Unveiling the Mysterious Deal: The Rapid Support Forces Sold the Illusion of Jebel Amer to Hamdok’s Government

“The Investigator” news site has obtained new information revealing many details that were previously unknown to the public regarding the deal made between Dr. Abdalla Hamdok’s government, represented by the Ministry of Finance, and Al-Junaid Company, owned by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Upon investigation, it became clear that the deal was surrounded by ambiguity and manipulation. The RSF, after exploiting the resources of Jebel Amer, sought to take over a significant share of “Sudamin,” the governmental arm of the Ministry of Minerals, and also become a partner in gold and copper mining activities in the Hofrat an Nahas area.

It should be noted that “The Investigator” reached out several times to Mubarak Ardol, the former Director-General of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company, for information about the deal, but he ignored all requests. Here are the details of the investigation.

The Investigator – Hiba Abdelazim

“When they acquired money, weapons, and power after 2019, they and others were capable of devouring all of Sudan’s resources,” said Dr. Youssef Mohammed Ahmed, a geologist and former Director of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company during Hamdok’s government, as he described the RSF leaders’ attempts to control Sudan’s resources.
Youssef revealed that all the easily accessible gold from Jebel Amer had been extracted between 2012 and 2019. He told “The Investigator”: “The remaining gold might be buried deep underground, and extracting it may not be economically viable. The area is no longer profitable for Al-Junaid Company, which is why they entered into a corrupt deal with the Ministry of Finance.” He added, “I don’t know the role of the Ministry of Energy and Mining or the Geological Research Authority at the time, but I believe they played a role in the deal.”
In October 2020, Dr. Hiba Mohammed Ali, the former Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, announced that the government had received control of Jebel Amer from Al-Junaid Company, after the company had relinquished Block N15 of Jebel Amer to the government of Sudan in March of the same year. The minister described the agreement as an important step towards enhancing state revenues, regional growth, and local development, calling it an achievement for the transitional government.
At the time, some media platforms aligned with Hamdok’s government celebrated the move, describing it as a political victory in which the state lost “not a single penny” since, according to them, the Sudanese public had been concerned about the RSF’s control over gold-rich mines in Darfur.
However, Dr. Youssef was unable to conceal his anger regarding what he described as corruption within the Ministry of Finance, including Minister Hiba, in their manipulation of the deal. He clarified that Al-Junaid’s relinquishment of Jebel Amer was not voluntary, as it had been portrayed, but instead came with a demand for compensation, which is not mentioned in Sudanese mineral wealth laws. Youssef explained, “If a company signs a mining agreement with the government in a specific area and then decides to withdraw, it is expected to submit a letter explaining the reasons. For example, if mining in the area becomes economically unfeasible, the company can withdraw, and the area reverts to the government without the government paying a single dollar.”
He added, “But due to corruption from within the Ministry of Finance, including Minister Hiba, they reached an agreement with Al-Junaid to cede the block in exchange for around $50 million.”
More than three sources closely associated with the deal, whom “The Investigator” spoke with, confirmed that the government did not have the foreign currency needed to pay Al-Junaid for the N15 block, which was initially owned by the North Darfur State government before being ceded to the RSF in a partnership that yielded no benefits for the state. These sources confirmed that the amount was not $50 million, as was widely rumored at the time, but rather $250 million. The Ministry of Finance forced the Social Security Fund to purchase U.S. dollars from the black market to cover the payment, contributing to the rise of the dollar’s exchange rate against the Sudanese pound. Additionally, 70% of Sudamin’s government shares were transferred to Al-Junaid, and the government partnered with Al-Junaid in the lucrative Hofrat an Nahas mining block in the Sangho region (located in the far western part of South Darfur, near the border with South Sudan and the Central African Republic).
At the time, the Sudanese government had financial claims amounting to $450 million against the RSF for unpaid mining lease fees from Jebel Amer, accumulated over the entire period the RSF operated in the area. Furthermore, the RSF obtained two letters that exempted Al-Junaid Company from paying export revenues and royalties to the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company and the Ministry of Finance under the government of Omar al-Bashir, according to several sources familiar with the matter. These sources also confirmed that Al-Junaid had been working hard to acquire shares in Sudamin, which represented the government in partnerships with foreign concession companies contracted to explore for gold in Sudan.
“The Investigator” has confirmed through its sources that security agencies, in cooperation with some professional and advocacy committees, were able to obstruct the transfer of 70% of Sudamin’s shares to Al-Junaid, which was registered in the commercial registry as being owned by Hemeti’s half-brother, Abdel Rahim Dagalo, the RSF’s second-in-command. Additionally, Al-Junaid never paid any export earnings to the government, and none of the gold profits from Jebel Amer reached the state treasury during the period Al-Junaid controlled the area.
