With Jeddah Peace Talks’ Prospective Resumption, Sudan’s Civilian Protection Must Top Its Agenda

As the Sudanese conflict approaches two years of destruction and immense human suffering, there is a notable surge in international efforts to revive the Jeddah negotiation platform before the end of the year. These efforts gained visibility after a key meeting that addressed the crisis in Sudan on November 11, 2024, between the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, held on the sidelines of the Arab and Islamic Summit in Riyadh.

The Jeddah platform, jointly initiated by Saudi Arabia and the United States at the onset of the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), began its operations on May 6, 2023. This marked the first formal and public negotiation between the two warring parties in Sudan. Also, it is the only platform that succeeded in bringing the two warring parties into public, announced talks. In its inaugural round, the platform successfully brokered an agreement on civilian protection in Sudan, “Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan” signed on May 11, 2023. This agreement obligated both parties to adhere to specific measures stipulated in the International Humanitarian Law aimed at safeguarding civilians from the horrors of the war. However, the RSF continued to evade the implementation of this agreement, particularly regarding the evacuation of the occupied and looted civilian facilities and residences. Hence these looting and occupation were leveraged for RSF recruitment campaigns, perpetuating a cycle of violence with institutionalized impunity.

These breaches spurred the Sudanese army to insist on the full implementation of Jeddah declaration before further discussions, while the RSF continuously sought alternative platforms to escape its commitments. Despite these tensions, over seven short-term ceasefire agreements were signed under the Jeddah platform, all of which collapsed due to mutual violations. Markedly, the RSF exploited these truces to expand its territorial control, particularly over the capital Khartoum.

In June 2023, Saudi Arabia and the United States suspended negotiations citing “serious violations” of the de-escalation efforts. Following a five-month hiatus, talks were briefly resumed in October 2023 but failed again, leading to their final suspension in November 2023.

Assessing Strengths and Challenges of the Jeddah Platform

Despite the criticisms directed at the rushed planning and structure of the Jeddah negotiation platform, it achieved a unique landmark by successfully bringing Sudan’s warring factions to the table for formal, public dialogue. None of the other efforts managed to do so. The initiative gained widespread international and regional support, including endorsements from the African Union, neighboring countries, the United Nations, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD was even added as a partner in overseeing the platform in the final round of negotiations.

However, attempts to undermine the Jeddah platform persisted, driven largely by the RSF’s efforts to evade its prior commitments during it. These efforts were politically backed by political factions sympathetic to the RSF, particularly “Tagadum” coalition led by former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok. Figureheads of this coalition controversially justified the militia’s unwillingness to execute the agreement’s by arguing it was only a non-binding “declaration of principles,” as though this could serve as a valid rationale for the serious violations the militia persisted in committing.

Furthermore, in a notable escalation of these undermining efforts, Hamdok accused Saudi Arabia of exacerbating the Sudanese conflict during an interview on Deutsche Welle’s Conflict Zone program in early November 2024. This accusation against Saudi Arabia sought to deflect attention from the overwhelming evidence and United Nations reports implicating other regional actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates, where Hamdok currently lives and manages one of its investment centers, in arming the RSF. This accusation was noteworthy not only because it targeted one of the most influential international actors in Sudanese affairs and the host of the most recognized venues for Sudanese peace talks but also due to the platform and medium through which it was broadcast, aiming at amplifying the global reach and impact of such claim.

Attempts to Replace the Jeddah Platform

These efforts and attempts to undermine and replace the Jeddah platform opened the door to “forum shopping,” whereby parties sought alternative platforms offering leniency for their advancing narrow agendas. This behavior prolonged the conflict and further complicated the path to political resolution that ends the war.

One of the most notable attempts occurred in Manama in February 2024, where unofficial and unannounced talks were held between the two warring parties along with several RSF-aligned civilian politicians. The Sudanese government was represented by Sovereignty Council member and Deputy Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces, Shams al-Din Kabashi, while the militia was represented by Abdulrahim Dagalo, the brother of the militia leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti.” The meeting did not result in an official agreement. However, the discussed drafted agreement, titled “Political Proposal to End the War and Establish the Sudanese State,” was leaked. It amounted to nothing more than arrangements to reintegrate the RSF into the Sudanese political scene and new power-sharing measures between the army and the RSF, without addressing the root causes of the Sudanese people’s suffering, let alone measures for criminal or even political accountability. Predictably, the proposal failed despite all the efforts of the “Tagadum” coalition factions to rally around it.

The second major attempt to sidestep Jeddah Platform was the call for Switzerland’s talks initiated by the U.S. in early August 2024. These talks ten-days talks began on August 14 without the participation of the Sudanese government, which boycotted the process because of the U.S. envoy’s insistence on excluding the Sudanese government and summarizing the participation exclusively to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Additionally, the U.S. envoy disregarded the Sudanese government’s objections to the involvement of certain regional actors in sponsoring these talks as neutral actors, since these actors were explicitly and unconditionally supporting and arming the RSF militia, compromising Sudan’s national sovereignty. These negotiations effectively became a monologue with the RSF delegation and concluded with the formation of an alliance called the “Allied for Saving Lives and Achieving Peace in Sudan (ALPS).” that failed to translate its title into any practical outcomes on the ground. The RSF’s atrocities continued after these talks, with the militia launching an unprecedented barbaric campaign of violence in Gezira State that remains ongoing. Despite these developments, the U.S. envoy did not shy of praising the RSF for its adherence to the Code of Conduct during the Geneva discussions. It is worth noting that during the ten days of meetings in Switzerland, the RSF’s attacks on civilians resulted in 650 fatalities.

