The Big Losing Deal (4-7): Lt.Gen. Hemeti between the Stick and the Carrot

Al-Tijani Abdel Qader Hamid
July 24, 2024

When the Ukrainian-Russian war broke out, all the Western powers lined up on one side, and the supporters of Russia lined up on the other. The Cold War between the two superpowers resurfaced, and with it the familiar slogan: He who is not with us is against us. Only a few weeks had passed since Lt.Gen. Hemeti’s visit to Moscow – that ill-fated visit – and before he was able to jump off the Russian ship, he was invited – according to what we believe – to a special and urgent meeting with representatives of the “Quartet Group” hostile to Russia, which was not absent from the scene, or unaware of Russian attempts to penetrate Africa through Sudan. In that meeting, the representatives of the “Quartet Group” confronted Lt.Gen. Hemeti with three dangerous files: the file of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur, the dossier of Russian rapprochement, and the file of “dispersing the sit-in at the leadership” (with its pictures, equipment, and gear).
These files were placed before Lt. Gen. Hemeti, and then the articles related to war crimes and genocide from the International Criminal Court (ICC) statute were read to him. It was made clear to him in an unambiguous manner that his fate was now dependent on the powers that held those dossiers , a fate that would be no different from the fate of Ali Mohamed Ali Kushayb, who was charged with 31 similar crimes, or the fate of Lubanga, the leader of the Congolese militia.
The representatives of the Quartet explained to Lt. Gen. Hemeti in clear and unambiguous language that he had one of two options: to become accused of war crimes and genocide himself (after the Rapid Support Forces RSF were declared a terrorist organization), thus ending his political career, or to start a new political page that would end with him as President of the Republic of Sudan.
If he chose the first option, the discussion in that meeting would be over, and he would simply have to prepare for the trial. If he accepts the second option (which is the group’s preferred option), he must return to his tracks and immediately engage in implementing three specific matters: First: To announce his apology for the October 25 coup in clear and unambiguous terms (with the subsequent sorting of ranks and severing of relations – whether with Burhan, the Islamists, or the civil leaders who respond to them).
Second: To close every window through which he looked out to Russia (or Turkey, Iran, or their allies in the region).
Third: To put an end to his differences with the “Freedom and Change” group and immediately join with all his weight (military and economic) to the arrangements and projects proposed and presented by the Quartet (through the Forces of Freedom and Change).
In return for these three steps, the group will commit to the following: First: To completely close the “leadership sit-in dossier ” and all the related mentions of the International Criminal Court( ICC) or the investigation committee of lawyer Nabil Adeeb, or the committee of the families of the martyrs, and similar demands to dissolve the Janjaweed and punish the dead.
Second: To turn a blind eye to his companies and investments, to increase his military support, and to provide him with political and media coverage (regionally and internationally) until the deal is completed.
Gen.Hemeti had no choice but to take the carrot; that is, to accept the “deal” and fully comply with the Quartet’s decisions (and return to the founding platform). Since then, the representatives of the major countries and their regional and local allies have become certain that their previous efforts to create the ideal “circumstantial” character were not in vain.
They came out from secret to public, and their group became known in the press as the “International Quartet Mechanism”, consisting of the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. This group continued to control Sudanese affairs completely through its ambassadors in Khartoum, its representatives or its intelligence services. It has been holding continuous meetings with some political activists, whom it calls “political actors”, and the permanent title of its movements has been to mediate a solution to the political crisis in Sudan through dialogue to complete the “political process” and reach a solution that ends the coup situation that has been in place since October 25.
It is self-evident that disengaging from the coup and re-establishing rapprochement with the Forces of Freedom and Change FFC are at the top of the expected demands of all members of the group and do not need explanation, due to what is known about its great investment in the ousted Hamdok government (with its military and political wings), and what is known about its phobia of political Islam and hatred of Iran.
As for the third demand related to severing ties with Russia, it is the main driver that may need further explanation. So why is the Group of Four afraid of a Russian-Sudanese rapprochement led by Hemedti?
None of these four countries saw Russian infiltration into Sudan (particularly on the Red Sea) as a detriment to their interests.
Each of these countries is keen to have unparalleled influence on the Red Sea coast, Sudan’s abundant agricultural land, or its precious minerals, and cannot tolerate the presence of a strong and hostile competitor such as Russia, Turkey, or Iran. Observers realize that the main ambition of the UAE – in particular – is to become an economic center linking East Africa and South Asia through what has become known as the “chain of ports” strategy, i.e. controlling the ports of southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa.
Since it does not have combat military forces, it is constantly searching for local fighters (militias) to train and arm, as it did in southern Yemen or in Libya, and as it has continued to do with the Rapid Support Forces RSF in Sudan.
If Hemeti turns the Rapid Support RSF Militias towards Russia, then everything the UAE has invested in these forces will have gone down the drain. By controlling Gen.Hemeti and his combat forces, Sudan and its African neighborhood can be controlled.
Just as the UAE needs soldiers to expand its African presence, Saudi Arabia needs combat forces to act as a buffer between it and the Houthis in the south of the kingdom.
As for the US government, it cannot stand to see General Hemeti pumping tons of gold into the Russian treasury, as part of its war with Russia and its support for Ukraine.
Of course, there is nothing to curb General Hemeti and control his movements other than frightening him with the sit-in dispersal dossier ; and there is nothing that moves him better than tempting him with power. Through intimidation and temptation, the group of four was able to conclude one of the most dangerous and bloody deals in modern Sudanese history – as will become clear later.
We continue