Opinion

Sudan Confronts a Plot to Turn It into a Failed State

Othman Mirghani

Since the outbreak of the current war in Sudan in 2023, the country has witnessed unprecedented destruction affecting virtually every aspect of life. State institutions and citizens’ property have been destroyed and looted, along with infrastructure, hospitals, universities, museums, banks, and agricultural laboratories. Throughout the various stages of the conflict, one particularly striking feature has been the deliberate targeting of the electricity sector and everything that could bring daily life to a standstill.

As the army regained the initiative and the balance of power began shifting in its favour, amid the declining position of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), drones entered the battlefield on a significant scale, revealing the increasingly prominent external dimensions of the war. Attacks on electricity stations have recently returned to the forefront with renewed intensity. Sixteen stations came under attack within just ten days, causing power outages across vast areas and prompting warnings of a nationwide blackout.

This is not merely a matter of electricity cuts; it is a paralysis that threatens virtually every sector of life. Electricity is the lifeblood of agricultural and industrial production, the foundation upon which hospitals and medical facilities operate, and an essential requirement for telecommunications networks and banking services. Destroying the energy system means undermining the basic necessities of everyday life and pushing the country towards an economic and service-sector collapse whose consequences would be extremely difficult to contain.

Following the repeated attacks, Sudan announced that more than 180 drones had targeted the country during the current year, having been launched from within Ethiopian territory. Earlier this week, the government lodged complaints with the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, accusing Ethiopia of aggression and involvement in attacks launched from its territory. These accusations place the war within a regional context that extends beyond the boundaries of an internal confrontation and warrant an international investigation into the circumstances surrounding these developments.

The involvement of external actors in the war is no longer something that can be ignored. Nor can the continuation of such intervention at this escalating pace go without raising serious questions about its objectives. Plans to weaken and partition Sudan are not new. Since South Sudan’s secession in 2011, warnings have continued to mount about further attempts to dismantle the country, within the context of struggles for influence and control over food, water, and mineral resources, as well as efforts to reshape the regional balance of power.

The course of the war so far can be understood through three main stages.

The first involved an attempt to seize control of the state through an initially swift military coup. The Rapid Support Forces launched an attack on the residence of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with the intention of arresting or killing him. This coincided with attacks on the General Command of the Armed Forces and other military units in the capital, the seizure of the headquarters of the Radio and Television Corporation, and the encirclement of ground and air military bases. However, the plan failed to achieve its objective after the presidential guard repelled the attack on the residence. The Armed Forces subsequently regained their balance despite the shock of the surprise assault and the RSF’s numerical superiority in the capital at the outset of the war.

The second stage involved an attempt to take control of the country through military force, expanding the RSF’s presence from Khartoum into other central states, while extending its operations into Kordofan and Darfur. However, the Sudanese army gradually succeeded in regaining control of the capital and Al Jazirah State, forcing the RSF to withdraw and retreat towards its areas of presence in Kordofan, Darfur, and the Blue Nile region.

The third stage, which is the current one, is taking shape along two tracks, in my assessment.

The first seeks to create a parallel entity and impose a reality of partition modelled on the Libyan experience. This involves the declaration of the so-called Tasis Government, the establishment of local administrations, a police force, and nominal institutions, alongside attempts to expand territorial control in western Sudan and forge an alliance with Abdelaziz al-Hilu and his forces within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in the Nuba Mountains. The plan also seeks to link this area to the Blue Nile region, extending towards the Ethiopian border.

With this track encountering obstacles, amid international and regional rejection of recognition for any parallel entity, and with influential regional powers standing alongside Sudan in rejecting any threat to its sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, a second and more dangerous track has emerged. This is particularly significant given the army’s ongoing operations to regain control of Kordofan and the Blue Nile region ahead of an anticipated advance towards Darfur.

The second track seeks to turn Sudan into a failed state by exhausting its capabilities, destroying its infrastructure, disrupting essential services, and plunging society into chaos. In this context, the escalation of drone attacks against electricity stations and vital facilities can be understood as part of a war aimed at destroying the fundamental pillars of the state.

The growing danger has recently prompted Egypt to signal its readiness to activate the joint defence agreement with Sudan, in order to support the country and ensure that no red lines are crossed regarding its territorial unity, sovereignty, and the integrity of its institutions. Saudi Arabia has likewise reaffirmed its rejection of any parallel entities in Sudan and reiterated its unwavering support for the country’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as the preservation of its state institutions.

In the face of this situation, the greatest hope ultimately rests with the Sudanese themselves and their readiness to protect their country from the schemes being devised against it.

What is reassuring is that conversations with ordinary people reveal a clear awareness of the dangers and conspiracies threatening their country. This helps explain their patience in the face of the mounting suffering caused by the war and their conviction that they will overcome this critical juncture, perhaps the most dangerous in their country’s history since independence.

The challenge is no longer simply to bring the war to an end; it is also to prevent it from becoming a gateway to dismantling the state and destroying the very foundations upon which its survival depends.

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