U.S. Political Shifts

The recent push for the reconvening of Sudanese peace negotiations in Jeddah coincides with the results of the U.S. elections, where the Democrats failed to retain the White House and the Republicans, led by Donald Trump, reclaimed the Oval Office. The Republican Party further solidified its control over both the US Senate and House of Representatives. The overwhelming control of the Republican Party over the U.S. government will likely bring in substantial alterations to U.S. foreign policy.

This anticipated political shift has pushed U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello to attempt achieving a diplomatic breakthrough before the Biden administration departs in January and his tenure ends in February. His urgency is particularly evident after the disastrous failure of the Switzerland’s talks and the lack of any meaningful impact from the ALPS alliance formed during those talks. This determination is reflected not only in the U.S.’s willingness to resume the Jeddah platform negotiations but also in Perriello’s recent hurried visit to Port Sudan on November 18, 2024. This visit came more than nine months after his appointment in February, following multiple delays and cancellations attributed to bureaucratic reasons that failed to convince observers.

In this context, Perriello’s frantic efforts to secure even a partial diplomatic success before the end of the Democratic administration become clearer. Even if these efforts result only in small steps, such as bringing both warring parties back to the negotiating table, they will at least allow the U.S. to save face regarding a crisis it has inadequately handled for over two years. Nevertheless, these small steps are not adequate to address the substantial challenges and risks faced by Sudanese civilians on the ground. Without addressing the ongoing violence, any progress made will fall short of having a meaningful impact on the lives of those most affected by the conflict.

Renewed Momentum Toward Jeddah: What Can Be Achieved?

One of the most prominent criticisms leveled against the Jeddah platform and its structure in previous rounds was its pursuit of an all-encompassing solution in a single stride. More explicitly, mediators focused on urging negotiators to achieve a complete cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive ceasefire as their focus. This approach has repeatedly proven defective due to the parties’ non-adherence to agreements, as well as numerous violations that have contributed to the expansion of the conflict and heightened military and political polarization. Additionally, this approach has empowered both warring parties to consolidate their positions in Sudanese politics, leading to inflating their demands and political aspirations rather than a reduction of such. Consequently, their aspiration of achieving all these objectives, even through a comprehensive military victory, have escalated, thereby complicating negotiations aimed at ending the war or even achieving a temporary cessation of hostilities and a ceasefire.

The failure to effectively implement ceasefire agreements can be attributed to several reasons, including the lack of trust between the two warring parties and the complex military dynamics on the ground, where territorial control intertwines with the ethnic and regional intricacies of the conflict. Additionally, there was an absence of enforcement mechanisms and a lack of effective monitoring tools to identify violations. This situation was exacerbated by the international community’s unwillingness or inability to impose effective sanctions on those violating the ceasefires, which created an environment of institutional impunity for the offenders. Furthermore, misinformation and false narratives justifying the war and downplaying violations undermined the Sudanese people’s confidence in peace efforts and fueled hate speech. Civilian entities also played a role by supporting the agendas of both warring factions, promoting their narratives, and diverting attention away from the violations and humanitarian suffering, instead making these issues a subject of political polarization. Foreign interventions and the provision of arms further prolonged the conflict.  Compounding these issues was the absence of genuine political will from both parties to end hostilities sustainably. The lack of comprehensive analysis and understanding of Sudan’s internal conditions, geography, military norms, and sufficient knowledge of the strategies and behaviors of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces—along with their military strategies, leadership structures, and decision-making processes—resulted in unrealistic expectations and impractical monitoring mechanisms. These shortcomings failed to address the deep-rooted dynamics of the conflict and, consequently, hindered the development of effective ceasefire proposals.

These factors collectively create complex challenges that will be difficult to resolve during the initial round of renewed negotiations in Jeddah. However, it may be beneficial to set precise goals for this round and focus on practical, achievable outcomes. Directing the negotiations toward an agreement on a specific framework for protecting civilians in Sudan represents a realistic and actionable objective that would provide immediate benefits to the Sudanese people. Such an agreement could involve the establishment of designated safe zones where civilians can live and carry out their daily lives without fear. Prioritizing civilian protection and genuinely addressing the needs of the Sudanese population should guide all parties toward identifying achievable objectives for the upcoming round of Jeddah negotiations. Implementable frameworks for civilian protection should take precedence in these priorities. Moreover, the concept of civilian protection must be expanded beyond mere physical safety to include ensuring access to essential services such as healthcare, water, education, and communication, as these are fundamental to the lives of civilians during conflict.

This proposal is particularly critical at this time, following the failure of the UN Security Council to pass a resolution on civilian protection during its session on November 18, 2024. The resolution, proposed by the UK, was blocked by a Russian veto, which stemmed from objections that can only be described as purely ideological and clearly driven by international calculations unrelated to the situation in Sudan.

In light of the escalating humanitarian crisis, it is essential for the sponsors of the Jeddah platform to address the limitations and challenges that impeded the effectiveness of the previous rounds. This can be achieved by adopting a more practical approach aimed at safeguarding lives and preserving human dignity in Sudan. Sudanese political organizations and alliances ought to refrain from the politicization of humanitarian issues that directly affect the lives and safety of civilians in Sudan. Political polarization risks undermining the resolution of these critical issues on the ground, where practical, impartial and non-partisan solutions are most urgently needed to protect and benefit the Sudanese people during their time of greatest need.