The Russian Veto on the UN Security Council Resolution on Sudan: A Missed Opportunity?

The discourse surrounding the Russian veto polarized opinions into pro- and anti-Russia camps, overshadowing the resolution’s substance.

The Russian veto of the British-Sierra Leonean draft resolution aimed at civilian protection during Monday’s UN Security Council session became a focal point in Sudanese political discourse. As expected, factions like the Coordinating Body of Civilian Progressive Forces (“Taqaddum”) and their Islamist adversaries aligned along predictable lines, mirroring their broader ideological battle behind the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This struggle, rooted in historical campus politics, has evolved to exclude direct engagement in the field in favor of a political proxy war. Both “Taqaddum” and the Islamists have distanced themselves from the combatants, framing SAF as “militias of the old regime” and RSF as “militias of the transitional government.” Thus, their conflict thrives in isolation, uncontaminated by third-party involvement.

This analysis seeks to move beyond the rhetoric of the factions to evaluate the draft resolution on its merits, even though it ultimately fell to the Russian veto.

Islamists, labeled as “remnants of the old regime” by “Taqaddum,” viewed the Russian veto as a sign of a genuine partnership with Moscow, granting Sudan autonomy to shape its political future free from regional and global pressures. Journalist Zein Al-Abdin Saleh argued that the veto highlighted Sudan’s sovereignty in governance and represented a strategic pivot away from neo-colonial forces bent on fragmenting the nation. Russia, they claimed, earned respect for resisting global powers’ dominance and interference.

Others linked the resolution to Britain’s colonial history, citing its divisive role in the Middle East via the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its purported plan to partition Sudan into mini-states—an agenda allegedly endorsed by “Taqaddum.” Islamist leader Amin Hassan Omar criticized the resolution as a British attempt to rehabilitate the RSF militarily and politically, positioning “Taqaddum” as the civilian proxy for this strategy. Similarly, Saleh argued that the resolution’s civilian protection provisions disguised an ulterior motive to empower RSF and its political allies.

For Islamists, the veto represented a victory, denying “Taqaddum” the anticipated arrival of international forces to impose governance without popular mandate. As Darfur Governor Minni Minawi stated, the world already knows the culprits behind civilian atrocities, rendering debates over civilian protection a diversion.

Within “Taqaddum,” opinions on the Russian veto diverged. Some focused on discrediting Russia, while others lamented the Sudanese government’s losses due to the veto. A “Taqaddum” statement commended the efforts of Britain, Sierra Leone, and other supporters of the draft resolution for addressing Sudan’s humanitarian crisis. The veto, they argued, perpetuated massacres and hindered efforts to tackle “the world’s most severe humanitarian tragedy.” Journalist Salah Jalal described the Russian veto as “international thuggery,” reflective of Russia’s isolation post-Ukraine invasion. He accused Moscow of exploiting Sudan’s war by trading gold and arms with both sides. Jalal called for an alliance bypassing the Security Council to aid Sudanese civilians, labeling Russia a corrupt autocracy offering no global inspiration.

Lawyer Hatim Elias referenced the “Uniting for Peace” resolution (1950), which allows the UN General Assembly to act when the Security Council is deadlocked, asserting that Russia’s veto could be circumvented. Journalist Sabah argued that Russia used the veto not for Sudan’s benefit but to embarrass President Biden. She speculated that its influence would fade within weeks as U.S. leadership transitions.

Conversely, some within “Taqaddum” argued the veto shielded the RSF from direct accountability for war crimes, sexual violence, and ethnic cleansing, marking a missed opportunity for Sudan to build an international case labeling the RSF a terrorist organization.

Diplomat Abdel Mahmoud Abdel Haleem offered insight into the resolution’s origins. The draft reflected a mix of international frustration over Sudan’s conflict and a pragmatic approach to its realities. UN Secretary-General António Guterres acknowledged in October that conditions were unsuitable for deploying peacekeeping forces in Sudan. The resolution thus emphasized subtler measures, such as engaging with Sudanese authorities via the African Union and IGAD.

Through Russian and Chinese mediation, the draft was revised to affirm Sudan’s sovereignty and avoid directly implicating the SAF. For instance, the term “Sudanese authorities” was replaced with “Transitional Sovereignty Council,” and a clause criticizing aerial bombardments—clearly targeting the SAF—was removed.

Regardless of Russia’s intentions, the resolution’s rejection likely had limited immediate impact on Sudan’s war or civilian suffering. However, it offered diplomatic recognition of Sudan’s sovereignty and presented an opportunity to label the RSF as a terrorist organization. Even “Taqaddum” conceded that the resolution, if passed, would have strengthened Sudan’s legal position. Thus, its failure marks a missed chance for both justice and state legitimacy amidst an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe.