The UAE Must Stop Stoking War in Sudan (2 – 2)

As a result of the RSF’s assault on civilian life, an overwhelming number of Sudanese now rally behind the SAF, with tens of thousands volunteering for conscription and widespread endorsement of the decision to disband the RSF by Burhan, acting in his capacity as chairman of the technically-still-ruling Sovereign Council.

While the situation is bleak, a return to relative peace in Sudan is possible in the case of a negotiated settlement or a decisive SAF victory,  given that the conflict is not yet as internationalized as the conflicts in Libya, Yemen, or Syria. Domestically, other armed actors exist, but they are small, poorly disciplined, and lack any serious foreign backing to pose an existential danger to the SAF. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz El Hilu gained ground in South Kordofan, ostensibly seizing the moment to gain leverage against the SAF and the future government in future negotiations over the fate of the war-torn region.

Beyond that, however, the only force that poses an existential threat to the SAF, the last standing pillar of the Sudanese state, is the RSF, which is a key ally of the UAE-Wagner-Haftar axis. The support afforded to the RSF in the form of arms will continue to fuel death and destruction. The war, therefore, can only end when these supply lines are cut and these munitions dry up.

For the UAE, betting on the RSF is a losing proposition for multiple reasons. Firstly, the public image of the RSF has been tarnished beyond repair. While before the war it was seen by the global community and Sudan’s political elite as a potential partner in the country’s transition to a civilian-led government, it is now becoming increasingly isolated and is reviled as a genocidal militia.

Secondly, the RSF looks unlikely to win the war given the fact that its forces have concentrated their efforts on Khartoum and its point of origin, Darfur. These forces, therefore, have embedded themselves in neighborhoods and have seized civilian infrastructure to wage a war that they know the SAF cannot win without leveling the capital and battle-scarred cities in Darfur such as  Nyala, El-Fasher, and El-Geneina. This has created a stalemate situation that is setting the country up for a long-term state of war.

Thirdly, the UAE’s ties to the group have already tainted Abu Dhabi’s image among Sudanese and will curb its influence on Sudan’s politics in the future. Pro-democracy protestors that led the Sudanese revolution in 2018/2019 were vocal in their opposition to the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s support for the Transitional Military Council, the body that united both the RSF and SAF when their relations with each other were still warm.

Banners that condemned the Emiratis and Saudis’ propping up of the Sudanese defense complex were widespread at the site of the June 3 massacre, in which both the SAF and the RSF were implicated. The current war serves to further reinforce the prevailing perception that the UAE is a saboteur of Sudan’s democratic transition.

Lastly, the UAE’s own economic and strategic interests are in areas firmly controlled by the SAF.  The multibillion-dollar Abu Amama Port on the Red Sea, which was to be developed by the Abu Dhabi Ports Group, and the hundreds of thousands of acres of agricultural land developed and slated for cultivation by Emirati development funds and corporations are largely in states held by the SAF.

For Washington, its continued inaction vis-à-vis the UAE’s hawkishness in Sudan will only result in yet another collapsed state in an already fragile neighborhood. Empowering the UAE to fill the void after the U.S. withdrawal from the region has actually undermined Washington’s own goals of promoting stable and democratic regimes in the region. Instead, the chaos that enveloped Yemen, Libya, and Syria will play out again in Africa’s third-largest country in a more magnified form as long as the UAE’s support for the RSF continues.

Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst focused on Sudanese affairs. Previously written for The Guardian, Open Democracy, and the Sudan Tribune.