Transformations in Red Sea Security: From Somaliland and Yemen to Sudan — and the Prospects for Regional Partnership

Amb. Dr. Muawiya Al-Bukhari

Introduction

The region stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is undergoing a profound process of reconfiguration, in which considerations of security and sovereignty intersect with intensifying regional and international competition for influence. A series of rapid developments — from Somaliland and the controversy surrounding potential Israeli recognition, to escalating tensions in Yemen between legitimacy and fragmented mandates, shifting roles played by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Somalia’s presidency of the UN Security Council this January, and the war in Sudan as it approaches its third year — all underscore that the region has reached a decisive crossroads.

It faces a stark choice: either sliding further into chaos, fragmentation, proxy conflicts, and entrenched fragility, or seizing the opportunity to build a genuine regional partnership grounded in shared interests, collective action, and the security of vital maritime corridors.

These developments cannot be understood in isolation. They are bound by a single unifying thread: the security of the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden — strategic arteries for global trade, energy flows, and food supply chains, as well as an open arena for competition among regional powers seeking influence and expansion beyond their borders.

1. Somaliland: Contested Recognition and the Logic of State Fragmentation

The renewed focus on Somaliland, and the reports surrounding possible Israeli recognition, reflects a shift in competition in the Horn of Africa from economic and diplomatic influence to the overt redrawing of political maps. The territory, which unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991, has remained outside the circle of international recognition for decades, despite relative internal stability, while Somalia itself has been making gradual progress in recovering from more than three decades of war.

Any move toward external recognition — particularly by an actor with security interests in the Red Sea — is not a bilateral matter. Rather, it sets a dangerous precedent that entrenches the logic of dismantling fragile states, undermines the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and amplifies militia rule and parallel governance structures. It also opens the door to instrumentalizing secessionist tendencies as tools of geopolitical conflict.

This underscores the importance of supporting the Somali state and its legitimate institutions, while addressing the root causes of internal crises and their regional spillover effects, instead of leaving the field open to external interventions that exploit political fragility for narrow strategic gains at the expense of regional stability and state cohesion.

2. Yemen: The Bab al-Mandeb Dilemma and the Cost of an Open-Ended Conflict

In Yemen, recent developments — and the accompanying threats to international navigation in the Red Sea — have once again placed the war-torn country at the heart of regional and international calculations. Yemen is no longer viewed solely through a humanitarian lens, but increasingly as a direct factor in the security of one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, amid a devastating internal crisis, secessionist fault lines, and the drift of the Arab Coalition’s objectives from supporting legitimacy toward confrontation and tension.

The Yemeni experience has clearly exposed the limits of a purely military approach and the risks inherent in managing conflicts through local proxies. It has also demonstrated that the security of Bab al-Mandeb cannot be guaranteed without a unified and capable Yemeni state that exercises sovereign decision-making and restores full legitimacy through Arab and regional consensus and support.

In this context, Saudi Arabia has appeared increasingly inclined to reassess its options and seek political settlements that reduce the costs of attrition while safeguarding its national security. This shift has, in turn, exposed aspects of the Emirati role, which in many phases exceeded the coalition’s declared objectives, moving instead toward building autonomous influence through control of ports and islands and support for parallel entities — a pattern later replicated in Sudan.

3. The UAE: Exposure of the Role and Shrinking Room for Maneuver

Across Yemen and the Horn of Africa, the Emirati role has been characterized by an intense drive to control port hubs, maritime corridors, and mineral resources, while leveraging local forces to project influence beyond the borders of the states concerned. While this approach yielded short-term gains, it has ultimately produced counterproductive outcomes, both in terms of local stability and the UAE’s regional and international standing, particularly amid the erosion of the Arab League’s role, Gulf Cooperation Council cohesion, and broader Arab consensus in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and its complex repercussions.

Today, as international shifts narrow its room for maneuver and regional awareness grows regarding the risks of this approach, the UAE appears to be in a relatively defensive position. Saudi Arabia’s indirect intervention has highlighted the dangers of betting on state-fragmentation projects and the limits of managing the region through the logic of security companies and militias — a strategy that has disrupted regional maritime security as a whole.

