The Tripartite Aggression (UAE / Ethiopia / Israel) Against Sudan

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1.
An investigative report published by Dark Box Intelligence—a website specializing in intelligence affairs—titled “UAE Flights Linked to Sudan War Tracked From Israel to Ethiopia as Gulf Rivalry Deepens” revealed, on January 22, 2026, the movements of an Antonov AN-124 cargo aircraft bearing registration number UR-ZYD, linked to Emirati logistics networks.
The report documented the aircraft’s movements between military bases in the Gulf, Israel, and Ethiopia, including stopovers at Ethiopia’s Harar Meda Air Base and Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa. These movements raised widespread questions about the nature of the growing regional role of Israel and Ethiopia in Sudan’s war, particularly after the exposure of the UAE’s involvement.
Let us begin with the story of the aircraft, then trace the Israeli and Ethiopian roles in the aggression against Sudan, alongside the well-documented Emirati role.

2.
The Antonov aircraft is operated by Maximus Air, a company linked to Abu Dhabi’s air cargo network. It carried out a series of regular flights between Abu Dhabi Airport and Al Dhafra Air Base, on the one hand, and Harar Meda Air Base in Ethiopia, on the other, with subsequent stops at Bole International Airport.

According to Dark Box Intelligence, the pattern, frequency, and short ground-stop durations of these flights suggest organized logistical activity of a security nature, rather than routine commercial cargo operations. The report also noted that prior to its flights to Ethiopia, the same aircraft conducted several trips between a military base in Bahrain and a facility believed to belong to the Israeli Air Force at Ovda Air Base in southern Israel.

Separately, Middle East Eye analyzed flight-tracking data for the same aircraft and uncovered a recurring pattern of flights between Abu Dhabi and Harar Meda Air Base. Specifically:

• January 3: The aircraft flew from Abu Dhabi to Harar Meda and returned in less than two hours.
• January 12: It flew from Al Dhafra Air Base to Harar Meda and returned.
• January 15: The flight was repeated for a third time.
• January 17: The aircraft flew again to Harar Meda, then continued on to Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa.

Earlier, between December 28 and 31, the aircraft conducted three flights between Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain and Ovda Air Base in Israel’s Negev Desert.

Nathaniel Raymond, Director of the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale University, said: “The repetition of these flights by an aircraft with such military cargo capacity should raise global concern.”

Middle East Eye also quoted a Sudanese intelligence source as saying that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had purchased at least six fighter jets—Sukhoi and MiG aircraft—which were dismantled and transported via cargo planes from the UAE to Ethiopia or to Al-Kufra Air Base in eastern Libya.

3.
Earlier, on May 5, 2025, the Israeli foreign minister arrived in Addis Ababa on an official visit publicly described as aimed at “enhancing economic and development cooperation.” However, during the visit, the Israeli minister discussed security cooperation, regional stability, and cross-border conflict challenges with senior Ethiopian officials, according to official statements from both sides.

The timing and regional context of the visit raised questions about its true objectives, especially as intelligence reports had confirmed that Israeli actors were involved in training RSF forces. Several research institutions published satellite images of sites under construction in Ethiopia used as RSF training camps, showing tents and large quantities of equipment.

Satellite imagery and press reports also pointed to RSF training camps in border areas of Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, near Sudan’s border—particularly in areas such as Bambasi and other locations close to the frontier. The reports showed equipment and vehicles in the camps and estimated that they host thousands of RSF fighters—possibly exceeding 10,000—distributed across training sites in areas such as Menqi and Al-Ahmar in the Ondlo area near the border.

A Sudanese official told Sudan Tribune on December 27, 2025, that Ethiopia had opened its territory to train RSF fighters and allied forces in four border locations within the Benishangul-Gumuz region, adjacent to Sudan’s Blue Nile State. He added that the training camps—hosting RSF forces, the SPLM-North (Joseph Tuka faction), forces loyal to Ubaid Abu Shotal, as well as mercenaries from Ethiopia and South Sudan—had been supplied with military equipment in preparation for an offensive.

The same official said the government had discovered the arrival of large quantities of military equipment from the UAE to two air bases inside Benishangul, expected to be used in attacks on Al-Kurmuk and Qeissan. Activists also circulated satellite images showing the completion of two new aircraft hangars at Assosa Airport, alongside ongoing construction and facility upgrades.

Al Jazeera Net quoted a government official on December 8 as saying that Sudan was preparing to open a new military front after Ethiopia allowed the establishment of RSF and foreign mercenary training camps. He confirmed that Ethiopian authorities were coordinating militarily with the RSF through supportive regional powers, including supply lines and prepared runways, with combat vehicles, artillery systems, and jamming equipment already arriving via Assosa.

4.
On January 21, 2026, Middle East Eye reported that uncertainty surrounding the future of Emirati bases in Berbera and Bosaso, after Somalia annulled all agreements with Abu Dhabi, led to the redeployment of Emirati elements inside Ethiopia. Ethiopia, according to multiple sources—including a former adviser to the Ethiopian government—has become a central pillar of the UAE’s regional strategy.

The adviser, who worked for more than a decade with the Addis Ababa government, said Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed “appears convinced that Ethiopia’s future lies in a close alliance with the UAE.” He added that some Ethiopian foreign ministry officials and others believe the UAE has shaped Ethiopia’s policies toward the Sudanese government, the RSF, Eritrea, and even the port of Assab over the past two years.

5.
The conspiracy became evident when all armed convoys in the Khor Yabus area inside Sudan—arriving from Benishangul—were destroyed last week. The convoy belonged to Joseph Tuka, whose forces had been trained, equipped, and armed at Assosa camps with Ethiopian knowledge and assistance, and fully financed by the UAE.

More recently, the UAE withdrew its equipment from Somalia’s Puntland region after being expelled from Somali territory and ports—an announcement made officially last week—and transferred all weapons previously stored in Puntland to militia camps in the Assosa area.

6.
Taken together, the facts presented in this article—from military flight routes, cross-border camps, and security-oriented diplomatic visits, to logistical and financial support networks—paint a single, unavoidable picture: a clear convergence of interests between the UAE, Ethiopia, and Israel aimed at prolonging and intensifying the war in Sudan rather than pushing toward its end.

Each party in this undeclared alliance plays a defined role: the UAE through funding and arms, Ethiopia by providing territory, strategic depth, and transit routes, and Israel through technical and intelligence support. The outcome is not merely the backing of a militia, but the transformation of Sudan into an open regional battleground managed from outside its borders, with its cost paid in the blood and future of its people.

7.
The continuation of this compound aggression against Sudan cannot be accepted. Today, Sudan’s struggle is no longer purely military; it has become a battle of awareness—exposing foreign interventions so the nation does not remain hostage to shadowy alliances planned in secrecy and executed on its soil.

In light of this complex entanglement of air routes, military movements, diplomatic visits, and intelligence reports, the war in Sudan can no longer be described as an internal conflict alone. It has become part of a broader regional conflict system involving multiple actors inside and outside the region, with Sudan as the victim of these interventions and this layered aggression.

Such a compound aggression requires a compound response—not only in Sudan’s interest, but in the interest of all who care about regional stability and their own national security, especially as the flames now threaten to reach their doorsteps. The decisive moment spoken of by Dr. Al-Tijani Abdul Qader in his in-depth article “Has the ‘Decisive Moment’ in Sudan’s War Arrived?” has indeed come.