On the Meaning of “Samoud” (Resilience)!
By Ibrahim Othman
Bakri Al-Jak, official spokesperson for the “Samoud” (Resilience) coalition, stated: “The Samoud coalition affirms its readiness to sit with the Democratic Bloc, forces allied with and supporting the Armed Forces, as well as political forces within the ‘Tasis’ (Founding) coalition, provided that the other parties continue to refuse to meet jointly, until conditions allow everyone to come together to manage the political process collectively. In this context, Samoud will continue its efforts to gather all political forces to reach a consensus on forming a preparatory committee that determines the parties involved in the political process, their issues, the venue for dialogue, and the role of regional and international facilitators.”
No other political actor is as insistent as Samoud on including another party in the leadership and management of the political process, particularly its insistence on including the militias and their allies in “Taqaddum” who joined them.
Key observations:
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Samoud repeatedly emphasizes that it is not militarily allied with the militias, despite defending them in many war-related issues. However, it does not deny its political alliance with them. Although it hesitates to declare this openly, it becomes increasingly evident whenever the political process is discussed.
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The phrase “political forces within Tasis” functions as a form of “political laundering”: first, for the factions joining the militia through their inclusion in the elite circle Samoud perceives, and second, for the militia itself, allowing Tasis to gain political legitimacy. While much of Taqaddum’s joining of Tasis has tarnished its own image, Samoud presents it as a process of politically “cleansing” the militias.
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Insisting on describing other forces as “allied with and supporting the army,” while omitting that Tasis includes militias and their supporters, is a tactic to downplay Samoud’s ties with militias and present itself as “balanced.” This rhetoric, however, ignores forces that are neither army- nor militia-supporting.
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Samoud’s stance implies that the reasons other political forces boycott the Tasis coalition will not prevent Samoud from insisting on its leadership participation—an exclusive privilege shared only with the militias.
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Samoud treats other parties’ refusal to engage with Tasis as a minor, temporary obstacle that can be overcome, postponing the political process it seeks to lead. No political process begins without Samoud, and Samoud cannot participate without Tasis.
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It divides roles: militias handle the military and field operations, including their impact on civilians, to build influence on the ground, while Samoud handles political defense of its leadership role until acceptance is secured.
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It also divides political roles, insisting on a “high-level leadership” managing the political process, composed of some forces including Tasis, through a preparatory committee that defines parties, issues, venues, and regional/international facilitators, keeping others outside for approval later. Formation of this committee is postponed until Tasis participates, making it the gatekeeper of the process.
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Samoud assumes it is universally accepted, except for those it rejects, granting Tasis the authority to “approve” other political forces’ participation.
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Samoud operates on the principle that all militia supporters are acceptable in political leadership, while some army supporters, except those it explicitly excludes, are outside leadership or participation.
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The venue of dialogue is highly prioritized, accommodating the active militias’ security needs. Dialogue is preferred abroad or in territories under militia control, ensuring Samoud’s concerns regarding militia relations are considered, along with insistence on regional and international facilitators.
While citizens count their losses from widespread looting and destruction by the militias, the Samoud coalition focuses on securing its gains from the militias’ inclusion in political leadership. Its reluctance to openly acknowledge this alliance only highlights the underlying political discomfort. Every maneuver and condition it imposes serves to make the militia a necessary actor: the process cannot start without it, cannot function without its leadership, and cannot be completed without its veto power. Militias—supported by Taqaddum—fight on the ground to assert their presence, while Samoud fights politically to enforce its acceptance. Between these two battles, the strongest alliance in the political arena is formed, even if its members shy away from admitting it.
