About What Happens in Manama: Between Blaming and Regretting (1-3) 

Ending the War

By: Mohammed Farouq Salman

Public opinion has been preoccupied with many events regarding what happened in the Bahraini capital, including a meeting between the army leadership and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and at the level of the second “man” in each, as if the preoccupation of many in the civilian political movement with ending the war would not have been preoccupied with a meeting at this level, or addressing the desire of the two parties to meet to put an end to it, unlike a meeting in Djibouti between the two leaders. In its importance, the meeting actually overshadows the invitation of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination (Taqaddum) to meet with the two parties, and even its signing of a declaration of principles with one of the parties, which was preceded by an invitation from the National Mechanism, to meet with the two parties to consult on an initiative announced by it, and the National Mechanism has already met with the President of the Sovereign Council, Army Commander, Lieutenant General Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan in Port Sudan, and Professor Aisha Musa, a former member of the Sovereign Council (and the head of her delegation who presented the initiative in the meeting with Al-Burhan), confirmed their endeavor to meet the RSF from Port Sudan on the Sudanese media, while the Democratic Forces seeks to end the war also through the position of the most important parties bearing arms in the Juba Peace Agreement (the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Minawi, and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Jibril), through its neutral position in the war so far, unlike the member of the bloc and Vice President of the Sovereign Council/Malik Agar Eyre, who shares his forces with the army, despite the presence of their forces in the city of El Fasher, which is threatened by warto the extent that the citizens there are at the mercy of a single individual from any of the parties, which do not appear to be only two parties there, especially after the arrival to El Fasher by both Dr. Al-Hadi Idris and Al-Tahir Hajar who were relieved from the Sovereign Council and transferred from Juba peace and from FFC- Democratic Bloc to the FFC- Central Council Bloc according to the (framework) arrangements that preceded the war, and some considered it a prelude to it, even though the war was a practical declaration of the failure of political efforts by everyone to avoid it. Its signs remained far from the civil political movement, and even the armed struggle forces, both those that signed the Juba Agreement and those that did not sign as well. These signs to the war were also far from the ability of the “remnants” of the previous regime to ignite it, no matter how much they wished to do so and no matter how comfortable this scenario seemed to them to clear exonerate the two warring parties from the war! Even what was convenient for some members of the former regime according to their vision of a quick war that would bring them back to the scene and eliminate the December Revolution, which seemed to be angered by everyone regardless of its peacefulness! Although the outbreak of war seemed inevitable and postponed before the fall of Al-Bashir in accordance with the growing ambitions of the RSF Commander. However, what was most important in its outbreak was the disruption of the concept of claims of the state’s monopoly on violence, and the contradictions within the security establishment and the military system and its discipline in the state, which were created by the growth of RSF by the former political regime, and this growth continued during the turbulent period of transition, until avoiding war was up to the RSF alone: Either accepting the transformation into an institution subject to the state and the rule of its law, and not affiliated with anyone, or for the state to submit to the RSF and its commander.

