The Opposition Against the Salvation Regime: A Culture of Cutting Ties
By Abdullah Ali Ibrahim
I state this candidly: the modernist forces (contrary to those they label as “obscurantist”) are on the rise, but they are heading towards self-destruction if they do not sever their ties with the Rapid Support Forces today rather than tomorrow. As these forces themselves have acknowledged, they are dissolving rather than ruling the state. This is modernity. In their abandonment of the armed forces, even wishing for their defeat, these forces diverge from their stance in the 1960s, when they believed that the military, modern to its core, was the only force capable of ruling Sudan or any other developing country. This theory was also prevalent in the Soviet state at the time and was adopted by the faction led by Ahmed Suleiman during the Communist Party’s dispute with our teacher, Abd al-Khaliq Mahjoub, regarding the stance on the May 1969 coup. The May coup emerged from this theory. The root of this suicidal tendency in these forces lies in their abject failure during the transitional government, a failure rooted in their miserable opposition to the Salvation regime, which I have been warning about in my daily columns for nearly three decades. Here, I publish a piece on the disintegration of camaraderie within their circles as they stood in opposition to a failed and dangerous regime like the Salvation regime.
I fear that the “official” opposition to Bashir’s regime within the National Democratic Alliance may meet the same fate as the people of Berber. In Atbara, a city that stole the spotlight from Berber during the British era, we used to say that the people of Berber, who loved cutting ties, would sit and cut off from the rest of society. If one of them asked to leave, they would become the subject of the next round of “cutting,” despite having participated in it just moments earlier. This cycle continued with each person who left the gathering until only two remained. When one of them finally asked to leave, the last one was left seething with no one to sit with, and in his frustration and loneliness, he would kick dust at the heels of the last person to leave.
I couldn’t believe my ears when I read the analysis by a member of the opposition regarding the Djibouti Declaration (1999) signed by President Bashir and Mr. Sadiq al-Mahdi. This person claimed that Mr. Sadiq was planted in the National Democratic Alliance by the Salvation regime to sow discord within its ranks, and that it was the regime that organized his escape in the “Tahatadoon” operation (1996) from Sudan to Eritrea (around which a debate arose over whether it was an “exodus” or an “escape”). This person also said that the opposition would be better off without Mr. Sadiq, as it would be more unified in vision and purpose without him. The opposition members opened Mr. Sadiq’s file and revisited his contradictions, which one of them had even written a book about, and his reputation for being all talk, “the man of words,” without action. And so, the cutting began again.
I have heard the opposition open these files before, such as when Sharif al-Hindi and his group decided to return to participate in politics in Sudan. I also heard unintelligent criticism about Drs. Machar and Lam Akol when they signed the Khartoum Agreement. It was said that they sold themselves to the National Islamic Front (NIF) and took bribes from Mr. Ali al-Haj, the regime’s peace broker in the south. These accusations were leveled against two distinguished intellectuals who were like stars among the new left in the late 1980s, blessed be their southern spirits. Even the respectable and wise Dr. Haidar Ibrahim heard things that were neither pleasing nor agreeable when he suggested (without forcing anyone) that the opposition return to Sudan to wage their struggle from within the legal frameworks available.
Will the opposition continue to “cut” off from every member who leaves for a reconciliation or other agreement with the government? When will the opposition stop opening files and instead bravely analyze their own “crooked neck” rather than just the faults of the regime or those who leave their ranks? In following the example of the people of Berber, who will be the last opposition member left, who will be forced, in the loneliness of having no companion, to kick dust at the heels of the last person who leaves to reconcile with the government?
Khalid Omar Yousif presents a compelling argument that we must either hold on to the armed forces or risk becoming a militia-ridden state like Iraq. Why is this argument now met with such disdain and rejection?
