Existential Threat

Since my understanding of the war—which is built on mountains of reports, evidence, and credible observations—is that it is a conflict being fought by the Sudanese army against a militia comprised mostly of foreign mercenaries driven by foreign agendas and international intelligence aims, with the goal of dismantling state institutions, existentially threatening its citizens, and aiming for ethnic replacement with limitless foreign funding.

Since my perception of the war is grounded in these realities and facts, fearing the army’s political role in the future, or even in the present, is a secondary or minor concern, insignificant when considering my decision to support the army or not.

Currently, in the face of this existential threat that confronts us as Sudanese, it is unreasonable for us, as a nation threatened with extinction, to let our primary fear be that our only potential savior might—or certainly does—have future political ambitions. This kind of thinking might lead us to hesitate to align with the army because of it. This is folly that leads to ruin.

Even if the army’s future dominance could potentially reproduce the same suffering later, a person drowning does not have the luxury of hesitating to seek help from a rescuer due to the possibility that the rescuer might repeat a mistake for which he is now paying dearly. Reality does not allow for this way of thinking when one is facing annihilation, displacement, and occupation.

The aspirations and hopes of Sudanese people today are for the army to liberate their regions so they can return to their homes. Thus, the majority have pragmatically chosen to side with the army.

This is despite the fact that most of the Decemberist elite who, before the war, held the keys to shaping political public opinion and controlled social media, stood against the army—either by directly siding with the militia or by refusing to fight it and demanding negotiations instead. Under the guise of peace and in the name of false neutrality, this elite launched an intense media campaign aimed at promoting the notion of equality between the army and the militia to both local and international public opinion.

But today, the people have bypassed them, deciding to choose and stand with their army, aligning with it and placing their hope in it. This is entirely natural, as in areas controlled by their army, unlike in areas under militia control, there is a minimum level of security, stability, and essential services.

This indicates that the majority of the elite are still trapped in a time zone that reality and history have surpassed—I mean the Decemberist era and its slogans. How can the military return to their barracks in the midst of war and foreign occupation of their country?

Currently, the priority for Sudanese people is to eliminate the existential threat posed by the Janjaweed, who threatens them at an existential level, not the pursuit of a civil democratic state. The army, even without a civil democratic state, has provided, in its areas of control, the basic means of survival. Sudanese people, like people drowning in the Janjaweed violence, with its powerful killing machinery aimed at their necks, have no priority now except to cling to their army, despite its flaws and regardless of future consequences. These consequences—under even the worst predictions—are certainly preferable to negotiating with their killers, rapists, and those occupying their homes over shares of power, wealth, and weaponry.