The Importance of Gold in Sudan’s Export Portfolio

By Dr. Adel Abdel Aziz Al-Faki

Gold tops the list of Sudan’s exports to foreign markets. The government is seeking to shift gold from being merely an export commodity into a reserve asset and guarantor of financial stability. The Ministry of Minerals’ efforts to attract investment into the mining sector is a positive step that should be encouraged.

Over the past two weeks, Sudan’s economic news has glittered with gold. Sudan ranks fifth among Africa’s gold exporters, after Ghana, South Africa, Burkina Faso, and Mali. According to international statistics, Sudan exports around 80 tons annually. Domestically, however, official agencies record only about half of that figure—meaning that roughly 50% of Sudan’s gold production is smuggled out, depriving the national economy of its value.

In recent years, gold has accounted for nearly 50% of Sudan’s exports, with earnings fluctuating between $1.57 billion and $2 billion. At the same time, gold exports covered roughly half of the country’s trade deficit. It is clear that curbing smuggling and expanding investment in the gold sector are crucial to Sudan’s economic recovery.

Last week, reports highlighted a strategic agreement signed between Egyptian businessman Mohamed El-Garhy—representing Deep Metals Mining—and Sudan’s Ministry of Minerals, pledging $277.3 million in gold exploration and production. The deal covers exploration rights across Northern State, the Red Sea, River Nile, and Gedaref, as well as an 85% stake in the Arkadia mine. It also includes building a waste-processing plant and a gold refinery.

The agreement, struck in partnership with Sudanese businessman Omar El-Nimir and engineer Mubarak Ardol, reflects a joint commitment to expand investment ties and strengthen the role of local partners. It marks an early success for Sudan’s new Minister of Minerals, Nour Al-Daem Mohamed Ahmed Taha. The memorandum is expected to evolve into a full concession agreement, drafted by the Ministry of Justice under the 2015 Mineral Resources and Mining Development Act.

On the policy front, Prime Minister Dr. Kamal Al-Tayeb Idris this week endorsed the decisions of the Economic Emergency Committee, issued last week. These include: restricting gold purchases and exports to the Central Bank of Sudan; obliging the bank to provide foreign exchange for imports; strict monitoring of gold output up to the export stage to prevent smuggling; empowering anti-smuggling forces with resources and enforcement tools; and criminalizing possession or storage of more than 150 grams of gold without official documentation.

Other measures include banning imports outside formal banking channels, prohibiting the entry of goods that do not meet regulatory requirements, establishing a national digital platform to track imports and exports from foreign ports to Sudanese ports, reviewing Cabinet Resolution No. 154 (2024) on vehicle imports, and banning unregulated car shipments.

These steps reflect the government’s recognition that boosting gold exports is vital to narrowing the trade deficit and stabilizing the Sudanese pound. The new policy hinges on channeling all gold exports through the Central Bank.

Critics argue this policy has already been tried and failed, neither halting smuggling nor boosting revenues. They view state intervention in gold trading as an unproductive intrusion. However, past failures (2021–2023) coincided with the war years, when economic policymaking was dominated by the sprawling financial empire of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). At the time, the Economic Emergency Committee—chaired by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” with Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s approval—assigned gold trading to two companies: Al-Kutla Al-Dhahabiya, owned by the Central Bank, and Al-Junaid, owned by the RSF. The former was tasked with wheat imports, the latter with fuel.

The RSF, unsatisfied with this arrangement despite the millions it reaped, moved to undermine Al-Kutla Al-Dhahabiya while expanding Al-Junaid’s reach. Abdel Rahim Dagalo further entrenched RSF loyalists across critical economic and regulatory posts. Unsurprisingly, the experiment failed to serve Sudan’s economy.

For the new policy to succeed, it must rest on transparency, anti-corruption safeguards, and firm political will, resisting pressure or blackmail from any quarter.

Among the approved measures is the creation of a national digital platform to monitor imports and exports. Former National Information Center director Dr. Ahmed Abdel Qader Saleh has noted that Sudan’s existing customs system, ASYCUDA, is fully capable of handling this role if integrated with the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Central Bank, the Sea Ports Authority, and commercial banks—and if all data is properly input.

Some anticipate a decline in the dollar’s exchange rate on the local market following the new decisions. Yet this will not happen immediately. Real stabilization will only come once policies take root, the Central Bank builds up reserves, and import financing shifts to the banking system—gradually reducing demand for dollars.