Where Did the Document Come From? Al-Burhan Called It “the Worst,” Andreas Motzfeldt Denied Its Existence, and Masad Bolos Disowned It

Sudan Events – Agencies

When the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council addressed the Sudanese Army officers in a recent meeting, he spoke plainly about the proposal submitted to him by the Quartet Committee. “The mediation has just presented the worst paper yet, and we will not accept it because it eliminates the Armed Forces, calls for dissolving the security apparatus, and keeps the militia intact,” he said. He added, “The Quartet presented three proposals, the first of which contradicts the fundamental principles of the Sudanese state and our aspirations as military officers.” He continued, “If the mediation proceeds in this direction, we will consider it biased—particularly the president’s adviser, Masad Bolos.”

Shortly afterward, a highly alarming document was leaked, detailing the “day after” plan for halting the war and arranging the anticipated settlement. The paper was not framed as a proposal but rather an imposed blueprint—ready to be applied wholesale to the Sudanese reality. It called for dismantling the army and security services, appointing a civilian government overseen by a figure selected by the Quartet, and removing Islamists according to criteria set by the Quartet. In effect, it amounted to placing Sudan under the committee’s direct authority—an approach Al-Burhan rejected outright.

Then came the statement from Norway’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik, who noted that during his meeting with Al-Burhan, he was struck by the heated debate surrounding a document said to have been delivered to the Sudanese government by Masad Bolos—the very same leaked paper. When Kravik inquired, he was told that a new proposal had arrived and angered the government. He denied the existence of any new initiative and contacted Bolos, who also denied it. Kravik reaffirmed that the only document presented was the initial one submitted weeks earlier, which contained no provisions on dismantling the military institution or dissolving security bodies.
So where, then, did the “worst” document—described by Al-Burhan—come from?

Some believe it was leaked by the Emiratis through Masad Bolos; others argue that it was leaked by the Sudanese government itself to tighten the noose around Bolos—who now seems to be facing the same fate as his predecessor during his final days.

Dr. Ezzeldin Al-Jamri, writing on Facebook, offered the following interpretation: “The only explanation is that Bolos sent the document while implying it came from the government, as part of pressure tactics. I believe he sent it based on miscalculated, hasty Emirati assumptions, and perhaps later attempted to retract or fix the situation. The government detected this and leaked the paper as a form of pressure—and as a shield against such ideas, especially since the Quartet contains multiple competing visions. This may be one of the undisclosed proposals. The UAE, impatient and misreading the moment—perhaps listening too closely to Bin Salman’s footsteps next door—appears worried about looming shifts in the Sudan file. Things got out of control regarding the leaked initiative, and the government had every right to exploit it.”
He added, “It is clear that all the recent delegations arriving in Port Sudan are linked to this file.”

Saeed Salama of the Vision Center for Strategic Studies says Al-Burhan has long understood that the Quartet is not united in purpose, and that its actions are shaped primarily by the interests of its member states. “Some do have strategic interests,” he said, “but the national interests of each state heavily influence its position.”
He added, “It seems to me that the document was leaked by the U.S. representative to the Sudanese government in order to extract a certain reaction and shape his upcoming stance—while striking down the initiative put forward by Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It was a malicious paper, and the army responded in a way Bolos did not expect, neutralizing it entirely. That’s all there is to it. No one will mention it again, and negotiations will remain confined to the first document.”

Dr. Al-Jamri counters, “The assumption that the government authored the paper to pressure Bolos is, in my view, simplistic. Yes, the government benefited from Bolos’ denial—but it is not in its interest to place the sovereignty of the state on the negotiating table, nor to find itself forced to defend that sovereignty. That is neither logical nor safe. What I believe happened is that the ‘foreigner’ forwarded the proposal for reasons known to him, and understood the benefits that would accrue to him and the UAE, given the Sudanese government’s publicly stated position.”