U AE confined the Sudanese to two options

Zain Al-Abidin Saleh Abdul Rahman

The argument in the speech that took place in the Security Council SC between the Sudanese permanent ambassador to the Security Council and the Emirati ambassador is the beginning of a direct political battle between the two countries.. The strange thing is that the Emirati ambassador did not respond to the accusations directed at his country by Sudan. The Emirati ambassador only focused in his speech on three issues.. The first said that Ambassador Al-Harith Idris represents the army, although the speakers at the United Nations and the Security Council speak in the name of the country that is a member of the United Nations, and do not represent an institution of the state.. Second, he spoke about the aid provided by the Emirates and that the army is obstructing the entry of relief, although the organization’s representatives praised the army’s role in facilitating the passage of relief.. Third, he asked why Sudan does not go to the negotiating platform in Jeddah, and the Emirati ambassador knows that this is not within his country’s jurisdiction.. The rhetorical argument is the beginning of an open media battle between the two countries.. And the Emirati ambassador’s disregard for Sudan’s accusations against his country and his inability to engage in that confirms the accusations, and his country’s role in supporting the militia, and this indicates that The Emirates will continue to support the militia..

The UAE’s interference in Sudanese affairs and its bias towards the militia did not begin with the war, but rather the interference began since the demonstrations of the December Revolution intensified, especially through some of those who called themselves “Sudanese businessmen” and these were the ones who financed the supplies that were provided in the sit-in square, and after the fall of the regime, the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were working in full coordination between them in an attempt to support certain elements of the authority that the two countries were satisfied with.. Also during this period there was a large presence of intelligence offices of many countries, especially the two aforementioned countries, and during this period Taha Osman Al-Hussein, who was working as director of the office of former President Omar Al-Bashir, was transferred and had been dismissed on charges of spying for the Saudi and Emirati countries. After the fall of the Salvation regime, Taha Osman moved his office to the United Arab Emirates, despite holding Saudi citizenship. Taha Osman hired a number of former security leaders to work with him in the Abu Dhabi office.
This is the period in which an invitation was extended to a number of political leaders to visit Abu Dhabi. It is also the period in which the so-called Quartet (America – Britain – Saudi Arabia – the UAE ) began to operate and direct interference in Sudanese political affairs began. The strange thing is that the leaders of the political forces were aware of this blatant interference of the embassies of countries in Sudanese affairs.
As I have repeatedly mentioned, Mohamed Mukhtar Al-Khatib, Secretary-General of the Sudanese Communist Party, had referred to it in the party’s first and last symposium in the school square, where he accused some countries of interfering in internal affairs and also in the visits of some political leaders to the embassies. Al-Khatib predicted that foreign interference would have negative repercussions on the political process in the future. The Emirates were also the ones who had undertaken to support the Juba talks between the military component headed by Mohamed Hamdan Hemeti and the armed movements in Juba, and the Emirates paid all the costs of the operation, including travel tickets and Miscellaneous expenses, accommodation and pension, which confirms that the plan was at the beginning of the revolution’s success, and this shows why the movements took a neutral position when the war began, and when they came to their senses and announced their support and standing with the armed forces, an invitation came for their leaders to come to the Chadian capital “N’Djamena” where Abdel Rahim Daglo, the second commander of the militia, was present. This clearly shows why Tahir Hajar and Al-Hadi Idris stood and Sandal and some leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement split, and the division also extended to the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Arko Minawi and their standing with the “Central Forces of Freedom and Change”, the political wing of the militia, and they had no other choice. The militia leader and the officers with him were 100% confident that their coup would succeed, so they had no other plan if the coup failed, and the political leaders who linked themselves to the plan were burdened with mobilizing the masses and rallying them to support after the coup statement was broadcast, and after it was confirmed that the coup had failed and the militia could not take power. The focus has become on negotiating with the armed forces with the aim of bringing the militia back to the political arena again. This plan is what made the political leaders affiliated with the “Central Forces of Freedom and Change” go to Addis Ababa after the Emirates arranged an understanding with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, Kenyan President William Ruto, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, so that the media elements would go to Kampala and Nairobi. These are responsible for managing the media battle in support of the militia and at the same time supporting the negotiation plan that leads to a settlement between the army and the militia.
When the United States US and the European Union confirmed that this project was a failure and would not succeed after the “Central Forces for Freedom and Change” held its conference in Cairo, which did not find any echo among the masses, and was ignored by social media, and they decided that new leaderships must emerge to cover up the failure of the “Central Forces for Freedom and Change” leaderships, America’s idea was that new leaderships must emerge, so the memorandum of the four was “Noureddine Sati – Al-Baqir Al-Afeef – Abdul Rahman Al-Amin – and Bakri Al-Jak”, and these are the ones who came up with the idea of ​​”progress” and the Emirates presented Hamdok’s name considering that he had support in the Sudanese street, and may be attractive to a large segment of youth, but the militia had transferred its war against the citizens.. which made the majority of the people turn to supporting the army in all regions of Sudan.. This shift is what also prompted Taha Osman’s office to become active and search for elements with the aim of saving the situation.. The idea of ​​supporting a sector for some academics and intellectuals and some political activists who are not affiliated to carry out a campaign in which they demand that the international community intervene in Sudan, or for guardianship, and all of them failed to find an echo In the street, and the Emirates had to evaluate its failed experience, to make sure that Sudan, despite what the war caused, is different from the peoples of other countries whose revolutions were destroyed.. The position has now become clear in the Sudanese issue. There is no middle ground: either standing with the homeland and the army, or standing with the Emirati plan. We ask God for good insight.