The Chadian President and the Dilemma of Backing the RSF

Sudan Events – Agencies

This week, The Africa Report published an analytical piece examining the situation in Chad and assessing the consequences of the Chadian government’s stance on the ongoing conflict in Sudan. The article concludes that President Mahamat Idriss Déby is now tasting the bitterness of a cup he helped fill through his alignment with the camp opposed to the Sudanese army. His high-risk wager on Sudan’s war, the report argues, is yielding results—albeit bitter ones—manifesting in instability and closed borders. By failing to fully scrutinize the implications of siding with the Rapid Support Forces and their allies, Déby now faces the latent dangers of that decision as they unfold along Chad’s eastern frontier.

The article’s author, Beverly Ochieng, notes that Chad’s decision to close its 1,400-kilometer border with Sudan indefinitely last Monday will not shield it from the broader repercussions of the war.

United Nations reports, Darfur-based human rights organizations, and investigative journalists have repeatedly alleged that Chad has served as a rear base for the RSF, with N’Djamena coordinating logistical support for the paramilitary group on behalf of the United Arab Emirates. Both Chad and the UAE deny these accusations. “However,” the article observes, “many analysts attach little weight to such denials—including some members of the Chadian army itself.”

Part of President Déby’s predicament lies in the fact that the alleged direct and indirect involvement contradicts—and sharply departs from—the legacy of his predecessor, Idriss Déby. During earlier conflicts in western Sudan, Idriss Déby supported Darfuri armed groups against the RSF’s predecessor, the Janjaweed. Any deviation from that position was always bound to carry risks for the current president’s legitimacy, particularly given that he assumed office largely on the strength of familial ties.

Déby the younger took power in April 2021 following the sudden death of his father, the veteran leader who was killed on the frontline while fighting rebels.

According to the article, a second challenge confronting Déby stems from the nature of RSF attacks. The United Nations has stated that RSF assaults in Darfur bear “hallmarks of genocide” and have disproportionately targeted members of non-Arab communities, including the Zaghawa.

In Chad, the Zaghawa have historically dominated political and military life, and their Sudanese counterparts maintain strong family ties in eastern regions. As a result, credible reports indicate that Chadian soldiers of various ranks have defected from intelligence services, the army, and other influential armed groups to cross into Sudan and fight against the RSF. Osman Dillo, a cousin of Déby and brother of the late politician Yahya Dillo, is reportedly fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces in Kordofan.

Chadian authorities deny reports of defections, yet a memo attributed to the army restricted leave and travel requests for soldiers in December.

There have also been reports that some Chadian soldiers fought alongside the RSF. On 19 February, former Defense Minister Mohamed Nour Abdelkarim accused Déby and senior military officials of forcibly recruiting more than a thousand young men to fight with the RSF. Chadian authorities dismissed the allegations, describing Abdelkarim as “isolated and disgruntled,” while the RSF likewise denied the claims. Nonetheless, unrest within the Chadian army and the presence of the president’s cousin on the Sudanese frontline have eroded confidence in Déby.

Since assuming office, Déby has reportedly fallen out with dozens of regime elites and has grown increasingly isolated. These tensions have intensified as the conflict has spilled toward the Sudanese border in recent weeks. Over the past few months, several Chadian fighters have been killed in clashes or attacks involving RSF forces, which have been violently consolidating territorial control in western Sudan along the frontier with Chad. In January, a drone strike in Sudan killed two Chadian soldiers. On 21 February, five more were killed when RSF fighters, repelled by the Sudanese Armed Forces in the town of Tina in North Darfur, fled into Chadian territory and clashed with Chadian troops. Two days after the fighting reached Tina, government spokesperson Qasim Sharif Mohamed announced the border’s closure.

Meanwhile, at least 15,000 Chadian troops have reportedly been deployed along the border, increasing the likelihood of continued periodic confrontations with Sudanese armed groups. Ironically, Chad’s current predicament is partly the result of recent battlefield gains by the side allegedly aligned with Déby. The fall of El Fasher to the RSF in October altered the balance of power in western Sudan.

The article argues that El Fasher’s fall pushed Darfuri armed movements closer to the Chadian border, heightening the risk of conflict spillover. The RSF was almost certain to pursue them, likely launching attacks from border areas. Compounding Chad’s concerns is the unreliable discipline within RSF ranks.

RSF leadership has struggled to control its fighters, the article notes, citing the case of Brigadier General Al-Fateh Abdullah Idris—known by the nom de guerre Abu Lolo—who boasted on social media of killing more than 2,000 people after the group seized El Fasher. Although the RSF announced his arrest in October, informed sources said he was released days later and is unlikely to face further internal consequences. The episode exemplified the group’s chronic indiscipline and weak chain of command.

The Tina incident offers another illustration. It occurred despite a January visit to N’Djamena by RSF deputy commander Abdel Rahim Dagalo, who is under U.S., UN, and EU sanctions, in an apparent effort to avoid antagonizing Chad—a country upon which his forces reportedly rely for arms transfers. Border closure, the article suggests, is unlikely to deter rogue RSF fighters.

Ultimately, Darfur is poised to remain a thorn in the side of the Chadian government, with political repercussions extending to N’Djamena. Déby’s focus on securing and controlling the eastern flank is expected to drive up spending on that front, straining financial capacity. In turn, this could undermine the patronage networks essential to maintaining military cohesion and safeguarding his political survival.