What Does Lifting the Siege of Kadugli Mean?

As I See 

Adel El-Baz

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Kadugli is not an ordinary city in Sudan’s military and political geography; it is the gateway to the Nuba Mountains and a command-and-control hub in South Kordofan. Securing it does not merely mean saving a city from a prolonged siege; it also means preventing the adversary from turning the region into a safe depth or a launch platform threatening western and southern supply routes, and from linking operational theaters in Kordofan and Darfur.

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Lifting the siege of Kadugli, alongside the recapture of other cities and the breaking of additional sieges, confirms that the military strategy adopted by the armed forces—through multiple tactics—has been grounded in realism, long-term endurance, and strategic patience. At the most difficult stages, this strategy preserved force cohesion and troop morale, even during moments of retreat or withdrawal, amid enormous regional and domestic pressures and acts of betrayal.
The strategy was built on the principle of weakening the enemy rather than holding territory for its own sake; territory—events have proven—returns once the enemy is defeated. This is precisely what happened: the adversary was pushed back and cities were gradually retaken.

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When militia forces became scattered across vast areas without direction, the army worked to encircle them on the ground by choking supply arteries and cutting off movement and logistics lines. In the air, the armed forces targeted the militia’s core vulnerabilities: its random movements, undisciplined spread, and the absence of any military doctrine or clear strategic objective.
The army relied on multi-layered tactics, including surprising the enemy by reaching it in terrain it did not know—especially mountainous areas—then surrounding and isolating it, and finally exploiting the victory and moving to the next operational phase.
This was clearly demonstrated in the lifting of the siege on Dilling, which was a calculated preparatory step leading to the dawn of the day when the siege of Kadugli was broken.
In a phone call I had with Major General Al-Sayer, commander of the 14th Division in Kadugli, following the lifting of the Dilling siege, he confirmed that planning extended beyond Kadugli itself, noting that lifting its siege had already become “a foregone conclusion.” This statement reflects the strategic depth of military planning, which views battles holistically across all theaters of operation in Sudan, rather than as isolated fronts.
Now… what does lifting the siege of Kadugli mean in practical terms?

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Thousands of soldiers had been trapped inside Kadugli, suffering shortages in weapons supplies, vehicles, and logistical stockpiles. Lifting the siege means freeing a massive military force that is now rearmed and mobile, reintegrating it into operational command, and deploying it to battlefronts in West Kordofan and along the fringes of Darfur.
It also means restoring freedom of movement and supply (fuel, ammunition, food), and transforming the city from a defensive burden into a launch base.

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Lifting the siege means that a city which endured the bitterness of blockade for more than a year has regained its vitality. This is the real reason behind the massive public turnout yesterday by Kadugli residents to welcome the vanguard of the “Al-Sayyad” military column.
It also opens the way for humanitarian organizations to enter safely and effectively ends the debate over the need for a “humanitarian truce” to deliver aid.
Today, there is a secure road from Dilling to Kadugli—a practical truce imposed by battlefield realities, not agreements: humanitarian organizations are now invited—the road is open.
Politically, lifting the siege on one of Kordofan’s most important cities strengthens state legitimacy and shifts the conflict from a situation of “besieged centers” to a battle over extending state authority and protecting civilians.
It also sends a strong message to the militia’s external backers: regardless of what you do or spend, this militia will not withstand the army and the will of the people.
Lifting the siege also means that any upcoming political process—whether ceasefire negotiations or humanitarian tracks—will now be managed from a stronger negotiating position, limiting external actors’ ability to impose coercive solutions, parallel administrative arrangements, or frameworks that bypass the state.

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This narrative makes clear that lifting the siege of Kadugli is not an isolated military event, but a strategic shift that will reshape the balance of power on the ground and alter political negotiation terms. It also demonstrates that strategic patience, when managed rationally, can defeat chaos no matter how long it persists.
What comes next after lifting the siege? Managing post-victory conditions is no less important than the battle to break the siege itself. The next challenge is not only preventing the siege from returning, but converting the military gain into lasting deterrence by securing surrounding areas, controlling weapons, restoring services, and engaging local communities in maintaining stability.
If the state succeeds in Kadugli as a model for post-conflict administration, it will send a decisive message: the army does not liberate cities only to leave them, but to restore law, services, and public security. When military strength is paired with effective governance, victory becomes irreversible, and liberated cities shift from battlefields into pillars of stability and foundations of the national state.

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While the “Lions of the Mountains” were climbing the heights to liberate cities and free them from the grip of the Janjaweed militia, failed traitors were touring western cities, inciting against their homeland, begging for truces, and defending their masters.
Treason has a thousand faces. But the betrayal of the “Sumoud” group toward its homeland, it is claimed, has no face, no faith, and no morality.

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Now the question facing the militia, its allies, and its backers is:
“If the siege strategy has collapsed in Sudan’s most rugged terrain—the Nuba Mountains—where can the militia flee in the plains and open areas?”
There is no refuge.