Designation… and the Re-Engineering of Sudanese Politics (2)

As I See 

Adel El-Baz

1

If the primary objective behind the decision to designate the Islamic Movement was to pressure and weaken the army’s camp at a critical moment in the war, the implications of the decision extend far beyond the military arena. Its impact reaches into the political sphere and stretches toward reshaping the very environment in which Sudanese politics operates.

In other words, the designation is not aimed at the Islamic Movement in the present as much as it is aimed at re-engineering the entire political landscape in Sudan. Decisions of this kind do not merely alter the status of the Islamic Movement; they redraw the boundaries of politics itself within the state. Once a major and influential political current is placed under the label of “terrorism,” it becomes easy to exclude it from any future political process.

Herein lies the gravity of the decision: it does not merely target the Islamic Movement’s current presence, but seeks to shape a different political reality in the future—one whose contours are being drafted from outside the country.

2

In essence, the decision to designate the Islamic Movement is not about the past—neither in its causes nor in its objectives. That is to say, the decision does not relate to any specific actions the movement took in the past. It does not point to any terrorist act carried out by the Islamic Movement or its military wing. Rather, the stated justification is that the group “uses unrestricted violence against civilians.”

Why? According to the decision, it is “to undermine efforts aimed at resolving the conflict,” and because it “contributed to mass executions of civilians.”

Have you seen such a crude and repugnant level of fabrication? Those who have practiced unrestrained violence against civilians are known, those who support them are known, and those who have taken part in atrocities are documented—facts that appear even in the records of the United Nations Security Council and the reports of the Human Rights Council. From where, then, did the United States extract these accusations against the Islamic Movement without evidence?

But let us set that aside for now; it belongs to the past and offers little benefit at this moment, since the decision has already been issued.

3

The decision in question does not target only the present and future of the Islamic Movement; it also affects the state itself. The political message behind it is clear: the isolation of the movement from the political sphere.

Once a movement is given such a designation, it creates an atmosphere of caution in dealing with it politically—whether at the level of the state or across the broader political arena—out of fear of sanctions that could be imposed on those who engage with it. This remains the case even though the decision is specific to the United States and does not formally bind any internal, regional, or international actor.

At the same time, the decision carries a warning to the state not to cooperate with the movement either now, at this critical moment, or in the future. Such cooperation could entail legal and political consequences and cast a shadow over the country’s institutions as a whole.

Moreover, the decision seeks to isolate the Islamic Movement from any future political settlement, thereby attempting to reorganize the political map in line with the vision of the forces behind the designation. When a major political current is excluded, it does not necessarily produce political stability; rather, it may create an imbalance within the political arena.

Experiences across the region have repeatedly shown that the exclusion of political forces through external pressure rarely produces a stable political order. More often, it opens the door to new cycles of conflict.

4

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the matter, however, is not only the political balance but also the international narrative surrounding the war itself. Decisions of this kind contribute to redefining the Sudanese conflict in global discourse.

Instead of the war being viewed as a confrontation between the Sudanese state and a rebel militia, it could be reframed as a confrontation between “extremist forces,” a rebel militia, and civilian actors. Such a shift in narrative is far from a minor detail; it could carry significant consequences for international positions in the future.

When the description of a conflict changes, so too does the way the international community deals with it.

5

For this reason, the designation decision should not be read as an isolated legal event, but rather as part of a broader struggle over the future of the Sudanese state itself. The designation of the Islamic Movement forms one element of this wider contest over the nature of the Sudanese state and the future of its political system.

The real question is no longer simply: how and why was the Islamic Movement designated, and by whom?

Rather, the question is: what are the strategic dimensions of this decision? What is the position of the Sudanese state toward it? How will the decision affect it—and how will the state respond?

These are the questions that will determine the course of events in the coming period.

To be continued