Between the Framework Agreement and the “Quartet”: The Complications of Weaving on Old Ropes
Report – Sudan Events
The UAE, the militia, the “Sumoud” Coordination, and several regional and international actors continue to insist on imposing the Quartet vision and pushing toward it at any cost. This insistence is clearly reflected in the statements of official spokespeople of the Emirati government, echoed with the same determination by the militia and Sumoud, among others. This stance explains their rejection of the joint US–Saudi initiative that has been gaining momentum in recent days.
Why this insistence on the Quartet initiative? Why has it reached the point where Anwar Gargash openly calls for imposing it by force on the Sudanese government? The comparison here inevitably recalls what happened with the so-called “Framework Agreement,” which some believe was the matchstick that ignited the war—an agreement between Hemeti and the very same faces now active within Sumoud, rejected at the time by the army.
Today, Sudan appears to be facing a similar confrontation: an agreement between the militia and Sumoud to move toward the Quartet initiative, and rejection by the army. Where will this lead? The Framework Agreement led to war—where will the Quartet take us?
At first glance, it seems that Donald Trump’s meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the outcomes of that meeting—along with the Sudanese government’s announcement welcoming the Crown Prince’s initiative—have unsettled the parties pushing to force the Quartet proposal as the sole option. This pressure has reportedly been exercised through figures such as Massad Boulos, at a time when efforts were accelerating toward approving a humanitarian truce, one that regional and international actors seek to exploit, each according to their own agenda.
African affairs expert Professor Ahmed Abdel Daim Mohamed Hussein says that attempts by the UAE and Sumoud to impose the Quartet have become well known, and so have their reasons. If adopted, the Quartet would return the militia to the forefront and make it a partner in any forthcoming political and military settlement. This is crucial for the UAE, which relies on the militia as a “cat’s paw” through which it advances its interests and imposes its will. Meanwhile, Sumoud and the militia’s political backers believe the Quartet could serve as a lever to return them to power, or at the very least eliminate the “Islamists” (al-Kizan) without facing any legal accountability. He described this as shallow thinking that treats the country with alarming superficiality, to the extent that it is hard to believe such people are considered politicians of the state.
He added that the UAE and its allies have now entered a phase of anxiety following Saudi interventions and new developments, including Turkey and Pakistan’s involvement and the growing, overt rise of Egypt’s role. All of these factors are troubling for Abu Dhabi: Saudi-Turkish rapprochement and Egyptian-Turkish understandings undermine years of Emirati efforts to freeze Egyptian-Turkish relations, in addition to developments in Yemen and their repercussions on Sudan.
Hussein noted that the UAE was once dominant in the Sudanese scene, with a supportive militia, politicians who took orders from it, and the ability to besiege and pressure the army to serve its interests. “But circumstances change, balances shift, and positions evolve—and this is what makes the UAE feel threatened,” he said.
He also argued that the United States appears to have moved beyond its earlier vision for resolving the crisis, which was based on two tracks: declaring a ceasefire and holding a direct meeting between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemeti. He described this proposal as detached from reality, unacceptable at least to the Sudanese government, and incapable of resolving the crisis.
According to Hussein, Mohammed bin Salman’s involvement likely added important dimensions to the US vision, broadening it beyond its narrow framework, aligning it with realities on the ground rather than attempting to bend reality to fit preconceived plans. He criticized Washington’s earlier approach of limiting consultations to representatives of the former civilian government, saying this clearly reflected a serious failure to grasp the nature of the conflict and the actual balance of power on the ground.
For his part, Professor Fadl al-Mawla al-Naeem, a political science professor, believes that Trump is highly pragmatic in handling political files, contrary to those who portray him as chaotic or prone to political thuggery. “In my view, he knows exactly where to step and does not rely on others’ visions; he has his own perspective that guides him,” he said.
Al-Naeem added that once Trump takes charge of a file, he does not stop until the war stops. He is currently studying the situation and seeking loopholes through which he can exert control over all parties, ultimately announcing a solution rather than merely an initiative. “I do not expect him to propose an initiative, but rather a solution—preceded by contacts here and there and communication with multiple actors. Strategically, he will not present an initiative to be negotiated,” he said, stressing that Sudanese leadership should understand this well.
He concluded that now is the right time to intensify efforts on all fronts—military, political, and diplomatic—because what is being prepared in Washington is a solution, not an initiative. This process, he said, is being carried out in partnership with Saudi Arabia through Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman personally, not merely through state institutions. He also noted that Sudanese leadership is fully aware that the Quartet is “pure evil,” which it rejected from the outset under pressure, and insisted that he does not believe it will retreat from that position now.
