Opinion

“The Struggle for Influence: What the Saudi–Emirati Rivalry Means for the Red Sea and Europe”

Camille Lons

In late 2025, the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a Yemeni political organization backed by the United Arab Emirates—launched a military takeover of Yemen’s Hadramout and Al-Mahra governorates. In a forceful response, Saudi Arabia initiated a broad diplomatic and military campaign, targeting what it described as Emirati arms supply lines, dissolving the council, and pushing the UAE to announce a full withdrawal from Yemen.

After years of escalating competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, their confrontation is now affecting not only Yemen but the entire Red Sea region. The rivalry is reshaping regional alliances and threatening to heighten geopolitical instability—developments that warrant close attention from European policymakers.

Beyond Yemen, Saudi Arabia has intensified efforts to counter Emirati activities in Sudan. International actors have accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a move widely viewed as prolonging the civil war against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which are backed by Riyadh, alongside the United States in mediation efforts.

During Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington in November 2025, he reportedly reiterated calls for the United States to increase pressure on the UAE over its role in Sudan. This was followed by expanded Saudi support for the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland and Its Impact

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in late December 2025 added another layer of tension. The move is believed to be linked to the potential establishment of Israeli military or intelligence facilities there to monitor Houthi activity in Yemen. The UAE played a role in strengthening Israel’s ties with Somaliland, particularly through the development of the port and airport of Berbera. These developments strained relations between the federal government in Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, ultimately prompting Somalia to sever diplomatic ties with the UAE.

The UAE has also participated in joint naval exercises with Israel in the Red Sea and previously acted as a mediator between Sudan and Israel ahead of the signing of the Abraham Accords.

Saudi Arabia’s Regional Response

These shifts have prompted Saudi Arabia to recalibrate its diplomatic and military engagement in the Red Sea basin. Riyadh has worked to build a countervailing regional coalition against Emirati and Israeli influence, deepening cooperation with Egypt and Somalia in an effort to curb Emirati logistical networks in Sudan and Yemen.

Saudi Arabia has also taken steps to restrict the UAE’s use of Saudi and Egyptian airspace for transporting shipments suspected of supporting the RSF in Sudan. Additionally, Riyadh has reportedly pressured Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar to sever smuggling routes allegedly used by Emirati actors to channel supplies.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has expanded military cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan, establishing a trilateral defense partnership and seeking to provide advanced military support to Sudan’s government forces.

Economically, Riyadh has shown growing interest in expanding its commercial footprint in Sudan, particularly in gold shipments and maritime infrastructure in Sudan and Djibouti, following the loss of certain Emirati contracts in those sectors.

Diverging Strategic Approaches

The Saudi–Emirati rivalry reflects deeper strategic divergences:

  • The UAE often builds influence through alliances with non-state actors and by leveraging ports and alternative political structures.
  • Saudi Arabia, by contrast, tends to adopt a more traditional state-centric approach, backing established governments and prioritizing conventional regional stability.

Saudi policymakers have also capitalized on opposition to the expansion of the Emirati alignment with Israel and Ethiopia, broadening their partnerships with Horn of Africa states to counter Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions—moves that have generated additional international tensions.

Conclusion: What Should Europe Do?

The analysis suggests that the region will remain a focal point of instability, driven by overlapping spheres of influence and intensifying regional competition.

From a European perspective, closely monitoring these shifts is essential. Europe must carefully balance its relationships with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia to avoid being drawn into regional power struggles that do not serve its strategic interests.

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