The Visit of General Kamal Abdul-Ma’arouf and the “Karbalaization” of the National Islamic Movement
Othman Jalal
(1)
The term “Karbalaization” was employed by Professor Abdullah Ali Ibrahim to describe the shock and paralysis that affected the Sudanese communists after the failure of Major Hashim Al-Atta’s coup on July 19, 1971. This was followed by trials and executions during the “Week of Suffering,” which claimed the lives of Communist Party leaders, including the late Mr. Abdel Khaliq Mahjub. The Communist Party was left in a state of ideological stagnation and organizational rigidity, unable to move past that tragic historical moment.
(2)
The national and social dimensions of General Kamal Abdul-Ma’arouf’s visit have evoked a state of “Karbalaization” among the Islamists, especially following the fall of the NCP regime on April 11, 2019. The NCP’s rule, which began with the coup of June 30, 1989, was a human experience born out of internal and external challenges. During its rule, it achieved exceptional successes and failures. However, when it reached a point of complete blockage, it fell, as the passage of time is a natural law. Yet, the vision remains ongoing, and the idea is ever-renewing. The experience of the NCP’s rule stands as one of the major structural transformations in the formation of the Sudanese state, beginning from the Kushite and Meroitic periods, through the three Christian kingdoms, the Islamic kingdoms in ancient Eastern Sudan, the Turko-Egyptian rule, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, and finally, the experience of the Islamic movement. The NCP regime brought about profound changes in Sudan’s political, economic, social, and cultural structures.
(3)
The strategic change brought about by the NCP regime was that it settled the question of governance in Sudan in favor of right-wing ideological and political currents. Sudanese society has become fertile ground for interacting with the various right-wing schools of thought, and the challenge lies in the richness and appeal of these schools’ ideas and programs to the youth and new forces. This is where the genius of the Islamists in intellectual and leadership renewal comes into play, enabling them to return to lead the Sudanese political stage. The Islamic movement has consistently shown this capacity for renewal through its major transformations since its founding in 1946, from the Islamic Liberation Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Constitution Front, the Islamic Charter, the National Islamic Front, and the National Congress Party, along with all the entities that emerged from its womb. The ultimate goal of these intellectual and political leaps has been to dissolve into society as the Sufi dissolves into worship, with the final vision being the leadership of Sudanese society in creating political, economic, and cultural renaissance. However, the results remain relative, and the challenges of reaching the ideal are ongoing, though they are yet to be fully realized.
(4)
The National Islamic Movement must liberate itself from the mindset of conspiracy and treachery. The fall of the NCP did not happen abruptly on April 11, but was the result of accumulated errors, starting with the deviation from the Islamic movement’s plan for change, transforming the coup from a temporary emergency situation to absolute power. The second strategic mistake was the internal splits and the tendency to bring down the experiment instead of reforming it gradually. The third strategic mistake was the alliance with leftist and secular forces, which used the Islamists as a vehicle to overthrow the regime and then moved to exclude all Islamist currents from political life. The fourth strategic mistake was President Bashir’s tactical handling of all reform and change initiatives, whether within the party, the state, or the national political environment. The responsibility entrusted to party organs or state institutions turned into a state of scrambling and lust for power, as described by Dr. Mansour Khalid when he depicted the chronic failure of Sudanese political elites.
(5)
The separation of the solid leadership and membership elements of the Islamists from the NCP project resulted in two outcomes: the dominance of the security mentality or “our younger brothers,” as Dr. Turabi called them, and a disconnect from the aspirations of society, especially the rising youth generations, leading to the prevalence of a “spoils mentality” (the culture of the rat devouring the rat). This vacuum and emptiness gave rise to the phenomenon of Hemedti, which evolved into “Hemedti the Protector,” while President Bashir began to approach and normalize relations with the Western axis, led by the United States and its allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The strategic goal of this alliance was to topple the Islamist experiment in Sudan. When they failed to achieve this by coercing President Bashir into submission in exchange for eternal power, they resorted to Plan B: fabricating the melodrama of the December 2018 revolution with all its stages and deviations, and using it to serve their project, which aimed at eliminating the Islamists, dismantling the army, and dragging Sudan into the global subservience club, stripping its ports, and plundering its natural, mineral, and agricultural resources. The members of the security committee, along with a significant number of Islamists and honorable revolutionaries, fell into the trap of the fabricated December Revolution, unaware of the sinister plot, thinking they were doing good. However, their national and moral awareness of the plot saved them, while the Qahat/Taqadum coalition sank further into betrayal, treachery, and mercenary activities.
(6)
The evaluation of the Islamic movement, which has been widely disseminated in the media, attributes the political developments since December 2018 until April 11, 2019, to poor political judgment without criminalizing or accusing the members of the security committee of treason. It was possible to persuade President Bashir to read a speech announcing his resignation from power and transferring his powers to the security committee or his first deputy, General Awad Ibn Auf. The leadership of the security committee could have stood firm in their positions and managed the negotiation process with the revolutionaries and political forces until an agreement was reached on the management of the transitional period’s tasks and parameters, instead of retreating and allowing the revolution and the state to be usurped by the external axis of evil. The consequences of this usurpation are evident in the existential war being waged by the people and the army against the axis of evil and its internal functional tools, the terrorist Daqlo clan militia, and the Taqadum alliance.
(7)
In conclusion, Islamists must break free from the “Karbalaization” mindset and the mentality of treachery. General Kamal Abdul-Ma’arouf and his family have sacrificed blood and martyrs in the service of the nation and its people. All the leaders and grassroots of the National Islamic Movement are relatively responsible for the fall of the NCP regime. Our present duty is to rally with the people and the army until the cancer of the Daqlo terrorist militia is eradicated and the formation of a vanguard party is renewed in its thought, leadership, political behavior, and inspiration to society.
