trying to marry investment with imperial ambitions—arming militias from Libya to Sudan under the guise of economic strategy. Both are impossibilities.
