Who Is Responsible for Squandering $10 Billion?

As I See 

Adel El-Baz

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The person responsible is Mr. Kamil Idris… Is he not the government? Indeed, he is. But before I substantiate my accusation against the government, let me tell you the story of the Southern delegation.

A high-level delegation from South Sudan, led by Pagan Amum, traveled to Britain seeking financial assistance after the South Sudanese state had shut down the oil pipelines during its dispute with the government in the North. One British official told them: “You are like a man who cut off his right hand and then went begging with his left.” That is exactly the condition of our state: it squanders the resources already in its hands through poor management, then searches for external resources and fails to find them.

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All credible local and international reports confirm that Sudan’s annual gold production, at a minimum estimate, reaches seventy tons. At today’s prices, this could generate approximately $10.6 billion in foreign currency revenues. In fact, just two weeks ago, the same production volume could have generated returns of up to $12.6 billion—an increase of nearly $2 billion.

This means that if we were able to bring this production under state control, we could achieve the following:

First: Close the balance of payments gap, which Central Bank data reveal has widened to nearly $5 billion.

Second: Stabilize the currency exchange rate and halt its deterioration.

Third: Control inflation, because imports would then be financed at reasonable and competitive rates.

If these three objectives can be achieved simply through controlling gold production and exports—and these goals alone are enough to significantly revive the economy—what more could any state hope to accomplish beyond achieving economic balance and controlling inflation? Governments around the world are preoccupied with nothing more than these three objectives.

I do not believe the state is unwilling or incapable. On the contrary, it knows exactly what must be done to achieve these goals. What it lacks is competence, sound management, and legal firmness. Yes, it knows the road well, yet it refuses to act… why?

The answer is simple: poor management, and nothing else.

So, what can the state do?

The truth is that it already knows what to do, as evidenced by the fact that it has recently begun moving in the right direction. It issued a decision obligating government companies to sell their gold purchases to the Central Bank of Sudan. It also decided to direct revenues that had previously gone elsewhere into designated accounts supporting the war effort. Furthermore, it has begun reviewing the percentages and agreements tied to concession companies—files filled with stories we will revisit later.

Yes, all of this has happened, but much remains to be done, and what remains is serious. The state still appears hesitant and confused… but afraid of what? I do not know. Is it afraid of the gold mafia? Of corruption networks within its own institutions? Who exactly is obstructing it?

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In this article, I will take Tanzania as an example. There, minerals belong to the state, which acts as trustee on behalf of the people. Companies do not own the gold; they are merely granted the right to extract it under state-defined conditions.

Tanzania moved quickly to bring artisanal mining under control through policies and legislation. It created registries for miners and their areas of operation, began providing services to them, and regulated local traders, middlemen, and exporters. Most importantly, it encouraged the formation of cooperatives, provided them with bank financing to purchase equipment and mills, facilitated access to technology, and established local refineries and commodity exchanges.

As a result of these policies, the Bank of Tanzania accumulated gold reserves worth more than $1.3 billion by the end of 2025. In the same year, it purchased more than five tons of pure gold valued at over $554 million as part of its reserve program. By September 2025, Tanzania’s gold exports had reached $4.43 billion, despite the fact that the country’s annual gold production in recent years has ranged between 55 and 60 tons, with a record level of around 60 tons achieved in 2024.

Sudan, by contrast, produces no less than seventy tons annually—ten tons more than Tanzania—yet its gold revenues in 2025 did not exceed $1.5 billion! Imagine that Egypt produces only eighteen tons of gold annually, yet its export revenues last year reached $7.6 billion, while we, with seventy tons of production, generate only $1.5 billion!

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Tanzania began where real decisions begin: with pricing and accessibility. It established an official market closely linked to global prices, guaranteed rapid payment, and simplified procedures. Over time, miners no longer needed to risk smuggling in search of better prices or quicker liquidity. Behavior changed—not out of fear of punishment, but in response to clear economic incentives.

Tanzania then employed technology and fully digitized the gold supply chain so that every gram had a traceable path: from the mine to the purchasing center, to the refinery, and finally either to export channels or the central bank’s vaults. In short, Tanzania understood that gold is not merely a mining issue—it is an issue of financial sovereignty. It linked the law to the market, the market to the central bank, and the central bank to national reserves.

At the same time, the state did not wait for gold to reach the borders. It went directly to the places of production, establishing official purchasing centers and maintaining a presence within the market itself to monitor, record, and follow every sale transaction. Oversight thus shifted from expensive pursuit operations to direct supervision at the decisive point of exchange.

Most importantly, the miner himself was not treated as an adversary, but as part of the system. He was licensed, supported, and integrated into the formal economy, gradually shrinking the space for smuggling.

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Tanzania also tightened its laws, treating smuggling not merely as an economic crime but as a crime against state security. It imposed strict penalties, including confiscation, fines, and imprisonment. Smuggling thus became an unprofitable option, while the official channel became faster, easier, and more rewarding. In this way, the market itself returned the gold to the state.

The essence of Tanzania’s experience lies in its realization that controlling gold requires an integrated system: one that begins by encouraging local producers as partners through fair prices and services, is organized through strict laws and digital tracking, and is secured through direct linkage to the central bank in order to reinforce financial sovereignty. The success did not come merely from banning smuggling, but from building an attractive formal alternative that outweighed the temptations of illicit trade.

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O Government of Hope, I hope Tanzania’s experience in the gold sector inspires you toward a path that changes the way this sector is managed—a sector desperately in need of comprehensive reform in regulation, law, and policy.

Believe me, there is no greater service you can provide to this people at this moment than gaining control over their most important resource. If you fail to control it, you will find no other resource capable of financing your programs, development plans, or anything else. All promises will become nothing more than words in the air.

My advice to you: leave everything else aside and focus solely on reclaiming the $10 billion that lies within reach—from smugglers, brokers, and the corrupt. Only then can gold be transformed from a raw resource into a pillar of the entire national economy, instead of stretching your hands toward others and causing us to lose what little hope remains in your government… the Government of Hope.