If the meeting between the two parties to end the war was important, then this meeting took place in the capital of Bahrain, Manama. If the failure of the Jeddah meetings was primarily linked to the ability and desire of the two parties – both but not one of them in any way – to end the war, then the desire seems clear in the meeting that took place in Bahrain, even if some wanted it to be dissipated by the way the meeting itself was revealed. What is certain is that the ability is not yet available, on both sides this time, to end the war, and what is changing in the Manama meeting is that the ability to continue the war has also decreased, and that the goals desired by both parties have declined with regard to the claims or fears of the civil political discourse about the ambitions of the army leadership and the commander of RSF in power; The army did not achieve a crushing military victory that would be attributed to its commander, such as Kemal Ataturk, not necessarily restoring the glories of the “Islamic” Ottoman Empire, but raising the hopes of Turkish nationalism as a populist leader to undermine and Turkey itself as a goal to undermine the legacy of the last empire in the modern world, according to the process of history. Followed it the end of the colonial doctrine in the countries of Europe that are not sick as well*. As for the RSF, its political losses overshadowed its military expansion, and the momentum of its victories was accompanied by the moral stain of the war of plunder and spoils that it pursues as a motivation and combat doctrine among its members, which does not only cast doubt on its ability in the future to be alone in rule – or even participate – in deciding the fate of governance in Sudan over what remains of State 56 (whose disintegration has become a reality since 2010 and not only now), but it now threatens the future of its existence as before, that is, before the war, as regular forces (and part of the military component according to the constitutional document and the Juba Agreement), can be subject to the rule of law, let alone being trusted to enforce it! These are among the obstacles that will face any scenario to end the war, far from the ambitions of its leaders (or its generals, according to the dysfunctional scenario of the war of the two generals): the issue of merging forces in the future and reforming the security and military sector in accordance with accommodating the same individuals who threatened citizens and seized their property in order to be their protectors!! Even if the Sudanese army itself, in the context of the Sudanese political and social conflict in the post-independence state, is not spared the accusation of threatening the lives and dignity of the citizens of its state! The state’s practices themselves have historically remained a continuous form of violations according to the distortions of the political society when, as a meeting of coercion and not consent, the army had no choice but to have the upper hand in this coercion, as the first force in the state according to the “law”, and the RSF itself was a series of the chains of this state-owned violence, and one of its most prominent achievements according to the context of the past, and the legislation of its laws as well, which has become closer to its ownership as in the scenarios of the army’s encroachment on politics, no matter how much we view it as a crude expression of violence alone, ending its threat to the existence of the state is achieved by ending the cycles of violence in the state, not by proselytizing another round. The current war could be the last cycle of violence. The choice now is between the state and war, as it is not a war between two parties. But it is a confrontation between two paths of history, and a crossroads of two destinations; The end of the state or the end of violence in it.

Repeating the outcomes of what was agreed upon in Jeddah remained an obstacle to the negotiations in more than one form, and for both parties, and after it was clear that the RSF was reluctant to reach a political solution by expanding the scope of its war, an activity that contradicts a priori with the primacy of the option of ending the war peacefully, no matter how military escalation appears to be part of the negotiating tools by some! The army has always been accused of being reluctant, an accusation that cannot be supported by the implementation of the agreement reached in Jeddah, or adherence to its terms, which took place in two chapters, the first in May 2023, when the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protecting Civilians was signed , which was described as an agreement on humanitarian issues, which is: an agreement of preliminary principles to commit to refraining from any military attack that may cause harm to civilians, and to emphasize “the protection of civilians,” and respect for humanitarian and international human rights law, as American officials confirmed – according to statements to Al-Hurra News Channel. It is not a ceasefire agreement. Under the agreement, the two parties allow civilians to leave conflict areas and protect the needs necessary for their survival, protect all private and public facilities and refrain from using them for military purposes. The declaration indicates that it will not “affect any legal, security, or political situation of the parties signing it,” and it is not linked to “engagement in any political process.” However, its last clause indicated that priority should be given to discussions to achieve a short-term ceasefire to facilitate the arrival of emergency humanitarian aid, within the framework of negotiating specific security measures that the two parties will take to secure the arrival of humanitarian aid. The second chapter took place in October 2023, and what was notable here was the exit of the Sudanese army leaders, Al-Burhan and Kabashi, from the siege imposed on them at the General Command in Khartoum. The most prominent thing in the resumption of these negotiations this time was the two parties signing commitments in two separate papers for each of them, the most prominent of which was, according to how national parties dealt with them, and their importance was not necessarily; The RSV eviction from the homes of citizens and civilian “buildings,” and the handover of fugitives of convicts in prisons, which was detailed for members of the former regime, despite the presence of a real threat to security as well from the escape or smuggling of convicted habitual criminals and others in terrorism cases who are now considered Fuel for war and also one of the reasons for the widespread security chaos witnessed in the areas where the RSF are deployed (and not the only reason, of course, according to the practices of these forces themselves, and it is something that has never been referred to in any negotiations so far!). Later, mediation was committed, and the United Nations also called on the two parties to find a means of communication between them to implement the Jeddah Agreement. Because of the necessity of humanitarian aid arriving, there must be coordination between them at least to cross the areas under the control of either party. Among the army’s commitments in October was to facilitate the procedures for the crossing of humanitarian aid at customs points and ports, which was considered necessary to extend the means of life in conflict areas with the cessation of food production activities and the decline of Sudan’s ability to confront epidemics as well.