Facing Jeddah and Geneva: What Needs to Be Done Before Negotiations Begin?

Principles: My stance is clear: I stand with the armed forces in their constitutional duty and with the legitimate state institutions. This is my personal and organizational position, and I remain committed to it without deviation. Secondly, I am for peace and the need to end the war and suffering through negotiations—not just to stop the war but to end it entirely by addressing all its causes, whether security, political, economic, or social, so that the Sudanese people can live in sustainable peace and dignity. The pursuit of peace and negotiation does not conflict with supporting the armed forces, as this is a war imposed on them.

Government Statement: The government’s statement issued late yesterday after the Jeddah consultations left the door open for participation and a positive response to the U.S. State Department’s invitation to Geneva. I hope the decision will be positive. The government’s stance on implementing the Jeddah Declaration is correct, and this should be a key issue for the mediators (American-Saudi-Swiss) before the government/armed forces and the Sudanese people. For example, for me and millions of other Sudanese citizens, official peace means nothing when our homes are occupied, and we are displaced or refugees in neighboring countries. However, the honorable negotiator and the leadership of the government/armed forces must know where and when to address this issue to achieve gains for themselves and their citizens. I believe this issue should be presented at the negotiating table, not as a precondition for starting negotiations. It should be included in the first session for procedural agreements after the opening session, and as a key demand in the opening statement to be delivered by the head of the government/armed forces delegation. This moment, witnessed by the world, will have the greatest impact and validity.

Fate of the Jeddah Declaration: After the opening session, it is essential, before negotiating new issues, to determine the fate of the Jeddah Declaration. The government/armed forces delegation should present a matrix outlining its implementation, scheduling deadlines, and monitoring mechanisms. This is a crucial part that must be accomplished. If agreed upon, the primary goal of the ceasefire will be clear. After that, negotiations will focus on technical military arrangements such as assembly points, joint monitoring mechanisms, sector division, resolving violations, agreeing on areas of presence, the duration of the ceasefire, how to renew it, and internal and external guarantees for its continuation. Afterward, the agreement will focus on humanitarian relief pathways, where the role of negotiating parties will be limited to ensuring unhindered access to relief and protecting workers.

Government or Armed Forces Delegation?: It is noteworthy that I refer to the “government/armed forces delegation.” This point could lead to debate and argument, as the Jeddah Declaration was signed in the name of the armed forces. If we demand adherence to the Jeddah Declaration as it is, it could be argued that the delegation should be called the “Armed Forces Delegation.” However, if we demand that it be called the “Government of Sudan Delegation,” we might implicitly drop the Jeddah Declaration and start negotiations anew. Therefore, this reality must be considered before presenting this issue at the table.

Is the name important? Yes, it is important, but both names require careful consideration. The comprehensive nature of the ceasefire needs to include more than one front where the armed forces are fighting against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rebels. If divided into stages, this will be important, as ultimately, all gunfire in Sudan must cease, and all fronts must cool down. For example, the ceasefire signed in Geneva will not be effective in protecting civilians in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and parts of Darfur, where other rebel forces are currently fighting the armed forces. These areas need similar arrangements in Geneva or elsewhere. Additionally, there is the matter of joint forces fighting alongside the armed forces. From one angle, the ceasefire has the political aim of initiating a political process in Sudan, so it ft equal civil forces to establish a sustainable state and a new security sector with a unified national army, drawing lessons from past experiences where fragmented solutions were unsuccessful.

The UAE: The UAE’s role as observers has become an obstacle to starting negotiations and may hinder the armed forces’ positive response to attending the Geneva negotiations. The U.S. State Department should reassess the situation. Since the Geneva platform is designed to achieve the strategic goal of ending the war in Sudan, ending the suffering of the people, and paving the way for an inclusive political process, it should not be used as a platform to improve the image of certain countries or restore relations with them. Although our previous position differed after the call between the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and the UAE President, the issue has been raised again, presenting an obstacle to achieving the strategic goal. Therefore, the UAE should be allowed to decide without embarrassing the mediators, putting the general interest of achieving the platform’s goal of ending the war and the suffering of the Sudanese people first. If this proves difficult, the relationship with the UAE and normalization with it could be left to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, given his connections with both sides or Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, to mediate parallelly between the Sudanese and Emirati governments, separate from the Geneva negotiations, while currently rallying support for the success of the Geneva ceasefire negotiations.

RSF Rebels: Their current stance aligns entirely with those opposing the Geneva platform, as evidenced by the recent military escalation in the battlefronts of El Fasher and Omdurman. They are trying to strengthen the anti-Geneva faction and weaken its supporters within the armed forces. In the end, Geneva aims to create a unified national army and eliminate all military formations outside the armed forces, as clearly stated by the U.S. envoy. This fundamentally opposes the ambitions of the RSF leadership, who always seek autonomy or to remain as independent security entities for as long as possible. While they have publicly declared their willingness to comply, they are obstructing this compliance, hoping the rejection will come from the armed forces so they can blame it and gain international recognition after the armed forces boycott the platform, or at least avoid embarrassment in dealing with it.