Cutting the Arteries: How Did the Militia’s End Begin? (1)

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1
Cutting off the militia’s arteries is the first step toward its final destruction—and we are now on the threshold of that phase. How so? Let us begin with the news reported by Reuters two days ago, which stated that Pakistan is close to finalizing a $1.5 billion deal with Sudan. This news was almost certainly leaked to Reuters by Abu Dhabi; the agency covers Middle East and Asian affairs from its Dubai bureau.

The Pakistani deal reportedly includes 10 Karakoram-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 reconnaissance and attack drones, and JF-17 fighter jets developed jointly with China. Anyone who reads up on these aircraft—often compared to the French Rafale and the U.S. F-16—will understand what awaits the militia and its electronic jamming capabilities.

Abu Dhabi had already leaked news of the deal through an American blogger two days earlier (under the name “South Alexander”), who claimed that Saudi Arabia would finance the arms purchase—despite the Reuters report making no mention of who would pay the $1.5 billion price tag.

Why leak this now?
The leak came amid the ongoing political confrontation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, as if the UAE wanted to suggest that Saudi Arabia, too, is intervening in the war and funding one of the parties—perhaps to ease the accusations against itself and shift pressure onto Saudi Arabia. A devious idea, but a foolish one. If Saudi Arabia has supported or financed Sudan, it would be backing an internationally recognized government. Abu Dhabi, by contrast, is supporting a criminal militia accused of genocide.

But why the particular alarm over this deal?
Because it comes as part of an operational plan to “cut the arteries”—a process that has already begun. Here, I will try to shed light on it and analyze its impact.

2
The operation began in the north, specifically from Egypt. Quietly and without announcement, Egypt helped neutralize many supply convoys crossing from Libya into Sudan. As the war escalated and drew closer to Egypt’s borders—especially after the fall of El Fasher—Egyptian strategy shifted entirely. Cairo clearly declared its red lines: threats to Egyptian national security, Sudan’s territorial unity, and the militia’s movements. Then it acted.

Urgently, Khalifa Haftar Sr. was summoned to Cairo last December and told in unequivocal terms that supplying the militia from Libyan territory would not be tolerated—no weapons, no fuel, no food—and he was instructed to shut down the Kufra camp. But because Haftar operates under Emirati pressure (as a patron), he ignored the warnings.

Egypt’s patience wore thin. Cairo then summoned his son, Saddam Haftar, issued a final warning, and held him personally responsible for any further violations. At that point, Haftar realized the matter was serious. The Kufra camp was emptied, and the process of curbing fuel supplies to the militia began.

Egyptian satellites are now monitoring militia movements and border supply lines, alongside undisclosed operations—an effort to “cut the nerve.” Egyptian intelligence even released a video under a pseudonym illustrating how Egypt acts to protect its national security. This is how the main artery from Libya began to be severed.

3
Another lifeline ran through Chad, via the Umm Jaras base. But because this route was exposed early on, traffic along it dwindled or became limited and unreliable. Sudanese intelligence has deep reach within Chadian society and within Chad’s army and intelligence services. As a result, the movements of supply convoys became fully exposed in time and place—especially given the close blood and kinship ties between the joint forces and communities in Chad, notably the Zaghawa tribe, the backbone of the Chadian government.

The UAE—the militia’s primary financier—no longer trusts the secrecy of its movements and supplies via Umm Jaras. Consequently, the flow of equipment and mercenaries shifted toward Libya.

Meanwhile, surveillance intensified at the Adré crossing. Convoys moving through it are now under the watch of military intelligence, which tracks their routes from Cameroon and N’Djamena to the border—and even after they enter Sudan—while issuing warnings and extracting pledges from organizations that deal with the militia and provide it with aid intended for displaced civilians.

In addition, N’Djamena is no longer enthusiastic about continuing support for the militia for two reasons. First, it feels betrayed by Abu Dhabi, which dangled billion-dollar promises but failed to deliver when payment was due—treachery being its hallmark. Second, the recently unified Chadian opposition could pose an existential threat to the rule of Mahamat Kaka if Sudan were to extend support to it at any moment after the war ends.

Another artery has been cut—or has withered under the weight of shifting conditions and mounting pressure.

To be continued.