This retreat creates a critical opportunity for regional states to exert meaningful political and diplomatic pressure through structured, serious, and in-depth dialogue, aimed at curbing destabilizing roles and reaffirming the principle of the national state as a red line and the cornerstone of Red Sea security and sustainability.

4. Sudan: The Weakest — and Most Dangerous — Link

Any discussion of Red Sea and Horn of Africa security would be incomplete without addressing Sudan, whose vast geography and long Red Sea coastline make it a pivotal element in the regional security equation. The war in Sudan is not merely an internal affair; its regional spillovers render it a crisis with direct implications for Red Sea security, migration flows, trade, smuggling, terrorism, and stability across the Horn of Africa.

The course of the war has laid bare the scale of external interventions, foremost among them the Emirati role, which — through its support for the rebel Rapid Support Forces militia — has contributed to prolonging the conflict and undermining prospects for building a stable Sudanese state. This involvement is closely tied to ambitions to control ports, supply routes, and mineral resources, and to integrate Sudan into a broader network of influence stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf.

Yet despite its ordeal, Sudan remains — in its multiple dimensions — a potential stabilizing force in the region if afforded an inclusive national pathway and regional support attuned to the complexities of its environment. Sudan’s stability is not merely a Sudanese interest, but a fundamental prerequisite for Red Sea security and for preventing its transformation into an open theater of conflict.

5. Somalia’s Presidency of the Security Council: A Window for Regional Partnership

Within this complex context, Somalia’s presidency of the UN Security Council this January assumes particular significance. It offers a rare opportunity to place the issues of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea at the forefront of the international agenda from the perspective of regional states themselves, rather than external powers.

If used effectively, this presidency could help catalyze intra-regional relations among Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Red Sea states, advancing a collective approach to maritime security based on respect for sovereignty, the prevention of coastal militarization, the rejection of turning ports into tools of political coercion, and resistance to the ambitions of parallel regimes.

This moment also enables the construction of a genuine partnership that addresses root causes rather than merely managing symptoms, and that redefines security as shared and non-zero-sum.

6. The Future: From Crisis Management to Region-Building

The convergence of developments in Somaliland, Yemen, and Sudan at this critical juncture, alongside shifting regional roles, points to a rare state of strategic fluidity. It is a moment that can either be invested in rebuilding the region on new foundations or squandered in favor of deeper fragmentation and division.

The prevailing wager should be on a genuine regional partnership that capitalizes on these shifts and applies organized pressure on destabilizing roles — foremost among them the Emirati role, now retreating under the weight of exposure. The alternative is to leave the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden hostage to proxy wars, with all the attendant risks for everyone.

Conclusion

What is unfolding in Somaliland, Yemen, and Sudan — and intersecting with shifts in the roles of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, alongside Somalia’s current presidency of the Security Council — is not a series of isolated events, but an expression of a decisive moment of regional realignment. Either the states of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa move from being open arenas for external tug-of-war to becoming proactive shapers of their own security, or they remain captive to state-fragmentation projects, managed chaos, and international power struggles in the absence of effective international law.

The model of influence based on militias, proxy warfare, port domination, and the erosion of national sovereignty has been exposed, with its costs now exceeding its gains — as exemplified by the Emirati role, which is retreating under the pressure of realities rather than rhetoric. Conversely, a rare opportunity is emerging to build an intra-regional partnership founded on respect for the national state and the securing of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb as a shared space rather than a geopolitical prize — without excluding Gulf security considerations.

The stability of Sudan, the unity of Somalia, and a settlement in Yemen are not deferred humanitarian files, but foundational conditions for sustainable regional security. Without them, the Red Sea will remain a permanent flashpoint and a theater for the conflicts of others. Investing in this moment — with political courage and a shared collective vision — could transform the region from a vulnerable flank into a pillar of stability, and from an object on external agendas into a full partner in shaping its own security and future.