Who Is Obstructing the Aramco Deal? (1)

As I See 

Adil El-Baz

1

For months, I have been following the astonishing developments in the fuel sector — the chaos and looting carried out by the sector’s mafia networks, where a single fuel shipment can generate profits exceeding $8 million. I have written more than once on this issue, and thankfully, the state has finally responded. The government has decided — “following a series of meetings implementing the Cabinet’s directives to regulate fuel import operations” — to abolish the quota system under which fuel imports were divided equally between public-sector companies and private-sector firms classified within certain groups.

In my view, this is the government’s first real victory against the petroleum mafia in decades. However, this step alone is not enough to resolve the deeply rooted crises within this sector, crises whose effects spill over into every other sector of the economy.

So what will the government do after abolishing the old system?

2

In a report published by the Ministry of Energy on April 28, 2026, it stated that the Minister of Energy discussed with the Foreign Minister the understandings reached with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding fuel supplies. The report also referred to understandings with other countries, including Libya.

Then the respected economic newspaper Elaf Economic, which has been closely following the issue, reported in its April 30, 2026 edition that the government was studying offers to import fuel directly from three external sources. At the time, the newspaper did not disclose the identities of those sources, but in its May 7, 2026 edition, it later revealed two of them: and Oman.

Now we know the parties involved in these understandings — three entities — so I began investigating the nature of these agreements, details of which were absent from the original report.

While researching energy-focused sources, specifically the Washington-based Energy Platform, I found a more detailed report dated April 28, 2026 explaining some of these offers.

The report stated: “Sudan is studying an offer submitted by Saudi Aramco to supply fuel, in a move that could strengthen supply stability and support the energy sector, which has recently been facing financial and operational challenges.”

The platform added that the offer from the Saudi oil giant remains under review by the relevant authorities as part of preliminary understandings addressing fuel-product supply arrangements.

It also explained that handling Aramco’s proposal involves several tracks, including financial commitments overseen by the Ministry of Finance, technical matters handled by the Ministry of Energy, and guarantees provided by the Central Bank of Sudan. As a result, the file remains under technical and financial evaluation before any implementation step is taken.

That was the end of the report.

At that point, I began asking: What exactly is the government still studying?

The offer is simple: a 180-day payment period in exchange for sovereign guarantees, along with a commitment to provide all petroleum products steadily throughout the year. There is nothing better than that.

So what is the government waiting for before signing this contract?

I was told the matter is still under review by the three concerned bodies, and that no final decision has yet been reached.

But studying what exactly? And when will these studies end?

Saudi Arabia is currently at the peak of its responsiveness toward Sudan. There is no guarantee that this favorable situation will remain indefinitely, so why are we not seizing the opportunity?

What critical issue could possibly be occupying them more than this deal?

The understandings at the highest levels have already been completed, and Aramco’s offer was submitted more than two months ago. All that remains now is approval from the Central Bank of Sudan regarding banking guarantees for payment and transfer flows, along with approval from the Ministry of Finance — meaning the state itself.

Gold could serve as an acceptable guarantee from the government to Aramco. After that, only the technical plans and implementation programs would remain to finalize the agreement.

So why all this delay?

I began to fear that the petroleum mafia is behind this slow decision-making process, using its influence within various state institutions already weakened by war and networks of vested interests.

Were it not for my confidence in the leadership of the country’s economic sector — namely Energy Minister Engineer and Adviser Al-Mu’tasim Ibrahim Ahmed, Finance Minister , and Central Bank Governor Amna Mirghani — I would have directly accused them of corruption and collusion with the fuel mafia.

This mafia fears not only losing profits, but also losing influence, because it understands that controlling fuel means controlling the dollar exchange rate, the market, inflation, and even politics itself.

Fortunately, in my view, this trio currently managing the economy stands above suspicion.

3

The pressing question is this:

Is there anyone who disputes the importance of this deal and its potential impact on the broader economy at such a critical time?

An agreement with Aramco goes far beyond merely securing fuel supplies.

A government partnership with a company the size of Aramco represents a long-term strategic transformation. It guarantees supply stability away from local market volatility and the schemes of the petroleum mafia, which may seek to obstruct the agreement.

This shift — from the costly and opportunistic “deal economy” controlled by networks of interests and corruption to an “economy of stable supply” — means stabilizing one of the most critical pillars of the macroeconomy.

The continued delay in finalizing this agreement is effectively giving this mafia more time to exercise its influence and undermine overall economic stability.

4

Again, the urgent question remains:

Is there anyone who truly disputes the importance of this deal and its macroeconomic returns at this moment?

Could the responsible institutions — even the highest authorities — genuinely fail to understand the urgency of concluding the agreement as quickly as possible?

The currency is collapsing, the agricultural season is on the verge of failure, and inflation is accelerating. Fast-tracking this agreement could help address several structural imbalances currently hitting the state.

Does no one within the state leadership understand this?

If they do, then why the hesitation?

5

In the next installment, I will explain in detail the potential consequences of an agreement specifically with Aramco — and with Aramco in particular, not any other company or offer.

Aramco is not merely a fuel supplier. It is one of the region’s largest instruments of energy and financial stability.

Entering into a long-term agreement with it would mean transitioning from an economy driven by ad hoc deals to one based on stable supply. The agreement could also fall under the framework of government-to-government fuel import agreements, commonly known as G2G arrangements.

We will also examine Kenya’s experience with Aramco and Vitol’s experience with Uganda for comparison — perhaps there are lessons to be learned.

6

I asked one of my well-informed friends why the agreement still has not been finalized. He replied: “There are clear directives from senior authorities in Saudi Arabia to complete the agreement as quickly as possible. Aramco is simply waiting for the government’s response.”

Then he added: “Honestly, this government has left us baffled.”

And it baffled me, while I was already baffled.

“Broke and showing off”…

The Prime Minister — may God forgive him — left behind Saudi Arabia’s opportunities and went instead seeking the Pope’s blessings at the Vatican.

To be continued…