Sudan’s civilians urgently need protection: the options for international peacekeeping

Jenna Russo, City University of New York

In September 2024, the United Nations’ independent fact-finding mission to Sudan issued its first report. Citing grave human rights violations amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the report called for the immediate deployment of an independent and impartial force to protect civilians.
Nearly 18 months after the outbreak of fighting, the humanitarian situation in Sudan has become dire, with nearly 25 million people in need of assistance. Is the deployment of a peacekeeping presence to protect civilians feasible or even advisable? Jenna Russo, whose research focuses on the protection of civilians in armed conflict settings and the UN’s contribution to peace processes, shares her insights.
Would it be a good idea to deploy peacekeepers in Sudan again?
The United Nations’ (UN) and African Union’s (AU) efforts to broker peace in Sudan since the outbreak of war in April 2023 have focused on achieving a ceasefire. So far they have been unsuccessful.
Calls to address civilians’ immediate security concerns are increasing. While communities have done much to facilitate self-protection, they continue to be targeted and more needs to be done.

For many years, Sudan had a peacekeeping presence. From 2007 to 2020, the UN and AU jointly led a hybrid peacekeeping presence in Darfur. This was followed by a UN-led political mission. However, since the latter’s sudden exit in February 2024, there has been no regional or international presence in Sudan responsible for protecting civilians.
It’s important to state that (almost) no one is suggesting the deployment of a full-scale, multidimensional peacekeeping operation. Rather, some – including the UN’s independent fact-finding mission – are calling for a more limited deployment of security forces to protect civilians. Sudanese authorities, however, have rejected this recommendation.
Providing widespread protection across Sudan is likely unfeasible given the size of the country and the intensity of the fighting. But it may be possible to provide more targeted protection.
This could include the creation of “green zones” to protect areas where displaced persons are sheltering and facilitate humanitarian aid, which is critical given the risk of famine. A regional or international security presence could also monitor rights violations and support local self-protection efforts.
What would a successful deployment require?
While the gravity of the situation in Sudan is clear, there are barriers to deploying a protection or broader peacekeeping mission.
First, it’s not clear who would lead the mission. Less than a year ago, Sudanese authorities kicked out the UN-led political mission, citing its ineffectiveness in supporting the political transition and protecting civilians. Most stakeholders are pessimistic that the warring parties will agree to another UN-led mission, which is a pre-condition for UN peace operations.
Some have questioned whether the consent of the Sudanese authorities is required, given their role in leading the 2021 coup. However, the UN has learned hard lessons from deployments where consent is lacking (including, recently, Mali). Thus, the UN security council is unlikely to approve a mission that would be resisted by the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces and could lead to additional attacks on civilians and peacekeepers.
This raises the question of whether the AU could deploy a protection mission. The AU is also involved in trying to support the political process. While it’s not clear that either party would consent to an AU-led presence, it’s more viable than a UN-led mission.
Because of this, some have suggested that Sudan could be a test case for resolution 2719, which was unanimously adopted by the UN security council in December 2023. It allows AU-led peace support operations to receive UN funding on a case-by-case basis.
The resolution is primarily understood as providing support for peace enforcement (as opposed to peacekeeping), but some council members are reportedly open to using it for other types of intervention in Sudan.
Second, even if the security council could agree on a mission to Sudan – a tall order given current council divisions – this raises a broader question. Can a mission succeed if it lacks a political role?
The UN has been clear that peacekeeping missions should be deployed to support a political process and be guided by a political strategy. A protection mission without a political mandate would be a clear deviation from this principle.
Previous lessons also give pause to deploying a purely protection mission. For example, the UN mission in Chad was deployed to protect civilians from violence flowing from neighbouring Sudan. However, because it didn’t have a political mandate, it lacked leverage with the authorities and was kicked out by the government after less than three years.
What are the options?
The UN security council and the AU peace and security council have both asked their respective secretariats to prepare recommendations on the protection of civilians in Sudan.
However, policymakers may find themselves with few good options. While there are no easy answers, the following are some points to bear in mind.
First, the UN and AU should consider options for sending a physical protection force to Sudan to keep areas safe for displaced people and facilitate the delivery of aid. However, policymakers will have to consider how such a presence can be connected with political efforts. This is needed to provide protection actors with leverage to maintain access and put pressure on perpetrators.
Second, those involved in the political process need to integrate protection into their mediation efforts. The lead-up to negotiation processes can be a crucial time for mediators to focus on the protection of civilians. This is because warring parties may ratchet up their use of violence to improve their bargaining positions. Mediators can also include specific language within agreements – relating to sexual and gender-based violence, for example – which can later be used to hold the parties accountable for their behaviour.
Third, at the international level, member states must put diplomatic pressure on the warring parties and on third-party states that are supporting them. In particular, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been implicated in providing weapons to the Rapid Support Forces, though it denies such allegations. Other countries within the region and beyond also have a stake in the outcome of Sudan’s civil war, given the oil and other resources coming from the country. The amount of money tied up in the conflict is a major barrier to peace. However, unless external powers use diplomatic pressure to stop efforts to arm both sides of the war, it is unlikely to stop.
Finally, greater assistance should be given to community-led efforts for self-protection. A communications blackout has severely impeded civilians’ abilities to protect themselves, and must end. Cash programmes are also critical to help individuals buy food and other life-saving supplies.
Despite the difficulties of reaching some communities amid the ongoing fighting, all efforts should be made to continue integrating their perspectives into planning for protection