The UAE’s Losses from the Sudan War..!

By Diya Al-Din Bilal

If we discussed in the previous article the calculations of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in its losing war for power, what about the calculations of its supporters?

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is considered the biggest supporter of the militia and the official sponsor of its power project. This support undoubtedly comes with specific goals and desired objectives. Yes, the UAE has interests, fears, and desires in Sudan. There are four interpretations to explain the motives of the UAE in this disastrous war:

Economic Interests: These relate to gold, ports, and agricultural resources.

Military Aspirations: The UAE might wish to use this diverse fighting force, with its familial central leadership and vast military base, for future external adventures.

Fear of Islamist Movements: The UAE harbors fears of the expanding influence and impact of Islamic movements in the region.

Acting as a Proxy: The UAE may be acting as an executive agent for the Israeli project in the region, particularly in Sudan.

It is not far-fetched to consider that all four interpretations, regardless of their order, form the basis of the UAE’s dealings with Sudanese affairs. Let us delve deeply into the potential impacts of the war and its repercussions on the UAE’s interests, fears, and desires:

First, assuming the validity of the first interpretation, that the UAE’s primary motive is to achieve economic interests like acquiring agricultural lands in Al-Fashaga and elsewhere, controlling ports, or maintaining existing interests such as obtaining gold.

The war, with its accompanying violations and atrocities, and the resulting bitterness and negative feelings, has created a hostile environment towards the UAE that will prevent it from investing in Sudanese lands or exploiting resources in the near or distant future. Logic dictates that “you cannot plant thorns and then hope to harvest grapes.”

As for the military investment by placing the RSF under the tactical and strategic control of the UAE for the implementation of pre-planned or potential scenarios, this had better chances of success if the RSF had taken power on April 15 through a swift and decisive coup with minimal moral and political costs. However, since the coup failed, and the country plunged into a brutal war, the RSF has transformed into a terrorist militia with a bad reputation both locally and globally.

As a result, the moral, economic, and political costs of the relationship with the militia have increased, making it impossible to benefit from it in the way initially planned before the war. As the production costs for any commodity or political project rise, the returns on profits decrease, possibly to the point of substantial losses.

The war, along with the accompanying violations and atrocities and their documentation by international committees, organizations, and global media, will put the UAE in a significant predicament. The UAE will find itself, after the war ends or even before that, pursued by international criminal prosecutions, compensation demands, and widespread moral condemnations, which will linger in its history as a stain that cannot be removed by humanitarian cosmetics (aid and relief) and will tarnish the bright image immortalized by the founding Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

Regarding fears of Islamists, the militia’s aggressive war against the Sudanese state has brought them back to the forefront with strength, increasing their popularity, which had been waning almost to the point of disappearance after 2019. Thus, the war ended their isolation as they, along with other societal factions, faced the invading project.

Moreover, Islamists, with their governance experience and organizational cadres, will play a significant role in forming a societal and psychological stance, which will remain a central obstacle to achieving UAE interests in Sudan.

Besides the UAE’s losses in its military project represented by the RSF militia, it also lost the role and influence of its civilian ally presented as an alternative to the Islamists. The ally’s deceptive and evasive stance on the war placed it on the list of suspects, politically and perhaps criminally, for involvement in its crimes.

If the UAE is involved in creating this Sudanese tragedy as a proxy for Israel and not on its own accord, the war’s outcome, whether the militia wins or loses, will not achieve Israel’s interests either, nor will it alleviate its fears.

If the militia triumphs over the army, chaos will spread in Sudan, as the militia’s nature, the culture of its fighters, and the lack of wisdom in its leadership will prevent it from managing the state. The events are likely to lead to deep internal disputes, conflicts, and divisions. Additionally, the legacy of the war and the broad social base harmed by the militia’s behavior will fuel fierce resistance movements from various origins.

In conclusion, the expected internal disputes within the militia’s structure and the potential wide-ranging popular resistance will open the door to a scenario of chaos that leaves nothing untouched. In such a chaotic state, interests will vanish, and fears will grow as Sudan’s vast lands with complex geography and multiple border outlets become the preferred refuge for extremist movements.

Thus, it is likely that in a chaotic, authority-absent Sudan, a hybrid version of the Middle Eastern ISIS and African Boko Haram will emerge. Instead of Israel, Western countries, and the UAE facing a pragmatic ruling power willing to negotiate and choose among options, they will find themselves confronted with extremist groups proliferating underground and above it in a security-fluid environment.

With these clear calculations for anyone with insight and wisdom, it becomes evident that the UAE, as much as it is a perpetrator and aggressor against Sudan, is also a victim of corrupt and invalid advice presented to it on a plate of counterfeit gold, lacking deep knowledge of the complex political and military landscape of Sudan. As a result, the expected profits have turned into evident losses.

Perhaps the UAE has begun to realize the enormity of its losses from the Sudan war. Hence, it has recently accelerated its steps to reposition itself, reframe its role in the scene as a mediator seeking peace from the seat of an observer, rather than a sponsor and financier of the most horrific war and the largest humanitarian disaster the world has witnessed in recent years.