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Hamidti: Old Fears of a Retired Camel Trader

By Ahmed el-Darini – Al-Masry Newspaper
A camel herder always remains in fear of its retaliation if it’s wronged. According to the tales of camel herders, a camel exacts its revenge within 40 days of being insulted or betrayed by its owner. If it doesn’t take revenge, it dies from grief and distress.
Camel herders have this constant feeling that dealing with camels is different from any other animal. It requires careful handling and readiness for an imminent revenge, which is said to be deeply thought out by the camel. The experience of breeding and tending camels blends with mystical tales that are hard to trace, which claim that the camel is influenced by the devil or has jinn within it. This adds to the fear of what is known as “the camel’s grudge” or “the camel’s revenge.”
At the same time, it’s said that those who ride camels acquire the same patience and calm nature from the camel’s pace and endurance. Arabs often said that the nature of a mount reflects on its rider over time.
These thoughts swirled in my mind as I watched Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hamidti” give a speech lasting around 35 minutes, where he accused Egyptian aircraft of bombing his forces in “Jabal Moya.”
Hamidti, at his core, is a camel trader who, along with some of his comrades, evolved into a protector of caravans from thieves, and then into a well-fed militia leader controlling trade routes between Sudan and Chad, and sometimes from Sudan to Egypt. Eventually, he integrated into the system under Bashir’s regime as the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was one of the many armed groups used by Omar al-Bashir to balance power and manage internal rivalries for his own benefit. Hamidti and his forces have been implicated in multiple atrocities and massacres since around 2010, marking the first verified public appearance of the young militia leader and his troops.
Hamidti holds the rank of “General,” despite lacking basic education. He unwittingly brings to mind the character of “the General” from Gabriel García Márquez’s first novel No One Writes to the Colonel, who proudly boasted in his many absurd letters about his revolutionary rank, which he earned amidst the turmoil that swept his country, rather than through a bureaucratic career path in the army.
But the issue isn’t as simple as this tempting portrayal of a comical character. Behind this militia leader are renegade minds working on political, legal, military, and media strategies, possibly more efficiently than the Sudanese government itself.
In August, the RSF participated in what were called the “Geneva negotiations,” while the Sudanese army refused to join. Hamidti successfully presented himself as a player willing to engage with the international community, adopting the global language that references “frameworks,” “international legitimacy,” “the international community,” “agreements and treaties,” and “international law.”
Meanwhile, General al-Burhan refused to participate in these negotiations, famously stating, “We will fight for 100 years,” a statement that may have resonated positively with the Sudanese public supporting the national army or those opposing the RSF. However, on the international stage, this phrase paints al-Burhan as bloodthirsty, while Hamidti appears as a politician, negotiator, and legal expert.
As accusations of war crimes and atrocities by the RSF in villages under their control grow louder, Hamidti sends messages to international mediators in Geneva, stating that he has issued strict orders to his soldiers to respect the rights of civilians, adhering to international humanitarian law and treaties related to human rights in both peace and conflict, based on the provisions of the “RSF Law of 2017, amended in 2019.” It’s as if he were speaking of the Swiss army’s code of ethics.
In a similar vein, Hamidti quietly collaborates with the European Union on curbing illegal migration, leveraging his control over key migrant routes in parts of Africa. Occasionally, he even threatens the EU if it doesn’t publicly acknowledge their “cooperation.”
Hamidti sends his forces to Yemen to fight as part of the interests of regional powers, while managing his alliances in the region and waging an information war on social media that surpasses his opponents in issuing statements and framing events.
Observers of Sudanese affairs notice over time that, despite the atrocities committed by the RSF, the militia has increasingly adopted the semblance of a state in its official discourse, far more than that of a rogue gang. Meanwhile, Sudan as a nation seems in dire need of improving its performance on all fronts.
In Hamidti’s latest speech, where he accused the Egyptian air force of bombing his followers in “Jabal Moya,” he stripped himself of all the minds behind him that buy fine suits for the camel trader and desert gang leader. He abandoned all the formal language his faction uses, which speaks in terms of international law and glittering political terms. Instead, he reverted to his original nature, with no makeup.
Hamidti spoke in his native language, a blend of simple religious sermons, unverified stories, accusations, and hasty gossip, with evident confusion for all to see. He did not hide behind carefully crafted words, which he often struggled to pronounce and read in classical Arabic. Instead of presenting himself as the statesman his backers wanted him to be, Hamidti spoke as the leader of a militia dominated by his family, which controls the financial, negotiation, and arms dealings, all managed by his brother, Gony Hamdan Dagalo, with other family members scattered across the organization’s structure.
Hamidti spoke like a camel trader, offering primitive reflections that he believes are distilled wisdom, mixed with religious beliefs similar to the rural tales told under the moonlit nights. They are driven by simple instincts and fantasies about himself and his perceived high moral standards in contrast to his adversaries’ tyranny.
According to observers, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo seemed anxious and unsettled in this speech, forced to confront greater and more decisive powers like Egypt, while admitting to his initial defeat. And, as it appears to me in a narrative connection between beginnings and endings, the camel trader within him awakens his old fear of the camel’s revenge, as he deeply knows that the camel is patient and never forgets its rights.

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