The Secret Deal:
It became evident that the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Finance, represented by Minister Hiba Mohammed Ali, deliberately ignored consulting or notifying the Economic Committee of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Energy and Mining Committee of the University of Khartoum Professors Initiative about the deal. According to Adil Khalafallah, a member of the FFC Economic Committee, the committee had no knowledge of the agreement between the Ministry of Finance and Al-Junaid, nor was the matter ever discussed in any meetings between the FFC Economic Committee, the Ministry of Finance, or Prime Minister Hamdok. Khalafallah added that the process was conducted in complete secrecy, with no records or documents available in the Ministry of Finance related to the matter.
All that was publicly announced was that the Ministry of Finance had paid Al-Junaid $50 million in exchange for the company’s relinquishment of Jebel Amer, one of the richest mineral sites in Sudan. It is worth noting that this occurred after Dr. Hiba had taken over as Minister of Finance from Dr. Badawi, both of whom followed similar policies, including the controversial contract with Al-Fakher Company to import fuel, a deal fiercely defended by both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance. They had also entered into an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP), which was a point of contention between the FFC Economic Committee and the government’s economic policies.
Khalafallah concluded by saying, “It later became clear that both Al-Fakher Company and Al-Junaid were affiliated with the RSF.”
FFC Economic Committee member Kamal Karar confirmed to “The Investigator” that the announcement of Al-Junaid’s relinquishment of Jebel Amer’s N15 block was made without details in March 2020, as reported by the official news agency at the time. However, the full details emerged in October of the same year. Karar described the entire deal as corrupt and pointed out that Sudanese mineral wealth law does not contain any provision regarding compensation for relinquishing a mining block.
On September 3, 2020, Al-Junaid Company requested Minister Hiba Mohammed Ali to allocate shares in Sudamin to Al-Junaid as part of the compensation deal, according to documents obtained by “The Investigator.” Subsequently, on September 8, 2020, Hiba wrote to Mubarak Ardol, then-Director General of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company, directing him to pay $50 million to Al-Junaid from the company’s royalties, as part of the agreed compensation for relinquishing Block N15.
The formation of the evaluation committee for Sudamin was authorized by decision No. (69), issued by Acting Minister of Finance Dr. Hiba Mohammed Ali on September 27, 2020. The committee consisted of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Energy and Mining, the Director-General of the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company, the acting Director of Sudamin, a representative from the Ministry of Finance, and two employees from the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company. In a single meeting, the committee agreed to approve Al-Junaid Company’s partnership with a 34% stake in Sudamin as part of the settlement agreed upon between the Sudanese government and Al-Junaid for the relinquishment of Block N15 (Jebel Amer). However, our sources confirm that the devil was in the details, and that only this percentage of the partnership was disclosed while the rest was kept hidden.
The Shock of the Numbers
The numbers reported by semi-official sources, indicating that Sudan’s gold production exceeds 250 tons per year, shocked many, especially in light of official reports stating that the total gold production in 2018 did not exceed 93 tons. This significant gap—around 157 tons, valued at approximately $6.647 billion at the time—represents the gold smuggled out of official channels. In 2017, the then Minister of Minerals, Ahmed Mohammed Sadiq Al-Karouri, admitted that none of the gold produced from Jebel Amer had reached the state treasury.
Despite the absence of official data on the size of production and reserves of gold in Jebel Amer, testimonies from those who visited the area suggest there are over 300 gold mines. More importantly, the UN “Sanctions Committee” reported that between 2010 and 2014, gold worth $5.4 billion was smuggled and exported. It is noteworthy that 37.7% of Sudan’s exports in 2018 were from gold, which, according to government figures, amounted to 93.4 tons, generating $1.156 billion in foreign currency for the country. In the first half of 2019, about 280,150 kilograms were produced, generating $6.695 million, according to statistics from the Central Bank of Sudan.
A report by Global Witness revealed that at various times between 2012 and 2019, the Central Bank of Sudan purchased gold linked to armed groups involved in the conflict over control of mines in Darfur. This included the purchase of gold from companies connected to the RSF, and it is likely that Kaloti, a UAE-based company, received at least 20 tons of gold linked to armed groups in Darfur, an area plagued by long-standing conflict and alleged genocide, according to Global Witness.
Jebel Amer: The Origin of the Story
The name Jebel Amer comes from a member of the Mahamid tribe who used to graze his camels while moving around. During the summer, he would settle in the valley of the mountain, which local legends described as unusual due to the glow it emitted at sunrise and sunset.
In April 2012, a small group of itinerant miners discovered gold in the hills of Jebel Amer. One of the mines was so rich that it earned its owners millions of dollars, leading to it being nicknamed “Switzerland,” according to a report by the International Crisis Group. Miners flocked to Jebel Amer from all over Sudan, as well as from Central Africa, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, after a visit by the then Minister of Mining, Kamal Abdel Latif, and the Governor of North Darfur at the time, Osman Mohammed Yusuf Kibir.
The discovery of gold in Jebel Amer coincided with the scramble to find a replacement for oil after South Sudan’s secession in 2011. There are over 60,000 miners extracting gold in Jebel Amer. The General Authority for Geological Research had mapped out an area of 1,800 square kilometers of the total block area, collected geological samples, and studied sediments. The mountain is located 100 km north of the city of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, and 70 km from the nearest inhabited town.
