Why is Washington Insistent on Completing the Geneva Negotiations Despite the Reluctance of the Sudanese Army Representatives to Attend?

The situation in Sudan has reached a “critical stage,” according to the regional director of the International Organization for Migration, Osman Belbeisi, 16 months after the outbreak of the civil war in the country.

In this war, between the regular army forces on one side and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the other, about 14,000 people have been killed according to UN estimates, while Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) puts the number at around 40,000 at least.

The war has displaced more than 10.7 million Sudanese—about one-fifth of the country’s population—in the worst refugee crisis worldwide, leaving nearly half of the Sudanese population facing the threat of famine. The United Nations and international human rights organizations have reported that war crimes have been committed in the western region of Darfur. Recently, floods have added to the suffering in 11 out of Sudan’s 18 states.

Meanwhile, negotiations have been taking place behind closed doors in Geneva since last Wednesday, under the sponsorship of the United States and Saudi Arabia, despite the absence of the Sudanese Army representatives. The RSF has sent a delegation, but the Sudanese Army has refused to participate. Yet, the negotiations continue.

From Geneva, U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello has repeatedly called for the Sudanese Army’s participation. Meanwhile, Norwegian Ambassador André Stiansen has offered to mediate between the Sudanese government, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the United States to bridge the gap over the Geneva talks. However, the Sudanese Army remains firm in its stance.

Why is the U.S. so insistent on moving forward with the negotiations? And why is al-Burhan’s camp so adamant about staying away?

Cameron Hudson, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, attributed the absence of the Sudanese Army’s delegation from the Geneva talks to the lack of consequences for not attending. In an interview with Sudanese Radio Dabanga, Hudson questioned why there are no repercussions for such absences and why those responsible are not held accountable before the International Criminal Court or subjected to sanctions.

Hudson wondered whether any pressure had been applied on the countries supporting the warring parties in Sudan to ensure their attendance at the negotiations. He noted that both sides (the Sudanese Army and the RSF) seem untroubled by the absence of negotiations.

The Sudanese Army, led by General al-Burhan, refuses to equate itself with the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. Al-Burhan’s camp insists on being invited as the constitutional representative of the Sudanese government, making their delegation the official representative of Sudan. However, the United States, the main sponsor of these negotiations, rejects this, stating that it wants a delegation representing the Sudanese Army as one of the warring parties.

Hudson considers al-Burhan’s stance to be “reasonable,” saying that the United States still has much to do to persuade him to join the negotiations.

Hudson noted that Washington is trying to use a strategy of creating momentum in various areas of the negotiations, whether by reaching a ceasefire, facilitating aid access, or addressing the political future. The idea is to use this momentum as leverage against al-Burhan, implying that if he doesn’t join the negotiations, he will miss out on decisions affecting his future and interests.

Hudson emphasized that the U.S. strategy warns the Sudanese Army that the negotiations may proceed without them, but in reality, “the army is the engine pulling that train.”

In an interview with the BBC, Sudanese political analyst and international relations expert Osman Mirghani attributed the army’s absence from the Geneva negotiations to political miscalculations by the military leadership. Mirghani explained that “some are betting on reshaping the Sudanese political scene post-war and do not want the war to end until these arrangements are secured… These individuals prioritize political gains over everything else, regardless of the consequences if the war continues, which could result in total state failure and a freefall into fragmentation into warring mini-states.”

Al-Burhan insists on implementing the Jeddah Agreement from a year ago first before entering any new negotiations. He also rejects the participation of the UAE in the negotiations, accusing it of arming the RSF, which the UAE denies.

Mirghani expressed surprise at this position, noting that the UAE participated in the direct talks held in Manama, Bahrain, last February, which lasted for three weeks between the army and the RSF. Those talks nearly resulted in a decisive agreement to end the war before the army’s representatives withdrew at the last moment.

Mirghani attributes the U.S.’s insistence on holding the Geneva negotiations to its “strategic” interest in ending the Sudanese civil war. He told the BBC, “Strategically, if Sudan collapses completely and the state disintegrates, the regional and international communities will pay a heavy price because Sudan occupies a very strong geostrategic position in Africa. It can destabilize all the surrounding regimes, not to mention the importance of Sudan’s Red Sea coast, which stretches for about 800 kilometers.”

He continued, “The Red Sea is one of the world’s most important trade routes. It has been in crisis off the Yemeni coast since the start of the Gaza war about ten months ago. If you add 800 kilometers in Sudan, it will become an international disaster, which explains the determination of the U.S. and the international community to end this war in Sudan.”

If the Sudanese Army ultimately refuses to respond to the call for negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. and the international community may intervene in Sudan for humanitarian purposes initially, which could gradually evolve into political intervention and, possibly, limited military intervention, according to Mirghani.

Analysts warn that the lack of stronger U.S. intervention in Sudan could have serious consequences. Benjamin Mossberg, Deputy Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, suggested that America’s geopolitical rivals are closely watching the situation in Sudan and could exploit the security vacuum to their advantage, with significant regional implications.

Russia and Iran, for example, have expressed interest in Sudan, each offering military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces in exchange for establishing a military base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, according to Liam Carr, a fellow at the American Institute for Public Policy Research. Carr noted that “Iran offered the Sudanese Armed Forces drones, while Russia offered unlimited military support.”

Sudan occupies a strategically significant position as a meeting point between the Arab and African worlds. Conflicts involving proxy wars, especially those backed by complex alliances of medium powers, are notoriously difficult to resolve, according to Comfort Ero, President of the International Crisis Group.

The Sudanese Army receives external support from several countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while the RSF receives backing from the UAE, Ethiopia, and others, each according to its interests. Ero believes that Sudan is embroiled in a significant political conflict, making the civil war likely to continue for months or even years, with the possibility of more wars to come. As long as external backers continue to supply the warring parties with arms, Sudan may remain trapped in a vicious cycle of violence.