The Economics of War (1/2)

As I see

Adil ELBAZ

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Since the cursed war ignited by the devilish Janjaweed began, we have been talking about everything happening within and around it, but we rarely discuss its economics, despite it being fundamentally an economic war in its causes and ultimate goals. It is a war in which the victor will claim the treasure—Sudan’s unlimited resources. Did they not start the war to plunder them?! For now, I will set aside the discussion of its causes and economic aims for later and focus in this article on the current war’s economics.

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When the Janjaweed ignited this war, they did not expect to spend a single penny; they planned to siphon off billions of dollars through the systematic looting they would have access to once they controlled the state. Years prior, the Janjaweed had established hundreds of companies across various sectors in preparation for the awaited day—the great coup through which they would seize all the country’s resources. But God’s will prevailed, turning the coup into a fierce war. Instead of reaping what they had planned, they found themselves spending what they had looted over the past fourteen years, including gold and state funds, on a losing war. In their previous experiences, the state had always financed their various wars, alongside their continuous theft of its resources, but this war required different measures.

The militia faced two challenges: the first was utilizing the resources they had previously looted from the state in a war with no end in sight, especially with other investments in their companies and gold mines coming to a halt. The militia is now left with only the “Singo” gold mine north of Darfur, which was partially destroyed last month. The other mines and gold companies owned or co-owned by the militia have been confiscated in favor of the state.

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The second challenge is finding an external sponsor whose interests align with the Janjaweed’s in taking control of the country’s resources. Such a sponsor has always existed, engineering war scenarios and being willing to finance it, but not indefinitely. This dilemma has now surfaced for the militia leaders as their own resources begin to dwindle, prompting the last Janjaweed leader, in his recent speech, to declare that he lacks sufficient “supplies.” Meanwhile, the sponsor faces growing international pressure for supporting a militia committing acts of genocide, while the militia’s position on the ground weakens as they suffer daily defeats, making it unappealing to continue funding a war led by a losing militia. Furthermore, there appears to be no political agreement in sight to return the militia to its previous status before the war broke out.

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The militia and its sponsor now need to spend on weapons and ammunition of all kinds. They also need to finance the supplies for their forces spread across more than nine states through long supply lines. If it weren’t for the looting their forces are committing against citizens’ money and food, they would have surrendered early on. The militia and its sponsor need to replace the hundreds of weaponized vehicles that are being destroyed daily by the Sudanese army, special forces, air raids, and the advancing convoys coming from all directions. They must also cover the costs of the easy gains the joint forces are making daily in many areas of Darfur.

The militia and its sponsor must also pay the salaries of their rebellious forces and the mercenaries brought in from eight African countries. They must also cover the fuel costs for their vehicles and combat units moving long distances, from the Libyan desert to the Green Island, which is now preparing to celebrate liberation. Additionally, they must finance media propaganda and the ever-expanding network of bribes to regional and international organizations, political activists, and advisors—all the cheap noise surrounding the militias and living off their scraps.

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The militia is left with limited funding sources, including imposing fees and taxes on residents and products produced and exported from areas under their control in western Sudan. The militia foolishly took a step it quickly retracted: stopping the export of vital goods to Egypt, from which it had been profiting, in an attempt to harm the Egyptian economy. They, of course, in their ignorance, know nothing about the Egyptian economy and believe it would suffer a catastrophe due to halting the import of a few goods from Darfur!

According to World Bank estimates and reports from last year, Egypt’s economy reached about $387 billion, placing it among the world’s top 34 economies and the second largest in Africa after Nigeria. It is a diverse economy, with the services sector representing a significant portion, and it is open to the global market. Therefore, the militia is the first to lose from this decision, as it will lose the levies and taxes it imposes on traders. The second loser is Sudan’s economy, especially if Egypt fully turns to importing meat from Somalia and Djibouti, which now compete with Sudan in the live meat market. Of the 2.5 million tons Egypt consumes annually, it produces about 30% domestically and imports around 30% of its live meat needs from Djibouti and Somalia, with the remainder from various markets, the most important of which is Sudan.

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So, we see that the militia’s resources are dwindling, either exhausted or nearly so. How, then, will it continue its war without substantial resources to meet the war’s requirements? This is their biggest dilemma, leading them to rely entirely on the sponsor as they approach bankruptcy. The problem now is the sponsor’s realization that the war is lost, with no way to end it now, while he faces escalating media and international pressure. Even if he wishes to continue funding a losing war, for how long? Given the impossibility of the militia’s victory and the lack of prospects for a political solution amid international pressure, the only option is to accept losing the war to halt the enormous, futile expenses. True, accepting the loss is akin to swallowing poison for the militia and its sponsor, but there is no choice but to do so.

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In this war, the militia has lost politically, tarnishing its reputation with its crimes, while the sponsor has lost his reputation by funding a criminal militia. At the same time, the militia is suffering military losses, with defeats mounting. If all this could be tolerated for a while, hoping for changing circumstances and shifting power balances, what is intolerable is losing hundreds of millions of dollars daily in a futile war with no potential positive outcome. Therefore, it is expected that the economy will end this war before weapons and combat do so in the fields. As they said long ago: “It’s the economy, stupid.”