The Journey to the Mountain of Gold
Obtaining information from inside the mountain was not easy, and it was preceded by stories akin to legends about the dangers of reaching it. Rumors suggested that one could be killed or, at best, kidnapped before reaching the gold mountain. Local residents who worked in the gold mines during the time Al-Junaid controlled some of them described the area as a plateau and highlands interspersed with a staggering number of over 7,000 mining pits. Security was tight in the areas under Al-Junaid’s control, with around 3,300 RSF soldiers guarding the mountain, supported by heavily armed vehicles, tanks, and Apache helicopters.
To a visitor, the area initially appears to be a massive market in a narrow, winding passage. On both sides of the passage, makeshift shops sell scrap and clothes, while in the middle, traders and goldsmiths buy gold extracted by traditional miners. A trader told us that they used to buy more than 35 kilograms of gold daily. He added that despite the high values involved, transactions were conducted in cash, with traders sometimes buying between 3 and 7 kilograms of gold from a single individual, amounting to over 3.5 billion Sudanese pounds for three kilograms in 2018. This reflects the high liquidity circulating in Jebel Amer.
A Condition of Non-Approach
Gold mining in Jebel Amer is traditional and produces two types of gold: sedimentary and primary. According to a high-ranking source in the Sudanese Mineral Resources Limited Company (the regulatory arm of the Ministry of Minerals), the RSF, which controlled the mountain, allowed traditional miners to operate in areas outside their pits on the condition that they did not approach Al-Junaid’s mining areas. The government at the time had announced that Al-Junaid was conducting exploration activities, though they had not dug deeper than 2,000 meters before stopping and turning to buying mining waste from traditional miners.
The source confirmed that there were no official government outlets, such as the Central Bank of Sudan or the Ministry of Minerals, represented by its regulatory arm (the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company), in the Jebel Amer area.
More than 7,000 Mining Pits
The mine management committee estimates the number of pits at around 7,000, both productive and reserved. Local reports estimate that Jebel Amer produces about 35 kilograms of gold daily. The same reports also note a significant decline in the amount of gold extracted from the mountain, which used to be as high as 50 kilograms per day in 2018.
Jebel Amer Gold: A Government-Supported Haven
Jebel Amer is located in the “hakura” (tribal land) of the Beni Hussein tribe, which shares the area with several other tribes, including the Tama, the sons of Mana, and some Zaghawa and Fur people. The northern Darfur region of the Rizeigat tribe is also within the Beni Hussein hakura. This situation placed Jebel Amer under the influence of the Beni Hussein tribe. However, the central government’s desire to control the mountain, backed by the power of the gun, led to its eventual takeover by the “Abbala” (camel herders) and border guards, first under Sheikh Musa Hilal and later under the RSF led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti).
Many experts on Darfur agree that the Bashir government, represented by the then Vice President, provided real support and protection for the RSF by directing the previous government to collect weapons under the supervision of Vice President Hasabo Mohammed Abdul Rahman in Darfur. This resulted in the capture of Musa Hilal, leader of the Abbala Mahamid, the second-largest tribe controlling gold in the region, leaving Jebel Amer entirely under the control of the RSF. However, the two tribes eventually allied to prevent outsiders from entering the region.
These steps led to the Beni Hussein tribe receiving a share of the revenues from Jebel Amer’s gold production. But by 2012, the entire mountain had fallen under the RSF’s full control.
The Gold of Jebel Amer: A Government-Supported Stronghold
Jebel Amer is situated in the traditional territory (“hakura”) of the Beni Hussein tribe, which also hosts several other tribes, such as the Tama, the sons of Mana, and a few from the Zaghawa and Fur tribes. Additionally, the northern Darfur region of the Rizeigat tribe is located within the Beni Hussein hakura. This reality placed Jebel Amer under the control of the Beni Hussein tribe. However, the government’s desire to control the gold mines, backed by military power, eventually shifted control to the “Abbala” (camel herders) and border guards, initially under the leadership of Sheikh Musa Hilal, and later to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti).
Many Darfur experts agree that the Bashir government, through then-Vice President Hasabo Mohammed Abdul Rahman, provided significant support and protection to the RSF. This was achieved by directing the government to collect weapons, and Hasabo supervised the disarmament process in Darfur. This led to the arrest of Musa Hilal, leader of the Mahamid Abbala, the second largest tribe controlling the gold in the region. As a result, Jebel Amer was handed over to the RSF. However, both tribes eventually formed an alliance to prevent outsiders from accessing the area.
These steps allowed the Beni Hussein tribe to retain a portion of the revenues generated from Jebel Amer’s gold production, but by 2012, the RSF had completely taken over the mountain.
In summary, the complex ownership and control over Jebel Amer’s gold mines have shifted due to political and military power plays, heavily influenced by government backing and armed forces, particularly the RSF. The area has seen various agreements and deals, often marred by corruption, secrecy, and manipulation, leaving much of the gold wealth out of the government’s official reach.